Four revolutions
Lieutenant-General (ret.) Romeo Dallaire
We are in an era that is rich in opportunities for advancing the human race. It is also very dangerous because we are risking a regression to an era of oppression even within the democratic states, as we close borders and try to weed out elements of our nation. In particular, we as a nation of immigrants could start a process that will provide nothing positive but leave us with an impression that we are living in insecurity, in which we will develop a siege mentality. That outcome is quite possible.
I will try to touch upon the different policy themes that you are going to be reviewing: global security, economics, environmental policy and of course world governance, using an experiential base of information and not necessarily an academic base.
I am going to use the post-Cold War era as the stepping-stone into the next decades. The post-Cold War brought four revolutions upon Canadians; and the rest of the Western world has experienced them in different degrees.
1. A revolution in conflict resolution:
First, there was a revolution in the whole concept of conflict and of war. We had a hiatus with the Gulf War, which temporarily proved that all our theories of the Cold War worked and which used classic warfare and all the sophisticated weapons systems that had been developed during that era. However, the Gulf War was an exceptional, unusual instrument of resolving conflict; over the last ten years we have found ourselves in far more complex scenarios with many more parameters than classic warfare. Although resisted by many of the Cold Warriors who wanted to hold on to all the Cold War instruments instead of adapting them, the scenario they have refused to face is that of conflict resolution. We are not even into peace-keeping as such; we are into longer-term conflict resolution, trying to bring about a state of stability and development in nations that have for the last 150 years been under the colonial yoke and the influence of other people.
In the colonial era we went into many of those nations, creating them from scratch, often regardless of the people but very conscious of their resources and their geographic importance. We would normally support a group in those nations that seemed to have control, even if it was a minority group, even an oppressive group, in order to gain the benefits of these colonial empires and resources. Then, as the struggle against the colonial powers started with India and spread through Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s, we found these people not automatically ruling in a democratic manner and not able to develop their own capacities and consciousness as a nation. Instead, they were cut off in the Cold War, where either superpower on a number of occasions put some very nasty people in charge. These nasty people held control in those areas as we continued to take strong actions to keep a balance of power and avoid a nuclear scenario in Europe.
Then in 1989 we suddenly turned around to many of these nations and said, "Listen, we really don't need you as such any more; so why don't you sort yourselves out?" Well, that's exactly what they are doing, sometimes with devastating effect. The result has been a proliferation of conflicts, and imploding nations that are attempting to grasp a form of democracy adapted for their cultures. In attempting to bring a certain level of stability and support - not doing it for them, not putting them under anybody's wing, but support - we have discovered that there are skill-sets that are wholly different from the classic security skill-sets that we have used in the past. We have, in fact, in the Western world moved into a fundamentally new role for the use of force.
The Treaty of Westphalia still exists, and the military is there to defend the borders of a nation-state and its interests overseas. The triumvirate of the government, the people and the military still exists. That is still a role that we expect to be conducted by our military forces and an arena in which our diplomatic corps will be involved: to do whatever you can do to avoid war but, if you have to go to war, then we envisage the defence of a nation being done by the military and through mobilization.
However, something else snuck in during the 1990s, and it is called conflict. Before then you had war, or Cold War preparations, and you had peace, peace-keeping; between these two there were very few actions taken involving the essential use of force. The Congo operation was one such action, Cyprus was another in the flare-up of 1974; but in NATO and for the Western world militaries, there was nothing there. You had to train for war, and whatever skills you had learnt there you could simply cascade them down to peace-keeping in the classic sense of Chapter 6 [of the UN Charter].
Both sides are tired of fighting each other, they are in their trenches and they need some sort of credible oversight in the implementing of their peace treaties.
