

Toward a Nuclear Weapons Convention

A Role for Canada

Report on
the Expert Seminar
held April 11 and 12, 2011
in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

CD	Conference on Disarmament
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
FMCT	Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty
HEU	Highly enriched uranium
NNWS	Non-nuclear-weapon state
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review (U.S.)
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWS	Nuclear-weapon state
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
WMD	Weapons of mass destruction

Letter to the Prime Minister of Canada

August 15, 2011

The Right Honourable Stephen Harper, P.C.
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0C6

Dear Sir:

RE: Recommendations to the Government of Canada

We are pleased to advise you of the expert seminar held on April 11-12, 2011 in Ottawa entitled “**Toward A Nuclear Weapons Convention: A Role for Canada.**” This event was organized to consider options for a Canadian response to the UN Secretary-General’s five point proposal for nuclear disarmament. The seminar opened April 11 with a speech by His Excellency Sergio Duarte, the UN High Representative for Disarmament, and responses by representatives of five Embassies. The next day we continued to examine legal, political, and technical issues that require consideration prior to the start of negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Amb. Richard Butler, Chairperson of the Middle Powers Initiative, provided a luncheon address.

From these discussions came the **list of recommendations** for action by the Government of Canada, which are set out below and included in the enclosed report. The recommendations and the report are the responsibility of the seminar’s sponsoring groups: Canadian Pugwash, Physicians for Global Survival, Project Ploughshares, and World Federalist Movement – Canada.

The recommendations have been endorsed by The United Church of Canada, Science for Peace, The Simons Foundation, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) Canada, World Conference on Religion for Peace Canada, Les Artistes pour la Paix, Lawyers for Social Responsibility, Peace & Global Educators of British Columbia, The Boundary Peace Initiative, Canadian Branch of the Registry of World Citizens, Canadian Department of Peace Initiative, Canadian Voice of Women for Peace, Conscience Canada, Pacific Peace Working Group, Religions pour la Paix – Québec, and the Toronto Hiroshima Day Coalition.

In 2010 the Senate and the House of Commons unanimously passed a motion that encourages “the Government of Canada to engage in negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention as proposed by the United Nations Secretary-General” and “to deploy a major world-wide Canadian diplomatic initiative in support of preventing nuclear proliferation and increasing the rate of nuclear disarmament.” The participants at our seminar expressed strong support for the historic motion. **The seminar sponsors now urge the Government of Canada to take specific steps to implement this historic motion. Our recommendations suggest ways for Canada to move ahead. We would, in particular, ask you to consider hosting a meeting of likeminded countries to examine steps that might be taken procedurally and substantively toward the elaboration of a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments, or a Convention backed by a strong system of verification that would be required to facilitate the achievement of a secure world without nuclear weapons.**

Canada’s reputation would be significantly enhanced, we believe, by your assuming a leadership role in making our world more secure by working toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

We would be grateful to receive your early response.

Best regards,

Bev Delong
Chairperson
Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Recommendations of the Sponsoring Groups

The expert seminar “Toward a Nuclear Weapons Convention: A Role for Canada” held in Ottawa, April 11 and 12, 2011, included participants from the academic community and civil society, as well as diplomats, parliamentarians, and government officials. The discussions addressed a broad range of legal, political, security, and verification requirements for progress toward a global legal ban on nuclear weapons.

Participants welcomed the unanimous motions in the Canadian Senate and the House of Commons encouraging “the Government of Canada to engage in negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention” and “to deploy a major worldwide Canadian diplomatic initiative in support of preventing nuclear proliferation and increasing the rate of nuclear disarmament.”

Participants also took note of the Vancouver Declaration, a statement by legal experts, which holds that both the use and threatened use of nuclear weapons is contrary to international humanitarian law. The Declaration states: “It cannot be lawful to continue indefinitely to possess weapons which are unlawful to use or threaten to use, are already banned for most states, and are subject to an obligation of elimination.”

The seminar discussions included broad encouragement for Canada to assume an international leadership role in exploring and promoting legal, political, security, and compliance measures conducive to the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons.

Taking into account the deliberations at the seminar, the sponsoring groups (Canadian Pugwash, Physicians for Global Survival, Project Ploughshares, and World Federalist Movement – Canada—all members of the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons) put forward the following recommendations to further advance that objective:

1. Canada should support UN resolutions calling for formal negotiations toward a nuclear weapons convention to begin in 2014 and should offer to host in 2012 a preparatory committee meeting of states and civil society representatives to begin planning for that negotiation process.
2. The Minister of Foreign Affairs should welcome the unanimous motions in the Senate and House of Commons calling for a new Canadian diplomatic initiative in support of nuclear disarmament and request that a special joint committee of the Senate and House of Commons hold hearings and prepare a report on how best to implement those unanimous motions.
3. The Government of Canada should re-establish a special disarmament verification unit within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Significant human and financial capital should be directed toward building Canadian expertise with regard to nuclear disarmament, drawing on lessons learned from verification regimes related to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear testing, and chemical weapons. An urgent priority is the development of verification procedures and technology in support of the still-to-be-negotiated fissile materials treaty. The overall focus of the new unit should be to develop and implement credible verification mechanisms, procedures, and technology to ensure compliance with a nuclear weapons convention.
4. Canada should continue its efforts within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to promote transparency and accountability and to address the NPT’s “institutional deficit.”

Such measures include proposals for annual decision-making meetings of the NPT, for the establishment of an on-going administrative support unit, and for more consistent and comprehensive reporting by States Parties regarding national efforts toward full compliance with the NPT.

5. In support of the NPT Review Conference's call on states "to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies," Canada should initiate discussions within NATO with a view to ending the Alliance's reliance on nuclear deterrence. Such discussions should include the call for an immediate no-first-use pledge by NATO, as well as increased attention to transforming the security relationship between Russia and NATO. Canada should also insist on the removal of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear-weapon states in Europe, and encourage discussions to begin leading to a global legal ban on nuclear weapons.
6. Canada should restore the practice of an inclusive approach to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to take advantage of the expertise within the NGOs by, for example, restoration of the annual government-civil society consultation and by naming representatives of civil society organizations to the Canadian delegation to the First Session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in 2012. In this regard, we are pleased to note Canada's endorsement of the "Berlin Statement by Foreign Ministers on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation" of April 30, 2011, which includes this promise: "We will actively promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, based on our conviction that education is a powerful tool for mobilizing further disarmament and non-proliferation efforts globally by enhancing awareness and understanding among our citizens."

Recommandations des groupes commanditaires

La Conférence d'experts d'Ottawa sur une convention d'interdiction des armes nucléaires réunissait des participants du monde académique et de la société civile, de même que des diplomates, des parlementaires et des hauts fonctionnaires. Les discussions ont porté sur un large éventail de préalables juridiques, politiques, de sécurité et de vérification, susceptibles de permettre de progresser vers une interdiction mondiale des armes nucléaires.

Les participants ont accueilli favorablement les motions unanimes présentées au Sénat et à la Chambre des communes du Canada qui « incitent le gouvernement du Canada à entamer des négociations sur le désarmement nucléaire » et « à mettre en œuvre une importante initiative diplomatique canadienne à l'échelle mondiale en appui à la prévention de la prolifération nucléaire et à l'accroissement du taux de désarmement nucléaire. »

Les participants ont aussi pris note de la Déclaration de Vancouver, émanant d'experts juridiques, qui affirme que l'utilisation ou la menace d'utilisation d'armes nucléaires constituent une violation du droit humanitaire international. La Déclaration établit qu'« il ne peut être légal de continuer indéfiniment à posséder des armes dont l'utilisation ou la menace d'utilisation est illégale, qui sont déjà interdites par la plupart des États et sont sujettes à une obligation d'élimination. »

Les débats de la conférence ont aussi fortement encouragé le Canada à assumer un rôle de leader international dans l'exploration et la promotion de mesures juridiques, politiques, de sécurité et d'observance susceptibles de permettre la réalisation d'un monde libre d'armes nucléaires.

