Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction: Topics and Speakers
Conclusions and Proposals
PRINCIPAL SPEAKERS
PANEL PRESENTATIONS
Any progress on sustainable development?
Trade and global equity: new partnerships or recolonization?
Redefining national and international security
DISCUSSION GROUPS
APPENDIX I
Text -
Hon. John Reid PC: Anti-terrorism and Secrecy
APPENDIX II
The Group of 78
Editors: Arch MacKenzie and Tim Creery
Production Editor: Mary Edwards
Acknowledgments
Our thanks must go first to the speakers, panelists, and resource people at
the discussion groups who freely gave their time and effort to making the Conference
a success.
A special word of thanks goes to Peggy Mason, who chaired the preparatory committee
for the conference and the conference itself. Our congratulations to her and
Penny Sanger, who helped build the G78 as executive secretary in the 1980s,
on becoming Chair and Vice-Chair respectively of the Group of 78.
The Group is most grateful to all those who helped to organize and run the
conference, which this year drew 86 people, of whom 61 were members, to Econiche
Lodge. Particular thanks go to:
Conference Coordinator: Working with the chair and preparatory committee,
conference coordinator Mary Edwards did a fine job of handling the administrative
side.
Members of the preparatory committee: Peggy Mason (chair), Élisabeth
Barot, Geoffrey Bruce, Tim Creery, Jennifer Dickson, Mary Edwards, Ross Francis,
John Graham, Robert Judge, Graeme Kirby, Arch MacKenzie, Peter Meincke, Clyde
Sanger, and Michael Shenstone. The committee would like to thank Nancy Drozd,
former Treasurer and Executive Secretary, for her continuing advice and support.
Conference Rapporteurs: Once again we were pleased to welcome
graduate students from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at
Carleton University as Aworking
guests@
at the Conference. This report is based on their work: Rebeca Batres-Doré,
Marie-Noëlle Desrochers, Zeynep Ersahin, Tiani Jimenez, Adria Mays, Brendan
Sutton, and Alexa Wilson (who is also a law student at University of Ottawa).
Moderators of panels and discussion groups: Jennifer Dickson, Dwight
Fulford, Michael Shenstone, Graeme Kirby, Penny Sanger, Tim Creery, Peggy Mason.
Editors: Arch MacKenzie and Tim Creery organized the rapporteur group
and were the editors of this report; Mary Edwards was production editor.
Translation: Suzanne Chabot and Evelyn Dumas
Financial Contributions: While members pay their own way
to the Conference and participants in the program donate their services, the
Conference would not be possible without financial support for organization
and administration. This year=s
gathering was made possible by the continuing generous support of the John Holmes
Fund, administered by the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development located
in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and by important
grants from the International Development Research Centre and the Special Projects
Fund of the Department of National Defence.
Rev. James Christie and Élisabeth Barot,
Co-Chairs of the Group of 78, 2000-2002
Introduction: Themes and Speakers
Themes
The world in the wake of Sept. 11, 2001 -
specifically the impact on Canadian foreign policy -
was the target of the Annual Policy Conference of the Group of 78.
Three principal speakers, three panels, four discussion groups, and a final
plenary session to consider the results filled the three-day event.
The theme AHot-button issues in Canadian
foreign policy since September 11" was explored by speakers'
panels in three main areas - environmentally-sustainable
development, trade and global equity, and national and international security.
The four discussion groups explored Canadian policy on water, defence, anti-terrorist
legislation and the International Criminal Court.
The final plenary session reviewed the conference as a whole and approved a
number of statements; they are set out in the section that follows: Conclusions
and Proposals.
Principal speakers
Margaret Catley-Carlson, a recent Order of Canada recipient whose career
reflects a glittering collection of domestic and international postings, was
the opening keynote dinner speaker. She is a former federal deputy health minister,
a former president of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA),
a former president of the Population Council and a former deputy executive director
of UNICEF. She outlined seven areas in which the hot-button issues cause Astatic"
in global management.
Currently, Ms. Catley-Carlson is the chair, director or advisor with several
organisations applying science and knowledge to the better management of national
and international problems ranging from fresh water to health, agriculture,
environment protection, and international development and its financing. They
include Global Water Partnership (Chair), Water Resources Advisory Committee
for Suez: Paris (Chair), and the International Development Research Centre in
Ottawa (Vice-Chair).