Well, in the 1990s that whole middle area has filled up with conflict. And an entirely different scale in the use of force is required, as well as in the use of diplomatic skills and of humanitarian instruments. Yet, in that middle area we have over the last decade either provided ad hoc responses or done a lot of on-the-job training. We were simply attempting to adapt Cold War methods to solving conflicts and to a complex, long-term involvement in nations which need to be nurtured with a variety of instruments and not just force, in order to permit them to advance. I am speaking of the diplomatic, political and humanitarian dimensions of the task, of security, the military, the police, and of the economic restructuring of these nations. The involvement is in nation-building and interfacing with a number of world organizations in order to bring a semblance of a plan to support those seeking to bring stability to their nations, helping in fact the moderates in many cases. We found ourselves deficient in those skill-sets needed in all these dimensions. In the 1990s we found ourselves wavering, attempting actions, succeeding in some, failing in others - and trying to learn lessons. Well, that new role of using all your capabilities as a nation in conflict resolution is here to stay. The era of the nation which is itself at peace but has its diplomats and humanitarian workers and its military and policemen in war zones is here to stay. It is very difficult politically for a nation to handle such altruistic ambitions and take casualties at the same time.
Over the last decade we have moved into those nations attempting to give them the support they need, using references of respect of human rights and moral values, maybe emphasizing the Judaeo-Christian aspect to it that we in the Western world have been observing for centuries. Now we are using force in our resolve to pursue such ideologies instead of for the defence of the nation. We have found that our military and a number of the structures are deficient in tackling this very different work. As part of the reform now begun in the military to handle this revolution of operations in conflict zones and humanitarian catastrophes, we are finding that we have to develop our people in areas like anthropology, philosophy and sociology. This, we hope, will help them grasp the complexities of the situations they face, and be able to be "value added" and not simply be there as a guard for the next two years. This new era is also demanding long-term involvement. Just as in development, you cannot bring about any solution in two or three years. You cannot meet the objective of giving the moderates scope to manoeuvre and grasp the processes of government for these nations to advance, if you are going to be there for [only] three years.
My mandate [in Rwanda] was two years. It created such pressures in negotiations and in trying to solve problems that it undermined the mandate. If you are going into these nations now, you are in for 40, maybe even 60 years. You have to formulate an integrated plan - not a military plan, not a humanitarian plan, not a diplomatic plan. For this, you must have people who are multi-skilled and multi-disciplined to build such a plan, where the use of the different skills and disciplines will vary as that attempt at stabilizing a country and reducing conflict evolves. That requires a whole new bag of tools.
To give you an example: there was a small NGO that was attempting to save lives of Rwandans during the genocide. They had a tent about the size of this room. A couple of doctors and a few nurses were going flat out, and at the tent door there were hundred upon hundreds of Rwandans standing there, or lying there, waiting to get treatment. Canada, Australia and Britain had sent in big military field hospitals - we are talking of hospitals that can handle 500 casualties a day. Now, those doctors and nurses and aides were in uniform and ran round with a big Red Cross sign; and they went up to this NGO and said, "Listen, we can do your triage. We can take some of these people by ambulance to the hospital. We can help you people do a better job." And they were literally thrown out of the tent. They were thrown out because of a philosophy of neutrality still prevailing: "We cannot as an NGO work with the military, because we will be compromised. We will let hundreds of people die but we must not be compromised." That basis of neutrality is passé and it is now even perverse. We must accept transparency, yes absolutely. But it is my belief, after working in the domain and conducting some research, that we are relying on all the wrong premises in trying to solve many of these conflicts.
We must be out there. We are a middle power with a grasp of technology and have a work ethic and a belief in fundamental values. We have no colonial past except for the destruction of our First Nations, which in many cases still continues - something for us not to forget. We can lead in this new era of conflict resolution, but we must do it with new tools. We have got to get rid of the ad hoc practices we have been using these last 10 years, and build a whole new conceptual base of what are the solutions for these complex mandates. [Beware of] any general who says to you, "We must not get involved in these missions until there are clear exit strategies, clear missions with very clear action verbs like we had in NATO." We spent 50 years ensuring that everybody [in NATO] knew what the word "attack" meant, or what "withdrawal" and "defence" meant. We are now into an era with broad and imprecise instructions and mandates like "establish an atmosphere of security"! Does that mean "while demobilization is going on and I will have to defend the nation, if some other nation decides to attack"? Does that mean that I take over all the security dimensions? Or does that mean that I just support the police? Support those armies? Just act as a buffer? What does "establish an atmosphere of security" mean? We don't even have the definition of the action verbs.