Pour refléter les débats qui ont pris place à la conférence, les groupes commanditaires (le Canadian Pugwash Group, les Médecins pour la survie mondiale, le Projet Ploughshares, et le Mouvement fédéraliste mondial – Canada, tous membres du Réseau canadien pour l'abolition des armes nucléaires), ont formulé les recommandations suivantes, pour faire progresser cet objectif :

1. Le Canada devrait soutenir les résolutions de l'ONU appelant à des négociations formelles en vue d'une convention d'abolition des armes nucléaires, dont le lancement est planifié pour 2014. Le Canada devrait offrir d'accueillir en 2012 la réunion d'un comité préparatoire d'États et de représentants de la société civile pour entreprendre la planification de ce processus de négociation.
2. Le ministre des Affaires étrangères devrait accueillir les motions unanimes présentées au Sénat et à la Chambre des communes appelant à une nouvelle initiative canadienne en faveur du désarmement nucléaire, et réclamer qu'un comité spécial conjoint du Sénat et de la Chambre tienne des audiences et prépare un rapport sur les meilleures façons de mettre en œuvre ces motions unanimes.
3. Le gouvernement du Canada devrait rétablir une unité spéciale de vérification du désarmement au sein du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international. On devrait consacrer des ressources humaines et financières significatives à la construction d'une expertise canadienne en matière de désarmement nucléaire, en s'inspirant des leçons tirées des régimes de vérification relatifs à la non-prolifération nucléaire, aux essais nucléaires et aux armes chimiques. Une haute priorité doit être accordée à l'élaboration de procédures et de technologies de vérification destinées à mettre en vigueur le traité sur l'interdiction de la production de matière fissile, encore à négocier. L'objectif général de la nouvelle unité devrait être d'élaborer et de mettre en œuvre des mécanismes, des procédures et des technologies crédibles pour assurer le respect d'un traité d'interdiction des armes nucléaires.

4. Le Canada devrait poursuivre ses efforts au sein du Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP) pour promouvoir la transparence et l'imputabilité et pour apporter des réponses au « déficit institutionnel » du TNP. Parmi ces mesures, on peut mentionner des propositions pour des réunions décisionnelles annuelles du TNP, pour l'établissement d'une unité permanente de soutien administratif et pour une reddition de comptes plus systématique et complète de la part des États signataires relativement à leurs efforts nationaux en vue d'une observance complète des termes du TNP.
5. Pour soutenir la Conférence d'examen du TNP dans son appel aux États « à réduire encore davantage le rôle et l'importance des armes nucléaires dans tous les concepts, doctrines et politiques militaires et de sécurité », le Canada devrait entreprendre des discussions au sein de l'OTAN avec l'objectif de mettre fin à l'investissement de l'alliance dans la dissuasion nucléaire. Ces discussions devraient comporter un appel à un engagement au « non-recours en premier » de la part de l'OTAN, de même qu'à une attention accrue à la transformation des relations de sécurité entre la Russie et l'OTAN. Le Canada devrait aussi insister sur le retrait des armes nucléaires tactiques de l'OTAN du territoire des pays sans armement nucléaire en Europe, et encourager le démarrage de discussions menant à une interdiction juridique mondiale des armes nucléaires.
6. Le Canada devrait rétablir la pratique d'une approche inclusive à l'égard des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG), pour mieux profiter de leur expertise, par exemple en remettant en vigueur les consultations annuelles gouvernement-société civile, et en nommant des représentants des ONG au sein de la délégation canadienne à la première session du Comité préparatoire du TNP en 2012. À cet égard, nous sommes heureux de souligner que le Canada a endossé la « Déclaration de Berlin des ministres des Affaires étrangères sur le désarmement et la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires », du 30 avril 2011, qui comporte cette promesse : « Nous ferons la promotion active de l'éducation en matière de désarmement et de non-prolifération, nous fondant sur notre conviction que l'éducation est un outil puissant pour mobiliser des efforts plus poussés de désarmement et de non-prolifération à l'échelle mondiale, par le biais d'une prise de conscience et d'une meilleure compréhension parmi nos citoyens. »

Context of the Seminar

Hon. Douglas J. Roche, O.C.

This seminar came at a propitious moment. UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon had issued a five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament and called for negotiations to begin toward a legal ban on all nuclear weapons. U.S. President Barack Obama had expressed unequivocal support for a nuclear weapons-free world and convened, for the first time, a summit meeting of the UN Security Council on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

The 2010 NPT Final Document noted: “The conference...affirms that all states need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.”

Moreover, the Canadian Parliament, through the unprecedented, unanimous passage of a motion in the Senate and House of Commons, had called on the Canadian government to “engage in negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.”

Clearly, we had entered a new era of high-level political momentum toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The primary task of this seminar was to build on Canada’s record of work on nuclear disarmament issues and develop a shared understanding of the main elements and requirements for a global legal ban on all nuclear weapons. Canada’s capacity in scientific and diplomatic work in the principal issues has long been established. We seek now the active involvement of the Government of Canada in working with other states to build a global ban on all nuclear weapons.

Amb. Sergio Duarte, the UN High Representative for Disarmament, delivered a statement during the opening session on progress with the UNSG five-point proposal. Representatives of the Embassies to Canada from Austria, Mexico, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom provided responses to Amb. Duarte’s address.

It is the hope of the seminar organizers to impress upon the political leadership of Canada the critical importance of Canada’s active involvement in securing a world free from nuclear weapons. There needs to be a national debate on this subject, which is the paramount global security issue of the 21st century.

Opening Address

Amb. Sergio Duarte, UN High Representative for Disarmament

Amb. Duarte opened his address by noting that, to this day, no nuclear weapons have been physically destroyed pursuant to a treaty commitment— bilateral or multilateral. States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) agreed to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” But 41 years later, there are still over 20,000 nuclear weapons in existence worldwide. The contagious doctrine of nuclear deterrence has now spread to eight or nine states and actually many more, when one considers the number of states involved in military alliances relying on the “nuclear umbrella” provided by doctrines of extended deterrence. Many of these weapons remain on high-alert status, even a generation after the end of the Cold War. Claims are still being made that both the threat and use of nuclear weapons are legal under international law. And well-funded, long-term plans are in place for the “modernization” of nuclear arsenals or their delivery systems, extending decades into the future, while no such plans exist for disarmament.

Amb. Duarte then reviewed the history of the UNSG five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament. This proposal has been endorsed by the Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, as well as by a World Conference of Speakers of Parliament. It has earned the support of Mayors for Peace, which now has over 4,600 members, representing a combined population of over a billion people. The UN has a new display containing a Mayors for Peace petition with over a million signatures in support of a nuclear weapons convention. The five-point proposal was welcomed by the Nobel Peace Laureates in their Hiroshima Declaration of November 14, 2010. It has also been highlighted in several statements made in the General Assembly, at the High-Level Meeting of September 2010 on “Revitalising the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations,” and at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which included two references to this proposal in the Conference’s Final Document. And the proposal has been strongly supported by many civil society groups around the world.

The Security Council held its first summit meeting to address non-proliferation and disarmament issues on September 24, 2009. The summit concluded by adopting Resolution 1887, which not only called upon all NPT States Parties to fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, but called upon non-parties to “join in this endeavour.”

With respect to transparency, the five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) met in London on September 3-4, 2009 to participate in the “P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards Nuclear Disarmament” and they have plans to meet again this summer in Paris to discuss transparency and verification issues in future arms reductions.

The world community has criteria for the elimination of nuclear arms. It must be verified, undertaken in a transparent manner, irreversible, binding, and universal in scope.

Duarte expressed his pleasure in speaking before a Canadian audience because Canada’s credentials as a world leader in support of disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives are unquestioned. It has considerable experience in the science, technology, and practice of international verification. It has a large community of governmental and legal experts who appreciate the value of treaty law in strengthening international peace and security. Canada has a robust network of civil society organizations and individuals that are absolutely committed to this goal, in cooperation with groups in other countries and with individuals and offices within the government that share these objectives. And as a member of NATO, Canada can add its voice to those of others in the alliance to articulate the case for a security doctrine that does not require the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons—but which does require systematic progress on achieving nuclear disarmament worldwide.

Responses

Ambassador Werner Brandstetter, Embassy of Austria, advised that Austria attributes great importance to disarmament. Austria is in favour of establishing a liaison office of the disarmament office of the United Nations in Vienna. Furthermore, the creation of a Global Centre of Competence of civil society in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation will be very useful. At the moment the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation is being established in cooperation with a number of international institutions, such as the Monterey Institute.

Austria considers the recent NPT Review Conference and the adoption of an Action Plan on Nuclear Disarmament a great success. Austria will participate in all organizations and processes that will constructively contribute to achieving this goal. It recommends that the following major steps be pursued:

- 1) The Action Plan for Nuclear Disarmament and its implementation;
- 2) a process toward entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT);
- 3) a process leading toward negotiations for the prevention of the production of weapon-capable nuclear material (FMCT), including verification mechanisms;
- 4) strengthening and institutionalizing the NPT and improvement of the review process; and
- 5) progress in terms of nuclear-weapons-free zones.

Ambassador Brandstetter concluded his address by stating that Austria fully supports the UNSG five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament.

Counsellor Julian Juarez, Embassy of Mexico, stated that Mexico supports the start of negotiations of a universal, transparent, verifiable, and irreversible instrument that eliminates and prohibits nuclear weapons. Mexico welcomes the proposal presented by Costa Rica and Malaysia as part of the effort toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, since it includes the implementation of different actions for the eradication of nuclear weapons, such as: effectively implementing all NPT pillars, reducing the potential of black markets for nuclear weapons, promoting export controls, and establishing new nuclear-weapons-free zones in the world, particularly in regions that face persistent conflict.