Warren Allmand, a former Liberal solicitor general and the past president
of Rights and Democracy (formerly the International Centre for Human Rights
and Development), gave a luncheon address on the perilous balance between human
rights and security.
Mr. Allmand, 33 years a Member of Parliament and a minister of three portfolios
including Solicitor General, worked against South African apartheid and the
death penalty and for tougher gun control laws, arms control and disarmament,
and human rights protection for the disabled, aboriginals, the poor, elderly,
jobless, prison inmates and others.
Professor Manfred Bienefeld, at Carleton University's School of Public
Administration since 1986, has had a lengthy academic career as economist, teacher,
author and consultant on national and international issues in countries ranging
from Fiji to Cuba, Russia, Thailand, China and many other sectors. His voluminous
list of publications includes four books and participation in 12 others as well
as scores of published papers.
He has been associated with the London School of Economics and the universities
of Dar es Salaam and Sussex, and his scholarly and professional activities cover
a broad range of issues from the environment to international development, labor
markets and industrial policy and the factors bearing on the formation of public
policy.
Panels
1. Environmentally-sustainable development -
International commitment and implementation: Are we going forward?
Roy Culpeper joined the North-South Institute in 1986 and became its
president in 1995, with previous background with the Manitoba government, the
federal finance department and Canada's foreign affairs service. He has been
an advisor to Canada's executive director at the World Bank in Washington.
Mark Winfield is acting policy director of the Pembina Institute as
well as director of its environmental governance program. Previously, he was
director of research with the Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy,
has published widely, and was an expert witness on Ontario environmental policy
at the inquiry into the Walkerton water tragedy. He also teaches at York and
Toronto universities.
2. Trade and global equity - New partnerships
or recolonization?
William Dymond, executive director of the Centre for Trade Policy and
Law at Carleton University, has been a senior official in Canadian foreign relations
and trade matters including ambassador to Brazil from 1992 to l995. He has headed
the department's chief think tank, the Policy Planning Secretariat, led negotiations
on international air agreements and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,
among other missions, and published abundantly.
Bernard Wood is the founding chief executive officer of the North South
Institute with a broad mix of experience in development, political and security
affairs. He now heads a consulting group in Ottawa but has worked with the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations, the Canadian International
Development Agency, and Parliamentary committees, among others. He was the CEO
of the then Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.
3. Redefining national and international security: Canadian foreign policy at
another crossroads or a steadily-narrowing bicycle path?
Professor Andrew Cohen has a cross-appointment to the Carleton University
School of Journalism and Communications and the Norman Paterson School of International
Affairs. He joined the Carleton faculty in 2001 after four years as the Globe
and Mail's Washington correspondent and had worked previously for the Financial
Post, Saturday Night magazine and the Globe and Mail editorial board. He is
the author of A Deal Undone: The Making and Breaking of the Meech Lake Accord.
Fen Osler Hampson, director of the Norman Paterson School of International
Affairs at Carleton University, is the author of six books and editor or co-author
of more than 20 others. They reflect his studies at the universities of Toronto
and Harvard and the London School of Economic, numerous awards, and a deep interest
in international conflict resolution. His articles have appeared in a number
of leading international journals.
Peggy Mason, newly-elected chair of the Group of 78, was Canadian ambassador
for disarmament and arms control affairs from 1989 to 1994 and maintains a busy
consulting role on international security policy, particularly the role of the
UN. She gives pre-posting lectures to Canadian diplomats and has been a faculty
member of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Cornwallis, N.S. since 1996 She develops
courses and lectures on the political and diplomatic components of modern complex
peace operations. She is a recognized international expert in disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration of ex-combatants in post-conflict environments.
Discussion Groups
1. Canadian defence policy:
Stan Carlson served from 1993 to 2000 as chief of the UN's Situation
Centre in the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, a 24-hour-a-day system
providing contact point services, reporting and crisis-management facilities.
He was in the Privy Council Office from 1985 to 1993 as executive secretary
of the intelligence committee. He held earlier postings to embassies including
London and New York.
Douglas A. Fraser ended 40 years of military service in 1993, retiring
as a colonel to become a political officer in the UN Department of Disarmament
Affairs. His final military appointment, following command of the second battalion
of the Royal Canadian Regiment, was military advisor to the permanent Canadian
mission at the UN, and a senior member of the Canadian delegation to the UN
first committee, responsible for arms control and disarmament. From 1996 to
2000 he was executive director of the then Canadian Council for International
Peace and Security. He is an active external faculty member of the Pearson Peacekeeping
Centre.