So, there is a whole new doctrinal, conceptual base required, because the missions will not be straightforward, and the mandates will not be simple to identify and to implement. Just look at how many changed mandates and fresh resolutions there have been in the Yugoslav campaign. Troops could not keep up with what was happening each week at the political level. Why are we always surprised when we carry out what we believe will be the solution, only to find that one of the two sides comes up with a new angle? Have we really pondered over these complex arenas of conflict and sorted out innovative ways to anticipate problems when working in the midst of ambiguity. [Can you picture] the military working in ambiguity? The diplomatic corps, no problem! But, for a soldier, a bit of a puzzle: "Where exactly am I supposed to point that rifle?"
What we have seen recently [in the attacks on New York and Washington] was not unpredictable. There has been a fair amount of literature and work done on the asymmetric threats to the Western world. Maybe this [form of attack] took us by surprise, but not the objective. [The attack was] not in our classic way of doing things. We in Canada have a small military because we are taking the risk of simply using the military in a possible war. The results of that risk we took are now coming home to roost. Why are we caught off guard, instead of having evolved any integrated plans for this new arena of conflict? We have a crisis because we were not anticipatory and had not worked out solutions to this threat. It does not matter how good a solution to a crisis we may come up with - and rarely is it the right solution, for we either overkill or undershoot - for what has happened is that the mere fact of a crisis has created insecurity, has created a lack of confidence, has created an atmosphere of people looking behind their back. That is not the way to lead. That is not the way to advance a nation. You cannot do it by crisis management because, no matter what the solution is, you will have "lost feathers" because you got us into the crisis.
We have entered a new era where conflict is the norm, and where the use of force in different forms, as well as its integration with humanitarian work and different diplomatic efforts, needs a new set of rules and tools. We cannot live through the next decade and beyond with the attitude that we had in the past, of "Let's try this, and let's try that. Hopefully, it will work."
2. A revolution in resource management:
We have gone now through a revolution in resources, or resource management. In accounting among nations and to their peoples in regard to using resources, we have discovered a massive problem in resource management globally. If we believe in all humans being human and accept that some are not more human than others, then we must also want the 80 percent who are close to or below the poverty line to reach a certain level where they can truly live as humans, and where they can meet the aspirations of their children and themselves to achieve a better shape of life. However, if the other 20 percent continue to burn up the resources, continues to follow policies that reduce the global resource base, then are we in fact truly committed to placing the human race on a more equitable basis, to pulling people out of poverty?
I am afraid we may give them some opportunities to start along the path to development and then tell them that there is nothing left for their advancement, because we have used up all the resources. We may even say, "We want to put controls on you as you move through the different industrial revolutions, to curb the pollution." We must have a revolution in accountability over resource management, not just nationally, but globally. You cannot on the one hand provide development aid while knowing that, on the other hand, down the road there won't be anything left for them. We have not had any positive outcome in this revolution yet, and certainly not during the last year or so as the world powers continue to use self-interest above humanity. World powers are guided by self-interest, they are not guided - as nations like us are - on a higher human plane.