For more than 40 years, most non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) have fulfilled their NPT obligations and have refrained from pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. However, after more than four decades, not only have nuclear-weapon states not destroyed their arms, but they have increased their stockpiles and upgraded their weapons.

For this reason, Mexico supports the UNSG five-point proposal. Mexico favours the entry into force of the CTBT, as well as a follow-up, at a Ministerial Level, to the Security Council Summit on disarmament. Moreover, Mexico supports the implementation of the NPT outcomes and the adoption of complementary measures on disarmament.

Mr. Nicolas Brühl, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Switzerland, advised that the Government of Switzerland supports the UNSG five-point proposal, which it considers to be of particular importance and a key initiative that has the capacity to contribute markedly to the nuclear disarmament process. To move forward, we need to think about the potential form, content, and structure of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The possible form and core elements that such an

instrument could take need to be fleshed out. We need to better understand what a Convention or a framework of instruments would entail in terms of basic undertakings, verification, and implementation.

But efforts are also necessary in other domains. Mr. Brühl insisted that nuclear weapons are not the appropriate means to meet current security challenges, which include terrorism, organized crime, migration, the misuse of information technology, financial market instability and climate change. Those pursuing nuclear disarmament must also insist that nuclear weapons themselves constitute an existential threat to the world. Their very existence makes them attractive to proliferators, whether states or non-state actors, and as a consequence increases instability.

A debate is also necessary on the legitimacy of the use of nuclear weapons, regardless of the defence-related considerations that can be invoked. We must examine the question regarding the point at which the rights of states must yield to the interests of humanity. Switzerland, as depositary of the Geneva Conventions, feels a special responsibility to bring the humanitarian perspective back to the heart of the debate on nuclear disarmament. To this end, Switzerland has initiated a study on the subject of delegitimizing nuclear weapons, and it successfully worked for the inclusion of a reference to international humanitarian law in the final document of the last NPT Review Conference.

Work is also needed to demonstrate how security would be ensured in a world devoid of nuclear weapons. The fact is that some countries are concerned that a world without nuclear weapons would be less stable and more dangerous than one in which some states maintain such a capacity. This applies not only to countries possessing nuclear weapons, but also to states taking part in formal or informal alliances with nuclear-weapon states. Therefore, a debate on security without nuclear weapons is necessary to demonstrate how international security and stability would be ensured. Switzerland will seek to promote this debate in the months to come.

Mr. Clive Wright, Head of Foreign Policy Team, British High Commission, confirmed that the UK Government remains committed to the long-term objective of a world without nuclear weapons. The UK believes they have a strong record on fulfilling their disarmament commitments and meeting international and legal obligations under the NPT. The UK is committed to maintaining only a minimum nuclear deterrent. The country has signed and ratified the CTBT and has ceased production of fissile material for military purposes.

As a depositary of the NPT and a co-sponsor of the resolution, the UK is committed to working on the Middle East WMD-Free Zone conference.

The UK Government's Strategic Defence & Security Review of October 2010 reaffirmed the commitment to maintain a minimum effective nuclear deterrent, but also contained a number of new disarmament measures. The Government announced that the UK will reduce the number of warheads onboard each submarine from 48 to 40, their requirement for operationally available warheads from fewer than 160 to no more than 120, the number of operational missiles on the Vanguard class submarines to no more than eight, and their overall nuclear weapon stockpile to not more than 180 by the mid-2020s. The UK also announced a new, stronger security assurance that the UK will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT.

Mr. Wright advised that the UK is continuing research with a non-nuclear-weapon state, Norway, into the verification challenges of nuclear disarmament. The UK firmly believes that increasing transparency and developing the technical, military, and political solutions to the practical challenges of disarmament are vital to making tangible progress toward the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

Panel 1: Legal Aspects of a Nuclear Weapons Convention

Address

Dr. John Burroughs, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, New York

Dr. Burroughs opened with comments on the legal architecture that would be best for the elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons. The Final Document arising from the 2010 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons noted “the five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which proposes, *inter alia*, consideration of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification.”

A “framework of instruments” could tie together agreements and institutions that now exist, as well as ones yet to be created. The tendency of this approach is to push finalization of the institutional and legal arrangements for elimination of nuclear weapons well into the future. We must resist the policy of sequentialism—that one instrument, for example the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty, must be completed before another can be negotiated. Rather, parallel tracks must be pursued.

There is another way the term “framework” can be understood, as in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which laid the foundation for the Kyoto Protocol and for current negotiations on a replacement for that protocol. A “framework agreement on nuclear disarmament” could set forth basic obligations of non-use of nuclear weapons and elimination of nuclear arsenals, and provide for further negotiations on matters that could not be settled at the outset. Such matters could include, for example, aspects of verification and enforcement, or possibly the sequence and timing of reductions on the path to achieving zero nuclear weapons. A framework agreement would have the great benefit of early treaty codification of the obligation of non-use, in turn facilitating the process of reduction and elimination.

A “nuclear weapons convention” is often thought of as a single legal instrument addressing all aspects of elimination of nuclear weapons, like the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, a nuclear weapons convention almost surely would incorporate or link to existing legal agreements and Security Council resolutions, such as those related to testing, safeguards, nuclear terrorism, and nuclear safety. If we are trying to get the process in motion soon, a robust framework agreement establishing a template of obligations of non-use and further negotiations might be the best way to go.

Burroughs asked: How do we create an effective regime for inducing compliance and ensuring enforcement? He noted that, in the Chemical Weapons Convention, enforcement is entrusted to the Executive Council and Conference of States Parties, which can impose economic sanctions, and ultimately to the Security Council. A contention now heard in Washington think tanks is that the Chemical Weapons Convention model will not be sufficient for enforcing a ban on nuclear weapons. Burroughs believes that the contention reflects a lack of appreciation for the absolute imperative of delegitimization of nuclear weapons, which would be accomplished in part by prohibiting their threat or use. It also reveals a related over-estimation of the potential benefits, in standard realist terms, of breakout.

The problem of enforcement deserves the closest attention, he believes. One option would be to endow the conference of States Parties to a nuclear disarmament treaty with the authority to undertake a military response to breakout. A second approach is to reform the Security Council. Burroughs contends that an absolute necessity would be to end the role of the veto in Security Council deliberations relating to enforcement of a ban on nuclear weapons.

A worthwhile project for the Government of Canada and/or Canadian civil society would be to launch an initiative that would make recommendations on governance, compliance, and enforcement for a nuclear-weapons-free world.

What are the implications of an “international humanitarian law approach” for progress on a nuclear weapons convention? According to Burroughs, the Vancouver Declaration, whose purpose was to set forth the current law applying to nuclear weapons, resolves that the use of nuclear weapons in response to a prior nuclear attack cannot be justified as a reprisal. The declaration holds that impacts of nuclear weapons on the natural environment are not only to be part of the calculus of proportionality in attack, balancing effects on civilians, civilian objects, and the environment against the anticipated military advantage. Additionally, the use of nuclear weapons is subject to the prohibition found in Protocol I on the use of methods or means of warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. A study by the International Committee of the Red Cross found that this prohibition has now become part of universally binding customary law. It was obvious to Burroughs that many uses of nuclear weapons come under the prohibition.

Further, the threat, as well as the use, of nuclear weapons is barred by law. According to Burroughs, “This rule renders unlawful two types of threat: specific signals of intent to use nuclear weapons if demands, whether lawful or not, are not met; and general policies (‘deterrence’) declaring a readiness to resort to nuclear weapons when vital interests are at stake. The two types come together in standing doctrines and capabilities of nuclear attack, pre-emptive or responsive, in rapid reaction to an imminent or actual nuclear attack.”

Burroughs contends that an understanding of the incompatibility of nuclear weapons with law is part of the delegitimization of nuclear weapons that is taking place. It can give momentum to possible policy steps of the kind this conference was intended to explore. The incompatibility of nuclear weapons with law supports

- 1) a prohibition on threat or use as early as possible in the disarmament process,
- 2) a prohibition on use and threatened use of nuclear weapons as part of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and
- 3) a requirement that nuclear-weapon states and their allies address this contradiction in their doctrines and policies regarding threat and use of nuclear weapons.

Address

Prof. Michael Byers, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia

Prof. Byers noted that international society has developed taboos or absolute prohibitions on slavery, genocide, apartheid, and torture, which, not so long ago, would have been difficult to contemplate. He then looked at the “remarkable” 1996 Advisory Opinion, in which the International Court of Justice came extremely close to overturning a centuries-old conception of international law that had the nation state in the predominant position. It came to the edge of the divide, the tipping point, looked over and saw a future where the rights and interests of human beings trumped those of nation states. And it stopped there, saying that nations could perhaps use nuclear weapons in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, but not showing any conviction with respect to that traditionalist position. Instead, it spoke about International Humanitarian Law and asserted that it was difficult to conceive of any situation in which the law would not be violated by the use of nuclear arms. According to Byers, this opinion, in terms of the progressive evolution of international law, was a huge step, taking us right to the edge of a new legal paradigm.