2. Canadian Water Policy:
Margaret Catley-Carlson, Mark Winfield (see above)
3. Canadian Anti-terrorism legislation:
John Reid, a Liberal MP from 1965 to 1984 and a former minister of federal-provincial
affairs, began his seven-year term as Information Commissioner in 1998. His
House of Commons work helped shape the current Access to Information act introduced
in 1983. He founded his consulting agency in 1984, was president of the Canadian
Nuclear Association from 1990 to 1996 and in 1997 joined the UN transitional
administration in Eastern Slovenia as political advisor to the chief electoral
officer. His text on AAnti-terrorism
and Secrecy" is given in full in Appendix
1.
4. The International Criminal Court and the future of international law:
Fergus Watt has been national executive director of the World Federalists
of Canada since 1985. The non-profit organisation has 1,500 members and is dedicated
to the application of democratic federalism to world affairs, advancing the
rule of law and a more effective and accountable global governance.
Mike Perry, an officer with the Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Section,
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, is co-ordinator of the
International Criminal Court Campaign. His work includes technical support and
capacity building with developing countries to facilitate their ratification
of the Rome statute of the ICC.
Conclusions and Proposals
This year as last, the Group of 78 Annual Policy Conference stressed the key
role of the United Nations in dealing with global security in the wake of September
11, 2002. The UN-centred approach is in keeping with the principle of a strengthened
and reinvigorated United Nations system embedded in the original statement of
the G78 in 1981.
Last year, the plenary session of the Conference urged that the September 11
terrorism attacks on the United States be pursued as criminal acts by the United
Nations, and that the UN Security Council create an ad hoc tribunal to
try those suspected of the attacks, similar to the international tribunals set
up by the Council to deal with the atrocities in Rwanda and the Balkans. This
year, the Group similarly put the emphasis on a UN approach to the problems
with Iraq:
Iraq
The Canadian government should consider the participation of Canadian forces
in military action against Iraq only if such action is authorized by the
United Nations.
The plenary session also considered the background to the hot-button issues
of the times and adopted a statement reflecting many of the views heard from
the principal speakers and panelists who participated in the Conference.
Support for Prime Minister's
worldview
The Group of 78 supports Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's
statements pointing to poverty and powerlessness among the younger population
of the Third World as being among the causes of terrorism. The Group welcomes
his pledge to increase by eight per cent Canada's Overseas Development Assistance
(ODA), directed in particular to measures of poverty-reduction and human
rights.
Valuable UN conferences
The Group of 78 further welcomes the raising of public awareness of global
issues through the staging of United Nations conferences, and through the
thorough airing of these issues in Canadian and other media. While recognizing
that the implementation of agreements reached at these conferences necessarily
takes considerable time, the Group expresses disappointment at the measurably
modest outcome of the UN conference on sustainable development. It calls
for more sustained action by the Canadian government to implement the measures
set out in Agenda 21 and in particular in the
areas of renewable energy and biodiversity, which received inadequate attention
at Johannesburg.
Fairer trade with developing countries
The Group of 78 recommends the removal of subsidies by developed countries
on products also produced by developing countries, removal of quotas on
the import of such products, and the immediate ending of subsidized exports
of such products by developed countries, with transitional fiscal measures
to compensate producers in developed countries harmed by such measures.
Monitoring foreign aid -- by the recipients
The Group also welcomes the emerging mechanism by which independent monitoring
groups in recipient countries (such as in Tanzania and Rwanda) compile regular
reports on the performance of donor countries, particularly the co-ordination
of their efforts.
The plenary session endorsed a number of recommendations made by the four Discussion
Groups and adopted them as G78 policy.
Canadian defence policy: review needed
From Discussion Group 1, on Canadian defence policy, the gathering adopted
the recommendation that:
Canada urgently needs a comprehensive, integrated review of foreign affairs,
defence, and security policy.
The plenary session also agreed with the Discussion Group's
view that: ACanada can play a significant
role in peace-keeping, peace-making, and conflict resolution".
Canadian water policy
Discussion Group 2 on Canadian Water Policy won approval for a range of views:
Foreign There should be global emphasis on exploring and
applying small-scale technical alternatives in water use and preservation.