There are nations in development that are screaming for this country to take the lead in the world in regard to conflict resolution, to logical human responses, to respect of human life; to take the lead, in fact. in proclaiming that every human is human. I had a staff officer from a great nation come into my headquarters [in Kigali], about three weeks into the genocide. And he started asking questions, like "How many Rwandans were killed yesterday? How many were killed last week? How many do you expect to be killed today? How many over the next week, the next three weeks?" And my staff officers, the few Canadians that had flown in, were so revolted by this person that they hauled him up to my office. And he told me what he was doing, and asked if I would acquiesce in it. And I said, "What is the aim?" And the aim was the following: he was sent to conduct an assessment of risk, and the risk was the following. It was believed by that nation that the nation could accept one soldier injured or killed for every 85,000 dead Rwandans. He was expressing his nation's fear of casualties, its fear of involvement, its self-interest. Rwanda is on nobody's radar screen.
In that same country of Rwanda there are 320-odd mountain gorillas in the mountain area in the northwest. They are an endangered species - you remember the film "Gorillas in the Mist", the story of Diana Fossey who was killed during her efforts there. I believe still today that, if some group decided to go and wipe out all those gorillas, there would be more of an haroosh, more of an involvement by the international community than there was when they were slaughtering tens of thousands every day in that same country.
This nation [Canada] is uncomfortable with these attitudes. We have problems in turning on the newscast and go absolutely nuts because one of our own people is being mistreated by the judicial system, and will mobilize all kinds of resources for that individual. I am proud and happy that we do that. However, in the same newscast we see [Rwandans and others] slaughtered all over the place, barely 12 hours away by aircraft. Do we have no problem with that? I think we do. I think this country has already reached a plateau of humanity, has already absorbed the essence of Kofi Annan's statement on "We, the People", a seminal document of the millenium.
3. The revolution in public engagement
We have also entered an era of revolution of public engagement, of inquiry by the people and individuals into our institutions. In 1968 everybody under 30 was trying to take these institutions apart, with the slogan "You can't trust anybody over 30." Today, we see a more sustained questioning of our institutions and a demand for transparency. The instrument is the media, spurred by the people who don't simply accept the fact that conservative institutions are there for good and all. Imagine what we in the military went through in the 1990s for being secretive. Old notions of putting a lieutenant at the gate to say that "There's no comment from the general" don't work any more. They demand transparency in what we are doing here inside of this nation and what we are doing outside. Some nasty people will say that this communications transparency, this desire to know everything that's going on, and the use of the media which maximizes, will culminate on the day when you will have a running commentary about a soldier in a trench getting a bullet between the eyes.
How do we balance this dimension of transparency and ensure we have more positive than negative effect? I believe it is producing a more positive effect. There is less of the flimflam; there are more pondered statements that satisfy people than simply hearing, "Trust me because I know better". Generals on [Parliament] Hill with medals, saying to politicians "Trust me", were a phenomenon of the 1950s, but the ascendancy of generals of that time has disappeared. I don't regret it disappearing. I recall what the military did in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis when we started to mobilize before the Minister of Defence knew anything was happening, because our friends down south were quite insistent. We are not doing that this time, at all.
4. A revolution of information systems
The transparency exercise will continue to evolve with the revolution of information. The revolution of information systems is going to be so prevalent it will be like the air, it will be like being in water. We did some futurist analysis of the use of information systems in the world, and concluded that in 2020 or thereabouts we will have systems that interface so intimately that it will put into question our classic method of making decisions and finding solutions, that is deductive reasoning. It will question whether that old method is capable of handling the whole spectrum of what we will be facing at that time. No scientist that we have approached with that thesis has fallen off his chair. But have the whole lot of us moved down that road, to take advantage of this revolution, or are we lagging behind and hoping the situation doesn't get out of hand?
Where is the grand strategy?
These four revolutions have changed so much in the 1990s, and they will become focused more and more, and we will see geniuses or statesmen appear with an ability to articulate a vision and guide us in a strategy for the orientation of this and other nations.
Yet, I have spoken at a number of U.S. institutions, universities, military colleges, staff colleges and a series of think-tanks; and I ask the following question. I say, "You are now the world power. I'm not sure if you are working on a Pax Americana but you are the world power. What is the grand strategic aim of the United States in this era? What does it expect historians to say about this world power in this era?" There is no answer. I get polite looks and no answer. What does a global power, evolving in the globalization exercise, what does it want to be remembered for, what does it want to advance? Making more money? Technology? Is there something deeper than that? And to the question, "Is there something deeper than technology and money?", you often find no answer.