Recent developments in human rights law and the implementation of Responsibility to Protect doctrine constitute relevant precedents. Given these developments, Byers believes that we can be quite certain that the International Court would go further on nuclear weapons today and say emphatically that the use of nuclear weapons would be illegal in all circumstances because it fails the standard requirements of proportionality and discrimination in international humanitarian law.

When considering international law and nuclear weapons, Byers urges us to focus our moral approbation on the nuclear-weapon states. It is immoral and illegal that they have not ruled out the use of nuclear weapons. Whether through a UN Security Council resolution or a stand-alone declaration at an international summit or a purpose-specific treaty, this should be Priority #1.

Byers believes that such an achievement is within our grasp because of international public opinion and broader developments in international politics. He can imagine President Obama wanting a universal affirmation of the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons in any instance. Once we get that, the way is open to a decision to get rid of any nuclear weapons anywhere. Yet the second step could be detrimental to the first step if the two are not separated out.

States must agree to the ban. Everything else is process. Complicated negotiations and obfuscations will divert and delay the inevitable. But, Byers urges, we should not be diverted by debating the type of instrument, but instead focus our moral suasion and demand an explicit affirmation of the illegality of use. Only then should we push for an outright ban on possession.

A convention banning nuclear weapons would not involve the negotiation of concessions, but would be all or nothing. It will be a complicated convention with elements of a test ban and a ban on fissile materials, and it will have complicated provisions on verification. But ultimately what we want is a ban on the existence of any nuclear weapons at all.

A ‘framework of instruments’ approach does create possibilities for delay, and so Byers adds a plug for a framework agreement. He advises that the model not be the UN Framework on Climate Change, which doesn’t seek to ban carbon dioxide emissions outright. A better parallel is the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Level, which led to the “Montreal Protocol” and a ban on emissions of CFCs.

In the discussion period, Prof. Byers was asked: Which comes first: outlawing possession of the weapon or a prohibition on use? Byers responded by talking about smallpox. There are two stores of smallpox in the world. There is no prohibition on them, but there is categorically a prohibition on their use. He believes that we are very close to having a universal public sentiment in favour of a taboo on nuclear weapon use, given recent developments in international human rights and international humanitarian law. He urged the world to seize the moment and look the Americans and Russians in the eye and ask, “Are you going to tell the world it would be legal to use nuclear weapons?” They should be challenged with the dictates of public conscience. And then, when they make that first step, they should be pushed to take the next one. Dr. Burroughs noted progress toward a prohibition is set out in paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Vancouver Declaration.

In response to a question on the implications of the agreement about the inclusion of international humanitarian law language in the Final Report from the NPT Review Conference, Byers said that we should not view the 1996 Advisory Opinion to be a ban on nuclear weapons’ use. We still need that explicit language in a treaty or framework agreement or UN Security Council Resolution.

What could Canada do to make progress? According to Byers, Canada should withdraw from the Nuclear Planning Group at NATO. This should not be an insurmountable issue for NATO.

Panel 2: Verification and Compliance

Address

Dr. Trevor Findlay, Executive Director, Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance

Dr. Findlay stated that the goals of verification and compliance arrangements are threefold: timely detection of non-compliance, early and effective response to non-compliance, and deterring non-compliance and sustaining confidence.

How much verification is enough? Findlay believes that one hundred per cent verification is impossible technically, politically, and financially. Instead, verification needs to reduce the risk of non-compliance to a minimum by providing a high probability of timely detection, raising the cost of attempting to cheat and creating uncertainty in the minds of the potential violator.

To secure a nuclear-weapon-free world, we would need unprecedented transparency to build confidence, with unprecedented intrusiveness in monitoring and inspection due to the security implications of any “breakout.” Additionally, we would need a more dependable compliance system than the one that currently exists in the UN Security Council.

With respect to verification tasks and methods, Findlay sees the relatively easy part as the dismantlement and destruction of declared nuclear weapons, facilities, and delivery systems, which could be based on measures already in use for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Additional research would be needed on warhead dismantlement. We would need verification of non-diversion of declared fissionable materials and facilities to new nuclear weapons production. This would require improved International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, especially for timely detection at dual-use facilities (enrichment and reprocessing facilities).

According to Findlay, it would be hard to verify that no undeclared weapons or facilities remained; this task would require intrusive challenge inspections and new technical means of detection. Timely detection of resumed or new research, development, or manufacture of nuclear weapons would require intrusive routine and challenge inspections as well as constant monitoring.

Verification tools are many and include:

- 1) transparency and confidence-building measures such as declarations, self-reporting, nuclear accountancy, archaeology, and forensics;
- 2) remote monitoring with satellites and aircraft for atmospheric, seismic, and environmental data;
- 3) unattended on-site, portal, or area monitoring using cameras and other detectors;
- 4) on-site inspections—permanent, routine, unannounced, and challenge;
- 5) National Implementation Measures; and
- 6) “whistleblowers.”

In terms of institutions required for the future, Findlay said that we need to consider options such as an Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (possibly as a successor to the IAEA), with universal membership; an Executive Council to handle non-compliance cases; a Secretariat and inspectorate with analytical specialists and weapons experts; and global verification, monitoring, and communications systems. We need also to consider a reformed UN Security Council or separate Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) Compliance Commission with a more representative membership and no veto.

Outside the NWC, Findlay believes that verification needs to be considered through

- 1) “National Technical Means” (HUMINT/SIGINT/ELINT);
- 2) verification and compliance arrangements among former weapons states (U.S./Russia/China, India/Pakistan, the two Koreas, Israel and its neighbours);
- 3) regional arrangements such as enhanced Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones; and
- 4) civil society monitoring (something equivalent to the Landmine Monitor).

The ability to avoid the “breakout” problem would depend on certain circumstances: whether warnings are given in time to take action; whether the violator uses or threatens use, and for what purpose; the readiness and deliverability of the weapon(s); the existence of missile defences; the existence of virtual nuclear deterrence; the conventional military strength of the violator vs. the rest of the international community; and the international community’s determination to respond.

The breakout problem could be reduced by a ban on reprocessing plutonium, a ban on use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for any purpose, multilateralizing uranium enrichment (and possibly even mining and processing), intrusive onsite inspections or perimeter inspections long before final destruction of weapons to deter hiding of existing weapons, and an aggressive lessons-learned process as nuclear disarmament proceeds.

According to Findlay, states could improve their nuclear transparency and develop confidence-building measures between nuclear-weapon states, including joint studies. We could be drawing lessons from such existing global verification regimes as the nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear testing, and chemical weapons regimes. Work is needed to flesh out the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, including the addition of a Verification Annex. And, of course, further verification research and development are required.

Address

Mr. Jo Sletbak, Minister Counsellor/Deputy Head of Mission, Royal Norwegian Embassy

Mr. Sletbak described the United Kingdom-Norway Initiative (UKNI) on the Verification of Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement, the first technical cooperation project on nuclear dismantlement verification involving a nuclear-weapon state and non-nuclear-weapon state. This project was established in 2007 with project partners drawn from Norway and the UK, with the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre acting as the independent observer.

Their objectives were:

- 1) to develop tools and techniques for future international agreements on nuclear disarmament in accordance with NPT Article VI (“a treaty on general and complete disarmament...under strict and effective international control”), while avoiding the risk of proliferation (Article I and II of the NPT);
- 2) to promote understanding between NWS and NNWS on the issues faced by the other partner; and
- 3) to promote discussion on how NNWS can participate in nuclear disarmament verification and how NWS may facilitate such participation.

According to Sletbak, it is the Norwegian view that, just as the IAEA today is essential in preventing and deterring proliferation, future disarmament efforts and, not least, a world free of nuclear weapons will likely require comprehensive arrangements for providing confidence, including verification. NWS have a special responsibility to develop these arrangements, but NNWS must also take part. The idea that disarmament should be left to NWS, while NNWS ensure non-proliferation, must be discarded. The NPT recognizes both non-proliferation and disarmament as joint responsibilities for both NWS and NNWS.

In developing tools and techniques, there are opposing viewpoints, with the inspector seeking maximum access to the warhead, while the host wants to limit access to the warhead and prevent any risks of proliferation, security, or unnecessary hampering of other facility operations. Both will be concerned with their personal safety at the plant. Information Barriers (IB) allow the inspector to do measurements on the warhead to confirm that the item in the container includes plutonium of a certain size and quality. The IB must be trusted by both parties. Two IBs with a simple jointly agreed design were successfully tested in Norway in 2009 and are currently under further development. Sletbak stresses that the inspector team must be given sufficient access to do their job. UKNI have tested various techniques such as guarding, escorting of inspectors, and exclusion and shrouding of areas and objects, while accommodating inspectors’ needs.

The first exercise in 2008 was a familiarization visit to allow the inspector team to plan first the actual inspection and then the monitoring visit in 2009. The countries reversed roles, with the UK playing a NNWS (“Luvania”) and Norway playing the NWS (“Torland”). The exercise was held at Norwegian civilian nuclear facilities at Kjeller. The inspectors by and large were satisfied. The host was satisfied that security at the facilities was not compromised. They then needed to test managed access in a real security environment.

The UK hosted the second exercise in 2010 to test the managed access arrangements in a real security environment, one of its nuclear weapons laboratories. The Norwegian team was invited (as “Luvania”) to inspect. The results are still being assessed. UKNI will present results of this exercise at the NPT conference in 2012.

Sletbak reported that UKNI will continue to develop tools and techniques for nuclear

disarmament verification, promote a common understanding between NWS and NNWS, and maintain a conversation on how NNWS can participate in disarmament verification and how NWS may facilitate such participation. A technical seminar with broad international participation is currently under discussion.

In the discussion period, a question was raised on how many states must join in the nuclear weapons ban for the agency governing the treaty to come into being. Many treaties have started with a small number of states signing on. It was suggested that because this treaty will be so important, we should, at a minimum, insist that all nuclear-capable states and those with peaceful nuclear capabilities be involved at the start; ultimately, all states should sign on because small states could be transshipment points. This universal membership could be encouraged through incentives such as nuclear power or sustainable energy assistance. As has been done with the CTBT, we should investigate the peaceful uses of the verification information to encourage states to join the treaty. One person suggested that we might consider the work toward the treaty as a staged process in which there are reductions to a level, then a pause to ensure all states are meeting requirements, then work on further reductions.

What is the history of special inspections? They can be requested to check on undeclared activities, but have only been attempted once with North Korea, which did not permit them. Such a refusal would not be allowed under a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Inspections would need to be seen not as threats, but as frequent, routine activities to achieve clarification and transparency.

The IAEA today could not cope with the verification work required for a NWC. But some facilities will be shut. The IAEA might inspect highly enriched uranium (HEU) and reprocessing facilities. The nuclear-weapon states could invite the IAEA to inspect and assume the costs. Inspections will have a cost, but they are cheap compared to a nuclear weapons system.

Non-nuclear-weapon states will be more involved in the verification process.

Instead of using nuclear reactors in the production of medical isotopes, cyclotrons can be used in hospitals.

Do we anticipate that expenses and complexity will decline in the future? Research is needed. Initially there would be huge costs for the destruction of weapons, and safeguarding materials and facilities, but once the weapons are gone, costs could go down. This task will never be completed.

Luncheon Address

Amb. Richard Butler, Chairperson, Middle Powers Initiative

Amb. Butler announced that the Middle Powers Initiative was seeking the support of ambassadors from a variety of countries for a proposed UN General Assembly Resolution that calls for the implementation of the Secretary-General's five-point proposal and calls on the Secretary-General to convene all states for a conference in 2014 on a framework of mutually reinforcing agreements or conventions.

He emphasized that it was time to move this process forward because of the continuing danger posed by nuclear weapons. We must stop accepting assurances of action and talk about safe systems. We need to talk dangers. There is stasis in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). There are new pressures in the non-proliferation regime. There is a degree of political instability. But there is also political opportunity. Butler recalled what Obama said in Prague. Later, President Obama issued a virtual no-first-use policy statement. If we act appropriately, Butler urged, we might be able to seize the time and make progress.

He cited the necessity of two basic actions: first, to assert with greater determination, clarity, and insistence that it is a matter of universal concern; second, to call for a new mechanism for nuclear disarmament, wrapped up in a convention that makes nuclear weapons illegal.

The UNSG's five-point proposal is now supported by 120 states and was 'noted' with unanimity in the NPT Review Conference Final Report. Still, as Butler noted, it is not clear how this proposal will move forward. A version will succeed. If it lights a fire under the CD, it will have done its job. If it creates another special purpose mechanism, it will get its job done. But, he said, we have to ask how to seize the moment to implement the Secretary-General's proposal and the NPT outcomes. Now very specific actions are needed.

According to Butler, we need negative security assurances, an agreement by nuclear-weapon states pledging no first use, a fissile materials cut-off treaty, and agreements on de-alerting and no new production. Nuclear-weapon states must be reminded of their obligations, not just under Article VI, but also under Article 1 of the NPT, which requires states never to assist anyone in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Yet China has assisted Pakistan; the U.S. is assisting India.

Butler stressed that to achieve a secure world without nuclear weapons, we need to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in nuclear weapons strategies. We need to deconstruct deterrence and extended deterrence. We need to assert the applicability of international law; as the Vancouver Declaration clearly states, nuclear weapons "are, by definition, contrary to the fundamental rules of international humanitarian law." We need a new mechanism for verification and enforcement in a world of nuclear disarmament. We need a new structure of global governance. We need to revisit the role of the UN General Assembly and Security Council, in which the veto is abused. The nexus of being a nuclear-weapon state and one of the permanent five members of the Security Council needs to be undone.

Butler recommended that the Canadian government be asked to convene or provide facilities for the MPI to call an informal consultation on the UNSG proposal. Canada's record is second to none among relevant countries. To change the public discourse on nuclear weapons, responsible governments need to stop the lies about the usefulness of deterrence based on the threat of nuclear weapons. The Canberra Commission's third axiom is that as long as nuclear weapons exist, they will be used, by accident or by decision. People can understand this. We need more truth to be told.

Panel 3: Political and Security Requirements for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

Address

Mr. Simon Rosenblum, World Federalist Movement – Canada

According to Mr. Rosenblum, getting nuclear-weapon states to sign a no-first-use declaration is both highly significant in its own right and a major step along the road to nuclear abolition.

Two major government reviews of nuclear weapons policies have been released during the past year. The first was Washington's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the other was NATO's Strategic Concept Review. Given the central role played by the U.S. in NATO, Rosenblum didn't find it surprising that both documents are "largely joined at the hip."

The NPR is what is known in the trade as "declaratory doctrine" and contains what Washington is willing to say in advance about the conditions under which the United States will use its nuclear arsenal. The key sentence says that "the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations." Except in extenuating circumstances, the U.S. will respond to chemical and biological weapons assaults with a "devastating conventional military response," thus reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. The document goes on to mention "the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack...the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons."

Rosenblum sees this as largely good news, comparing it to the Bush Doctrine, in which new missions were being continually invented for nuclear weapons. Yet President Obama's Nuclear Posture Review still invites questions about whether Washington might use its nuclear weapons against non-nuclear targets whose proliferation policies were not acceptable to the United States. Furthermore, additional clarification is needed on the U.S. policy in regard to other nuclear-weapon states. This is most relevant at a time when approximately one thousand nuclear weapons are ready to be fired at a moment's notice. But, Rosenblum noted sadly, the NPR does not mention the urgency for nuclear states to remove these weapons from alert status.

On the heels of the NPR came the review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Rosenblum believes that, thanks in part to the expected new U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the NPR's reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, the NPT got a relatively easy new lease on life. While he sees this as also to the good, he doesn't advocate complacency regarding nuclear proliferation, given that the NPT has proven to be quite ineffective in stopping a country from going nuclear if it is determined to do so. While it is frequently said that progress on nuclear proliferation is inextricably linked to nuclear disarmament progress among the major powers, he finds this link somewhat tenuous. The centrality of an effective verification and compliance regime to serious progress toward nuclear weapons abolition cannot be overstated, Rosenblum believes.

He is not surprised that the new NATO strategic concept falls pretty much into line with the NPR. The circumstances in which the alliance could contemplate using its nuclear arsenal are now said to be "extremely remote." The 1999 NATO review asserted: "Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace." But Russia has now been removed as the bogeyman and NATO and Russia are now more comfortable with each other.

Confining nuclear weapons to pure deterrence goes a long way to challenging the utility of nuclear weapons and delegitimizing them, in Rosenblum's view. It would further bolster an already powerful taboo against the actual use of nuclear weapons. All the factors mentioned are seen to contribute significantly in dampening proliferation pressures. But, he notes, some pressures arise

from particular circumstances that have a life of their own. There are grounds to worry about North Korea's recent communiqué to Libya's Gadhafi, which points out that Libya likely wouldn't be the target of NATO bombing today if it had continued to develop a nuclear weapons capability. And, while Rosenblum is quick to deny any criticism of the no-fly zone, he believes that others may draw such a lesson.