We are going to face an era where we will be taking casualties, real casualties. There will be economic casualties, as some say, and casualties in the sense of security. There will be casualties in how we perceive the world; there will be casualties caused by our involvement in areas of the world. And, I am afraid to say, there will be casualties in the hundreds of thousands of innocent people in the developing world. Pushed aside, abused and sent back into the dark ages. I believe that middle powers like this nation are capable of ensuring that we don't fall into the trap of international self-interest, egoism and a focus on ourselves in an isolationist stance. [ A recap in French followed.]
If we see what has happened because of extremists, opponents that have moved to radicalism because of a variety of factors, then one of the main areas we should be promoting strategically at the human plane is in development, in education, in eradication of small arms, in the destruction of those noyaux who use and abuse children in war and war-affected areas. We should be tripling, increasing tenfold our efforts in those nations that are suffering from these conflicts, to ensure that recruits amongst them do not blossom and create an insecure world for our children and our grandchildren (in this case, grandchildren of course! I say that very politely.)
If we don't handle problems like war-affected children, child soldiers, the use of force; if we let the nearly one million children that are sitting around Afghanistan in refugee and displaced camps, see the use of force and listen to ideologies that are expressed in extremist ways; if we cannot eliminate the impunity of using children in war, then we are guaranteeing massive numbers of recruits for the next series of conflicts. And in this state of insecurity we will move over the long term into a dark era. If we pursue the present tactical exercises and forget the higher plane of moving these people out of their poverty, if we don't invest in their education, and support them in establishing judicial systems, in building the ability to grasp their own future, in protecting their moderates, then we are no different than all the other ones who cannot be wearing enough stars and stripes to make them feel American.
[In a question period, General Dallaire made the following points]
I believe that a two-tier exercise must go on. One, in providing a better sense of security to the nation because our structures have failed, and different elements have combined to create insecurity. We can't blame one person, it has happened over the years. We must bring a better sense of security to the nation without ever affecting the rights and freedoms in our Charter. But concurrently we have got to move beyond these borders into those [poorer] countries, not as do-gooders (as right-wing people in this country would say), but as people solidly skilled in support measures, to offer what we hope is useful to them in getting out of their morass. If I ever see in the months to come CIDA suffering a budget cut, then I probably won't be at CIDA very long, because that will be the guarantee that we are no better than the rest of them, we are going down the same practical path [of self-interest]. You will not eradicate terrorism unless you wipe out the reasons for it.
[Maynard Gertler asked a question on the bombing of Yugoslavia. How did we give way to a decision to do that?] It is interesting that this nation conducted over 10 percent of all those operations, which is about five times more than we would normally be considered capable of doing. What we can do about the Kosovo campaign is (1) agree that it failed, (2) recognize it as a reaction by a body - NATO - of which we are part, and in which we have committed ourselves to continue to be involved. I find an interesting statement in your background papers that Canada originally joined NATO only until it can be replaced by something better. That is phenomenal! How much of the American influence in NATO is going to keep moving us in the direction which maybe we don't feel is the right one? We are going, I hope, to expend more effort in Afghanistan and surrounding areas to help the increasing flow of refugees and displaced people. The question is, we may be doing that with one hand - but are we going to be blasting away with our allies on the other hand? Are we going to be creating an increase of demand that we will have to meet on the humanitarian side? What's the balance, what is the real politik, where will be the statesmanship, where is the Solomon that is needed in these excruciatingly complex times? That is why we in the military have spent so much time studying campaigns and doctrines, because we learnt our lesson many years ago that rarely will you have a genius to lead you; so you had better bring up the rest of the gang to a reasonable level!
[Another question was, what are the two or three most important reforms to be carried out at the UN.]