A no-first-use declaration is a powerful pledge, Rosenblum declares, that would entail big changes to nuclear weapons deployments, because a survivable second-strike deterrent needs a much reduced nuclear weapons force structure.

The idea of a nuclear-weapon-free world—unlike a landmines convention—is not going to be digested whole, Rosenblum believes. It will be digested, if at all, bite by bite. With the vision of zero always in sight, the first step is to introduce measures intended to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs. Success on the no-first-use front is within our reach. While the NPR was not yet prepared to endorse no-first-use, it did say that it was necessary to “work to establish conditions” for no-first-use.

Opposition to no-first-use is the soft underbelly of the nuclear weapons establishment. Rosenblum urges proponents of disarmament to work to win active and vocal support—politically salient, vote-determining support. No-first-use offers that opportunity. It is clear-cut and the moral imperative is obvious.

Address

Mr. Ernie Regehr, O.C., Research Fellow, Conrad Grebel University College; Fellow, The Simons Foundation

There is no denying, said Mr. Regehr, that for a world without nuclear weapons to be secure and stable it will have to be different in some fundamental ways from a world with many nuclear weapons, which is itself insecure and unstable.

The international security environment is already fundamentally different from what it was when nuclear arsenals were at their peak. The Cold War is over. He believes that a greater awareness of the proliferation incentives generated by existing arsenals, along with heightened concerns about non-state groups getting their hands on the bomb, have helped to galvanize a new constituency of supporters for nuclear abolition.

The lesson Regehr wants us to learn is that the world security environment can and does change, even for the better. Furthermore, while it is clear that a world without nuclear weapons will require significant changes to big-power security arrangements and to regions of conflict that have been nuclearized, it is also true that credible progress toward zero nuclear weapons is itself transformative. So Regehr's point is not only that the achievement of a Nuclear Weapons Convention depends on transformed big-power relations, but that the pursuit of nuclear disarmament contributes enormously to that transformation.

Kissinger, Perry, Shultz, and Nunn said in a March 7 op-ed in *The Wall Street Journal* that a secure and stable world without nuclear weapons "will not simply be today's world minus nuclear weapons." Regehr took issue with this statement. Day-to-day security conditions in much of the world, he said, are unaffected by the contestations of the nuclear powers. No part of the world would be immune from nuclear catastrophe, but the two dozen intrastate wars now being fought, the deprivations and human insecurity of much of the planet require their own particular remedies. Nuclear weapons have no currency in deterring intrastate war; they are impotent in the struggle to prevent terrorist organizations from acquiring nuclear weapons or materials; and they are irrelevant (except for the diversion of scarce resources) to many of the world's most pressing security challenges.

Regehr asked if nuclear deterrence will have to be replaced by conventional deterrence. Without nuclear deterrence, will we need the threat of devastation by other means? Destruction by conventional arms can never approach the scale of nuclear destruction, so removing the latter is a fundamental step toward a much safer world, but a post-nuclear world will not be more stable if it is heavily militarized through competing, offence-oriented, national and alliance military postures.

Regehr contends that high levels of competing offensive conventional military forces are a primary source of nuclear proliferation pressure. Those pressures will not vanish with nuclear disarmament. Nuclear materials and technology will continue to exist and spread through civilian programs, and states that feel an existential threat from militarily superior powers will still be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons.

Long before the U.S. and Russia get close to zero nuclear weapons, the NATO-Russia conventional imbalance will become an impediment to further progress, in Regehr's view. The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty—suspended by Russia in 2007 in response to European missile defence plans—is one attempt to address the imbalance. Russia has the added concern about Chinese conventional capabilities. The difference in Chinese and U.S. conventional capabilities will also come into play—as will Indian and Pakistani imbalances.

In calling for deliberate efforts toward a world without nuclear weapons, President Obama has

always insisted that as long as nuclear weapons remain, the United States will maintain a credible deterrent. Regehr conceded that deployed nuclear weapons have a basic deterrent effect against other nuclear weapons. But, he continued, if other states feel genuinely intimidated by U.S. nuclear arsenals and, notably, U.S. conventional dominance, they will, as John Steinbruner reminds us in “Renovating Arms Control through Reassurance (*The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2000), have “a strong incentive to pursue asymmetrical deterrent strategies.” Steinbruner believes that it is in the U.S. interest, therefore, to “reassure the [militarily] disadvantaged to prevent these asymmetrical deterrent strategies.”

Regehr listed reassurance policies, including de-alerting, no-first-use, and sole purpose doctrines. But, he reiterated, the main point is to avoid provocative behaviour and thereby reduce demand—not only among the big powers, but for a much broader range of states that are obviously intimidated by U.S. conventional capacity.

A system of competing national defence strategies, in which security is defended behind borders, is no longer possible, according to Regehr. Security must be mutual and collective. The Cold War ended when the Soviets and the Europeans both recognized that, to enhance their own security, each side would have to begin demonstrating genuine regard for the security of their adversary. As a result, the threat environment was radically altered and the state of constant high-level east-west tension could be eased through the recognition of mutual security interests, nuclear and conventional arms reduction, and, notably, military strategies for preventing rather than winning wars.

Regehr believes that the U.S.-China relationship needs to move into a phase of cooperation that can build confidence that any disputes between them will be settled diplomatically. Indeed, both Russia and China must be confident that the U.S. will not act unilaterally on the international stage. However, as long as the U.S. maintains a commitment to overwhelming conventional military superiority, such confidence will be hard to achieve.

Russia and China are also apt to look at each other with growing wariness as nuclear numbers decline and their relative conventional military advantages and disadvantages come more into focus. Relations between Japan and China, India and China, and Pakistan and India all need to undergo important changes to facilitate, not only nuclear disarmament, but also a more stable international order.

The central point of non-offensive or mutual defence, according to Regehr, is for states to seriously consider the security needs of their adversaries. If their adversary feels more secure, their own security will be enhanced.

Regehr listed three possible approaches to war prevention in a world without nuclear weapons:

- 1) Deter war through the threat of a counteroffensive. This requires a major threatening force, which is then perceived by an opponent as the threat of pre-emptive aggression and thus calls for a reciprocal counteroffensive strategy, leading to major, costly, and destabilizing conventional arms races. This creates a much more dangerous world, if one in which the danger of nuclear annihilation is removed (although pressures to pursue a nuclear trump card remains very much in play). Among advanced military states this kind of deterrence is already in play and effective.
- 2) A second form of conventional military deterrence can be pursued through non-offensive defence (NOD). Here the strategy is not the threat of counterattack, but the demonstration of “deterrence by denial”—a demonstration to an adversary that it would not be able to achieve its war aims through acceptable costs and sacrifices.

3) The third war prevention strategy sees NOD in terms of mutual security arrangements, in which mutual conventional arms limitation or control arrangements put both sides on a clearly defensive posture, all with a demonstrated lack of capacity for aggression.

Regehr suggested that the most daunting challenge is finding the means to manage regional conflict in a zero-nuclear-weapons environment. It is no accident that nuclear weapons are most deeply entrenched in national security calculations, and that nuclear proliferation pressures are most intense in the world's most conflict-ridden regions. He urged the conference to reaffirm that setting those conflicts is central, not peripheral, to the pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons.

The pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons carries with it a requirement to reshape global security relationships, Regehr asserted. As he indicated it was a tall order, but also an opportunity to make a virtue out of necessity in pursuit of a less militarized world.

In the discussion period following these presentations, one person spoke up for UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which calls for increased participation by women in discourses ranging from prevention of war to post-conflict construction. Several people supported this, noting that women understand that insecurity commonly arises from an inability to meet basic needs, feed a family or avoid a knock on the door at night, and that the remedies for these threats do not come from weapons, but from a safer and more sustainable world. Improved security in Africa and Northern Ireland has often resulted from the leadership of women. If women were more engaged in the fight against nuclear weapons, they would generate energy for a legal ban.

One person noted that in 2010 NATO said that “as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, we will remain a nuclear alliance,” and suggested that the statement could be changed to “as long as there is a NATO alliance, there will be nuclear weapons.” The question was raised: Should Canada walk out of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group?

In response to a question about how Israel’s security might be increased, it was suggested that a regional discussion and very active diplomacy are required. The NPT 2010 Review Conference ended with a proposal for a regional meeting on the idea of a Middle East WMD-Free Zone. The UN Secretary-General is having difficulty determining who will facilitate this meeting.

Hard, thoughtful discussions on alternatives to nuclear deterrence would avoid calls for a massive conventional build-up.

Sequencing must be discussed seriously. What do we need first: new security architecture or a Nuclear Weapons Convention? The sequencing dispute can be a cover for bad-faith negotiations.

The fallout from Canada’s decision to support the export of uranium to India is being felt now at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), where Pakistan is not cooperating in setting a program of work. Pakistan and India must learn that they cannot build security relationships when both are threatening to use nuclear weapons. They need to figure out how to coexist, by settling the dispute over Kashmir, among other concerns.

Round Table: The Role for Canada

Address

Mr. Paul Meyer, Fellow, Simon Fraser University; Senior Fellow, The Simons Foundation

These days, Mr. Meyer noted, Canada is conspicuous by its absence from international efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. After years of commitment and leadership on the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament file, Canada has withdrawn into the shadows and cut back significantly on the resources, human and financial, that it devotes to this effort.

Canada needs to resume the role of an engaged and innovative actor on the multilateral stage, Meyer believes. The lack of political support given to the current Ambassador for Disarmament, Marius Grinius, when he assumed the presidency of the CD in January 2011 is disconcerting. Only after Canada's term of presidency was over did Minister of Foreign Affairs Cannon address the CD: "If consensus continues to be blocked on the CD's Program of Work, countries will increasingly look to find disarmament results in other fora, such as the General Assembly, where consensus is not required to do business." Meyer sees this as an opening to develop a diplomatic strategy to overcome the blockage in the CD, but it will require going beyond the noncommittal "countries will increasingly look" to an expressly Canadian engagement to make this happen, in concert with others.

Any country aspiring to play a role in a major international production has to show up at the audition and at least pretend to be enthusiastic about getting the part, Meyer stated. There is a primordial need for the political level to attach some sense of priority to any potential field of foreign policy if it is to be activated. 'Political level' includes the Government of the day, of course, but also the totality of Parliament.

Meyer applauded the adoption last December of a unanimous resolution in the Senate and the House of Commons calling for Canada to launch a "major worldwide diplomatic initiative" on behalf of nuclear disarmament. But he questioned the depth of interest and resolve embodied in that resolution, given Parliament's lack of attention to this subject in recent years. The Ambassador for Disarmament has not been invited to report since 2007. He recommended that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House or Senate should arrange for a hearing at which representatives of the Government would be asked how exactly they intend to implement the call for a major international diplomatic initiative by Canada to promote nuclear disarmament. As an ex-civil servant, Meyer said, he could not overstate the importance of political support to advance any initiative.

If the political interest is present, there is scope for significant action, even by those states that are not great powers. The Prime Ministers of Australia and Japan recently joined forces to establish an international commission on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Canada is a follower of that group. Meyer viewed broad-based coalitions as the way to go, but still hoped that Canada would take a turn in the driver's seat or at least a leadership role in determining the excursion.

Meyer cited the lack of real resources and capacities to underpin diplomatic initiatives. He claimed that Canada's expertise in arms control and disarmament verification had essentially evaporated with the abolition of the Verification Unit of DFAIT and the reduced budget to support Canadian research in international security issues at DFAIT and the Department of National Defence (DND). New funding would be needed to commission the necessary research to support, for example, the development of verification procedures and technology accompanying the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

Meyer believes that states like Canada need perseverance and even intestinal fortitude to pursue a diplomatic initiative that makes a compelling case for cooperation by nuclear-weapon states. This means being prepared, in concert with likeminded states, to make it known that the

NWS cannot count on cooperation on international security issues of importance to them, unless these same states display an equivalent commitment to realize nuclear disarmament objectives.

If Canada wanted to contemplate launching a major international diplomatic initiative, Meyer acknowledged that the exact form of that initiative would need to be defined in consultation with eventual partners in a cross-regional team effort. He applauded the proposal by Doug Roche and Richard Butler that Canada host a preparatory committee meeting in 2012, prior to an envisaged UN-wide conference in 2014.

Meyer urged attention to CTBT entry into force and the start of FMCT negotiations. He found a good niche for Canada in researching and developing the verification and governance aspects of an FMCT or another nuclear disarmament accord. This would entail some investment by the Government.

Meyer encouraged Canada to build on the innovative proposals it put forward to overcome the NPT's "institutional deficit." These practical proposals for initiating authoritative annual meetings of the NPT membership and establishing a one-officer implementation support unit did not receive universal support at the 2010 Review Conference. But Meyer believes that they merit sustained support. There is a need to establish the practice of reporting and regular sessions of accountability for compliance with nuclear accords.

Address: I Refuse to Wait: The Role of Canada in Banning Nuclear Weapons

Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C.

As Mr. Roche noted, the seminar was premised on the idea that a Nuclear Weapons Convention is not only possible but necessary; his role and that of Paul Meyer was to examine the role for Canada.

He first paid tribute to Canadian parliamentarians and officials who have worked creatively in support of policies aimed at curbing nuclear weapons, noting that Canada's scientific and political work in advancing a set of verification principles set a UN standard. He expressed the wish that such leadership had been given a higher continuing priority.

Canada's official position on a Nuclear Weapons Convention was stated on March 9 by Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon, who said, "Canada supports the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the importance of nuclear disarmament and the growing impetus for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Canada is not opposed to the pursuit of a comprehensive, multilateral agreement banning nuclear weapons. However, we believe this goal is best built on a foundation of incremental agreements, such as the CTBT and a future FMCT." Roche characterized Canada's position as "a Nuclear Weapons Convention if necessary, but not necessarily a Nuclear Weapons Convention."

Forty years of work in this field have taught Roche that confining nuclear disarmament to a series of incremental steps will never achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. Proponents of the step-by-step approach see elimination only as an "eventual" goal. But, to Roche, this approach is a trap for the world. Modernization programs by the nuclear-weapon states drive forward the nuclear arms race, and keep "eventual" beyond reach. In retaining "eventual," nuclear defenders will so solidify the justification for nuclear weapons that proliferation to more states is inevitable. The greater the proliferation, the more fragile the claim that nuclear disarmament has legitimacy. The double standard of trying to stop the spread of nuclear weapons while allowing the nuclear powers to retain their guarantees that nuclear disarmament will always be but a dream, in Roche's view.

He called for a clearly defined goal to be set and claimed that a Nuclear Weapons Convention would do this. Because Roche believes that the world urgently needs a precise plan for the construction of a legal ban on all nuclear weapons, he refuses to wait until a nuclear weapons attack obliterates a city before starting negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons. He refuses to wait until a nuclear explosion causes international panic through the killing of millions and the shutdown of food, water, medical, and transportation systems. He refuses to wait until cooperative world politics breaks down completely under the weight of nuclear weapons hegemony.

Roche called for Canada to be at the forefront in the movement now building for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The 2010 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty affirmed that "all states need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons."

At the UN, two-thirds of all national governments have voted in favour of negotiating a convention. In 21 countries, including the five major nuclear powers, polls show that 76 per cent of people support the negotiation of a ban. The European Parliament has voted for a convention, as have a number of national parliaments. Mayors for Peace, comprising more than 4,500 cities around the world, is campaigning for it. Long lists of nongovernmental organizations want it. In Japan, 14 million people signed a petition for it. The Secretary-General of the UN is campaigning for it. There is no doubt that historical momentum is building.

Roche believes that the reluctance of the Government to commit to work on a Nuclear Weapons Convention calls into question the state of democracy in Canada.

For the first time in Canadian history, he said, a substantive motion on nuclear disarmament

has been unanimously adopted by both the Senate and House of Commons. The motion endorsed Ban Ki-moon's five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament and encouraged the Canadian government to "engage in negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention" and deploy a major worldwide diplomatic initiative. Never before has a joint motion so substantively addressed the nuclear weapons problem. Roche believes that the will of Canada's Parliament is very clear.

The motion was stimulated by 550 members of the Order of Canada, who called on Canada to join a new worldwide campaign for international negotiations to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention. This action by prestigious Canadians from all walks of life was also unprecedented.

Roche pointed to evidence that the Canadian public has a strong desire for an enforceable ban on all nuclear weapons. In a 2008 poll sponsored by The Simons Foundation and conducted by Environics Research, 88 per cent of Canadians said that they would support an enforceable agreement eliminating all nuclear weapons. The poll reported: "Canadians believe that nuclear weapons have made the world a more dangerous place, with the greatest threat coming from terrorist attacks. There is overwhelming public support among Canadians for the complete elimination of the world's nuclear weapons."

Although NATO has stopped describing nuclear weapons as "essential," Roche notes that it still claims that they provide the "supreme guarantee of security." In the 2010 Strategic Concept NATO stated: "Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance." Roche commended Germany and Norway for challenging NATO's nuclear policies and encouraged Canada to support this effort.

Roche advised that the government be pressed on how it intends to implement the parliamentary motions on nuclear disarmament. Canada should, he said, give strong support to resolutions at the UN seeking to start negotiations and consider hosting a preparatory meeting open to all states that want to move forward on a global legal ban.