First of all, may I give you my impression of what has happened in the UN? The UN has failed because some nations want it to fail. Through that whole genocide conflict I was convinced that there was a body above the Security Council, their members talking with its national capitals and setting out the game-plan; and it was simply being articulated in the Security Council and then being applied. My belief is that strategically the powers of the world are not keen on having an effective UN. It's a fabulous scapegoat. We even saw Clinton use it, on the one hand saying the UN had failed and on the other hand making sure they didn't have the resources to not fail. And so I do believe that there is a strong movement among several world powers which do not want another player on the block with the capacity for intervention, and the capability of launching it.
The first reform needed is for every UN member state to give a little chip of its sovereignty to the UN. People will be aghast at that thought. Yet, in your readings here and what we anyway know, every country in the Western world has already started to give up its sovereignty or pieces thereof. There is no more pure sovereign state. The concept of sovereignty, the pillar of how we structured our Western world, with governments and bodies of nations, is (I think) is a bit distrait. One year before the Rwandan genocide sixty-nine nations signed documents to the Secretary-General, in action acquiesced in by the Security Council, stating that, if there was ever a crisis, these countries will almost automatically provide troops. (I say nearly automatically, because I also believe that, if you are going to send troops and other people overseas into these conflict areas, the political structures must be held accountable for that decision. I will be accountable if I wipe them out; I will be court-martialed. I believe the government should be held accountable for their use and for whatever result.) However, when the Rwanda crisis started, all 69 nations were called upon to provide troops. None of them provided troops. Can there be an instrument by which you can still have a political influence, but which gives room for manoeuvre for the Secretary-General or the Security Council, in order to permit preventive deployments and so on? Standing on pure sovereignty is passé.
Another needed reform of the UN is a reform of the political will of the nations. Politically the nations must acknowledge the UN as the world body, the world arbiter, the world's transparent and impartial entity, and give it the room that it deserves in the decision-making of this global village, this global structure. I totally disagree with any of us hoping that the West or the Japanese or the Germans will be able to keep a lid on the destructive or negative influences of globalization in the future. I think you still need a world body, more than ever. There have been changes at the UN; but it is all nuts and bolts. There has not been a will to reform in a more strategic way, and countries who base their policies on self-interest don't want that reform. That's my short answer.
[ Archie MacKinnon: where are the leaders in conflict resolution?]
Well, there are some in academe. Some will say that academe produces all kinds of theories for which they don't necessarily hold responsibility when you try to apply it. The whole world of NGOs is very intimately involved in conflict resolution and human rights. We don't have a national security council as such. The strategic orientation of this nation is done within various bodies, unless they invented something new recently. And it is also exceptionally difficult for the political structures, the way they are, to be able to bring about a long-term, strategically focused vision. It was done in the past. Many reforms in this nation were carried out by strategically thinking people in a practised exercise - all our health systems, and so on first in small areas and then expanded on the national scene. Many people took significant risks in changing the nature of this nation. That statesmanship is what is required at this juncture. All I know is that a lot of lessons are being learnt; we are taking a lot of casualties; we are not being as successful as we could wish to be; we will be over-rating in some areas and under-rating in others as we work our way through this fog. I would very much like to join any body that has the authority to bring forward such a new conceptual base.
You had a strong capability during the Cold War: the whole anti-nuclear movement - massive capability! I hope that one day, because of globalization and communications, people will have the same abhorrence to the use of children in conflict as they have to nuclear weapons and to chemical weapons. It's funny that we can't raise that reaction. We don't seem to consider these crimes against humanity any more evil because they are using children - and we should. I think that through global communications we can create global cultures, and can destroy the impunity of people who use children; in fact bring their actions to the same plane of abhorrence as we do with the weapons. Some of the thoughts that I'm offering you will require decades to happen, maybe will require centuries, or a millenium. The only way you eat a one-ton marshmallow is one bite at a time! I believe that we can mature; that over time and working every day we can advance humanity into a different sphere if we have that strategic, long-term belief - as long as you don't count it in elections, if you don't count it in budgets, or count it in the near term.