With solid credentials in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NATO, La Francophonie, and the Commonwealth, as well as trusted relationships with the U.S., the UK and France, Canada is well placed to host an initial meeting. Roche considered that, because President Obama is an ardent advocate of a nuclear-weapon-free world, the U.S. would likely attend a preparatory meeting in Ottawa. China has already voted at the UN to begin NWC negotiations and would likely attend. The UK is moving in this direction. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has committed his country to global negotiations. Within NATO, Germany and Norway are calling for stronger nuclear disarmament measures. Austria and Switzerland have explicitly called for a start on a convention. The New Agenda Coalition countries—Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden—are deeply committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Roche believes that a Nuclear Weapons Convention can provide a safe and secure way to rid the world of all nuclear weapons. He hopes that Canadian hospitality will lead the way.

In the discussion period, Amb. Meyer was asked about the attempt in 2005 to have the UN General Assembly create committees to permit work on the CD's four "core issues" outside the CD. He replied that, having been an architect of the 2005 initiative, he thought that this approach was as valid today as it was back then. In his view, if there were tension between achieving our principal goal and having to change the negotiating forum, it was better to abandon the forum rather than abandon the objective of negotiating a multilateral accord. We need to find a way around the straitjacket of the CD's consensus rule. Within the UN system, this is most readily achieved by seeking authority for negotiation through the UN General Assembly, which works by majority vote.

A resolution passed by the UN General Assembly could authorize open-ended working groups to take up the CD's responsibilities until such time as that body was able to resume its work. This approach has been used in the past with the Ottawa landmine ban and, more recently, with the UK's decision to go the UN General Assembly route to initiate negotiation of an Arms Trade Treaty. The Secretary-General's five-point proposal is another manifestation of the UNGA formula. If states are serious about actually achieving the goal, they will devise the right diplomatic process to bring it about.

Agenda

Toward a Nuclear Weapons Convention: A Role for Canada

Expert Seminar, April 11 and 12, 2011

Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

Opening Event: Monday, April 11 at 7 PM

Guest Speaker: Ambassador Sergio Duarte, UN High Representative for Disarmament

Respondents to High Representative Duarte:

Ambassador Werner Brandstetter, Embassy of Austria

Counsellor Julian Juarez, Embassy of Mexico

Mr. Nicolas Brühl, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Switzerland

Mr. Clive Wright, Head of Foreign Policy Team, British High Commission

Expert Seminar, Tuesday, April 12

Panel 1: Legal Aspects of a Nuclear Weapons Convention

Address by Dr. John Burroughs, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, New York

Address by Prof. Michael Byers, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia

Panel 2: Verification and Compliance

Address by Dr. Trevor Findlay, Executive Director, Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance

Address by Mr. Jo Sletbak, Minister Counsellor/Deputy Head of Mission, Royal Norwegian Embassy

Luncheon Address by Ambassador Richard Butler, Chairperson, Middle Powers Initiative

Panel 3: Political and Security Requirements for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

Address by Mr. Ernie Regehr, O.C., Research Fellow, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo

Address by Mr. Simon Rosenblum, World Federalist Movement - Canada

Round Table: The Role for Canada

Address by Mr. Paul Meyer, former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament; Fellow in International Security, Centre for Dialogue, Simon Fraser University; Senior Fellow, The Simons Foundation

Address by Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C., "I Refuse to Wait: The Role of Canada in Banning Nuclear Weapons"

Participants

Diplomatic Representatives for April 11 Opening Event

Amb. Werner Brandstetter, Embassy of Austria
Mr. Filip Vandenbroeke, Embassy of Belgium
H. E. Pirajibe Tarrago, Embassy of Brazil
Mr. Riho Kruuv, Chargé d'Affaires, Embassy of Estonia
Mr. Tamas Kiraly, Deputy Head Mission, Embassy of Hungary
Mr. Kambiz Sheikh-Hassani, Chargé d'Affaires & Head of Mission, Embassy of the I.R. of Iran
Mr. Mousalreza Vahidi, First Secretary, Embassy of the I.R. of Iran
Ms. Suraya Pauzi, First Secretary, High Commission of Malaysia
Counsellor Julian Juarez, Embassy of Mexico
Mr. Erik Boer, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the Netherlands
Mr. Jo Sletbak, Minister Counsellor/Deputy Head of Mission, Royal Norwegian Embassy
Lt. Col. Dimitry Fedorchatenko, Assistant to the Defense Attaché, Embassy of the Russian Federation
Amb. Teppo Tauriainen, Embassy of Sweden
Mr. Nicolas Brühl, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Switzerland
Mr. Berkan Pazarci, Counsellor and Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Turkey
Mr. Clive Wright, Head of Foreign Policy Team, British High Commission

Participants for Expert Seminar

Speakers/Chairpersons/Rapporteurs

Dr. Adele Buckley, Past Chairperson, Canadian Pugwash Group
Dr. John Burroughs, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy
Amb. Richard Butler, A.C., Chairperson, Middle Powers Initiative
Dr. Michael Byers, Canada Research Chair in Global Politics and International Law, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia
Ms. Bev Tollefson Delong, Chairperson, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
Dr. Trevor Findlay, Director, Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance
Mr. Cesar Jaramillo, Program Officer, Project Ploughshares
Ms. Peggy Mason, former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament and Advisory Board Chair, Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance, Carleton University
Amb. Paul Meyer, Fellow in International Security, Centre for Dialogue, Simon Fraser University, and Senior Fellow, The Simons Foundation; former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament
Hon. Landon Pearson, O.C., Director, Landon Pearson Resource Centre for the Study of Childhood & Children's Rights; and Member, Canadians for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
Mr. Ernie Regehr, O.C., Research Fellow, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo; Fellow, The Simons Foundation; co-founder, Project Ploughshares
Hon. Douglas J. Roche, O.C., former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament
Mr. Simon Rosenblum, World Federalist Movement - Canada
Dr. Erika Simpson, Department of Political Science, University of Western Ontario; Vice-Chair, Canadian Pugwash Group
Mr. Jo Sletbak, Minister Counsellor/Deputy Head of Mission, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Ottawa

Canadian Political Parties

Ms. Danielle Leclair, representing M. Claude Bachande, M.P. (BQ)

Canadian Government

Mr. Richard Cohen, Senior Defence Advisor, Minister of National Defence
Mr. Shawn Friele, Policy Officer, Global Partnership Program, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT)
Mr. Hussein Hirji, Senior Policy Officer, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Division, DFAIT

Ms. Elaine Kanasewich, Nuclear Non-proliferation Officer, Directorate of Security and Safeguards, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
Ms. Jacqueline Littlewood, Senior Advisor, Non-proliferation and Export Controls Division, Directorate of Security and Safeguards, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
Ms. Katherine Simonds, Library of Parliament, Research Section (Monday evg. only)
Mr. Jonathan Tan, Senior Policy Officer, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Division, DFAIT

Civil Society

Mr. Justin Alger, Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance
Ms. Janis Alton, Chairperson, Canadian Voice of Women for Peace
Ms. Tara Ashtakala, Instructor, Law, Carleton University; Lawyers for Social Responsibility
Ms. Judy Berlyn, Canadian Peace Alliance
Mr. Jordan Bishop, Veterans Against Nuclear Arms
Ms. Joan Broughton, United Nations Association - Canada
Mr. Robin Collins, United Nations Association - Canada
Dr. Nancy Covington, Past President, Physicians for Global Survival
Ms. Phyllis Creighton, Science for Peace
Mr. Lawrence Cumming, board member, Project Ploughshares
Dr. Richard Denton, President, Physicians for Global Survival
Sr. Mary-Ellen Francoeur, Sisters of Service, Religions for Peace
Ms. Martha Goodings, Seriously, Time to Stop
Ms. Catherine Gribbin, Canadian Red Cross
Mr. Richard Harmston, Chairperson, Group of 78
Dr. Anna Jaikaran, Science for Peace
M. Pierre Jasmin, President, Les Artistes pour la paix
Ms. Macha MacKay, Canadian Voice of Women for Peace
Dr. Peter Meincke, Canadian Pugwash Group
Mr. John Siebert, Executive Director, Project Ploughshares
Dr. Penelope Simons, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa; Lawyers for Social Responsibility
Mr. Murray Thomson, O.C., Canadians for a Nuclear Weapons Convention
Mr. Anton Wagner, Canadian Peace Alliance
Mr. Fergus Watt, Executive Director, World Federalist Movement - Canada
Mr. Stewart Webb, Research Associate, Salt Spring Forum

Graduate Students

Mr. Alex Braden, Canadian Forces
Ms. Susan Khazaeli, University of Ottawa
Ms. Gabrielle Biren Huden, Carleton University
Mr. Simon Palamar, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
Ms. Mohamed Elkeshky, Carleton University
Ms. Nicole Waintraub, University of Ottawa; intern, Project Ploughshares
Ms. Catherine Holden, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
Mr. Florian Oelck, intern, Physicians for Global Survival