[Romeo Maione spoke about the Atlantic Monthly articles on Rwanda and the destruction of its coffee industry by multinational corporations.]
The corporations have been assisted by globalization and have got another step ahead in the self-interest dimension versus the humanitarian dimension. Rwanda is the size of Prince Edward Island, and there are 8.3 million people there, and it is full of mountains and valleys and swamps.
Overpopulation is an understatement. And so we had NGOs from Monday to Saturday who would try to cover in rubber the whole country, and on Sunday we would have these Judaeo-Christians - 90 percent of them - at church and receiving instructions about "no contraception". These are complex, ethical, moral problems - not just for or against -that have to be faced in the evolution of these nations. What is the answer? What is the balance? It is all out there to be solved. That is why I say to many of my colleagues, "This is the most phenomenal time to serve! For there is nothing pat out there; it is in revolution."
[Ross Smyth on the Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war.]
I think the UN Charter is strong enough to do that, if people will apply it. It's like going to school: you are given the books and the theory and the information, but whether it gets between the two ears is another story, of course. Do we want a UN that can police and oversee that? A world body is crucial; the question is what will be its moral authority and how will people respond to one of the reform ideas that was thrown around a lot, that we need a UN army. I think the most terrible action ever to consider for the UN in resolving conflicts or a crisis is to have its own army. For one thing, to whom is it loyal? Is it loyal to the UN? Are most people prepared to give their lives for the UN? What is the selection process across the world? What will be its values and its ethical references? And what do you do with it when it fails? Fire it, get rid of it? A UN army is not a solution. The solutions are in the nations' capitals, and what they can bring forward as innovative solutions for that world body. That world body is not an entity, it is brought together because people want it to be brought together. People and nations can influence it and change it; and it is no more difficult to change than any other bureaucracy. I'm not saying it is easy; I'm just saying it is no more complex.
[Murray Thomson on how we can help to make people realize that a basic part of international development is conflict resolution.]
This is part of my report to the Minister [of International Cooperation] after being with her for a year. My message is that development should not be subordinate to foreign policy. It is supportive; it is a grown person. It might be a younger brother, but it is an entity and not a subordinate. I know that there are frictions and a flow of discussion that generally has CIDA people sitting there as subordinate, hesitating to bring their own dimension for international policy and their view of the world.
A second point is that the agency has produced a policy document called "Child Protection". It encompasses war-affected children, children who are under terrible labour structures, being abused in all kinds of ways around the world. It is a magnificent instrument to put a face on CIDA and in fact encapsulate the interests of this nation. I have given speeches in all kinds of places - in high schools, universities, teachers' associations and the like. And I speak to them all about conflict and about children affected by conflict. The first question every time is, "What can we do? It works out better if we can do something." Which is crucial, because if you have got communities and the schools, chambers of commerce and so on behind you, then you get money and effort, and you can strengthen the normal structures that support both CIDA and the NGOs out there.
There is a $2.2 billion social development component that Minister Minna has inserted as a priority into the CIDA program structure. It is a five-year plan. There wasn't a cent for communications inside this nation. I believe that almost all the money in CIDA's hands should go overseas to help development. However this self-effacement at home is simply guaranteeing that you are going to get less money available to advance these ideas. There is no face to CIDA. I am proposing over this next year what I call a campaign plan based on child protection and war-affected children. To give to schools something as simple as what the War Amps do, which is a package about the veterans. There are a variety of other instruments out there; so possibly we might choose one of those four priorities of social development - education, health, HIV/AIDS, child protection - and make that the new corporate image of CIDA. It needs a corporate image. Its self-effacement is self-destructing. But then again you get into internal politics and "Why choose child protection when we are doing 4,395 other projects?" That discussion requires a lot of departmental maturity. Anyways, thank you for the questions.