This would include run-of-the-river (no dam) turbines, water harvesting,
and storage tanks.
Domestic A major challenge is the lack of government regulation
to encourage compliance by agriculture with agricultural protection, especially
domestic water sources threatened by pollution from chemical fertilizers.
Other The interpretation of chapter 11 of the NAFTA agreement
should be narrowed to ensure government has the power in dealing with the
question of bulk water exports to conserve water resources and protect health
and the environment. The current treaty language could lead to international
legal challenges on control of water exports, resulting in applications
for compensation where export schemes are denied.
Anti-terrorism legislation goes too far
The following conclusions of Discussion Group 3, on Canadian Anti-terrorism
Legislation, were adopted by the plenary:
The Group concluded that under pressure of time and a panic reaction to
the terrorist threat, Parliament adopted a bill providing for unreasonable
restrictions on citizens and impairing the capacity of the courts to protect
a number of citizens' rights.
The Group recommends that the anti-terrorism legislation should now be
subject to thorough study by the House of Commons Justice Committee with
a view to repealing or amending those provisions that cannot be shown to
be needed for the protection of citizens and their rights and liberties
from terrorist attack. This would offer citizens and interested parties
a full opportunity to express their views.
If such a course is not adopted, the Group recommends that the Government
refer the legislation to the Supreme Court of Canada to determined whether
all its provisions are consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.
Building support for the International Criminal Court
The plenary session supported the following recommendation from Discussion
Group 4 on the International Criminal Court and the Future of International
Law:
1. Public advocacy: Create a network of NGOs and groups of lawyers who
are interested in criminal law and human rights issues. Members of this
network could:
- Create an international criminal bar association.
- Promote the further development of Canadian criminal legislation.
- Propose definitions of the crime of aggression that would further strengthen
current laws, including the UN Charter.
- Help expand efforts to create a trust fund for victims, and to pressure
the Canadian government to make a substantial initial contribution.
- Generate further discussion promoting the ICC and publicize those discussions.
Media groups should be targetted, lunches can be organized, members of local
bars should be included, a speaker's
bureau can be formed, and faculties of law could also be included in the
process.
2. Individual initiative: Support the ICC by accessing the Amnesty International
Web site and signing the petition at the following Web site:
Amnesty International -
then click on the International Justice link.
Clearly there is cause for optimism in the current movement to establish
a permanent international criminal law system. With active support by members
of governments and civil society, the ICC has the potential to make vast
improvements to criminal law protections worldwide.
Principal Speakers:
SCANNING THE HORIZON: SYSTEM STATIC AND ROUGH WATERS
Margaret Catley-Carlson
(Edited transcript)
This talk will address what I call sources of static in international affairs.
Sources of static are hot button issues in the tapestry of international relations.
Sources of static are not events in themselves, but background forces that influence
the capacity of international actors to manage global issues effectively.
In the Post Cold War era, the global horizon is not as we had hoped. Now there
exist even fewer manageable sources of tension than seemed to be the case when
bi-polar missile issues were the main topic on the menu. These include: the
rise in disparity of income (the United States makes up 5 per cent of the world's
population, but 21 per cent of its output), shifts in the global economy, increased
interdependence leaving each country more vulnerable to crises, rising disaffection
with foreign aid programs, extension of weapons capacities outside national
borders, new diseases, and new environmental threats. Another source of tension
is disintegration. In 1900 there were 60 nation states; today there are 190-plus.
In the western world, 50 per cent of marriages collapse, thereby destabilizing
society within states. Urbanization has led to a breakdown of social structures,
and the push factors - the resistance
and the political backlash associated with immigration -
add to a global sense of disintegration.
On the other hand, there are certainly positive elements discernible in Post
Cold War times. For instance, the world witnessed a dramatic dissolution of
communism, a global movement toward greater democracy, increased concern with
poverty and human rights, wider participation by civil society institutions
in national and global affairs, more people living better than ever before,
and greater advances of education in global society.
Unfortunately, for each positive element of change, exceptional situations
exist. In addition, the sources of static I mentioned have made global management
more difficult. Clearly, the Post Cold War era is different from what we expected.
The following seven sources of static reflect the new international horizon
that makes global management a complex task.
Static in the system: Seven hot-button issues
1. Static from living with the hegemon
Living with the hegemon is the single greatest source of static affecting the
world's ability to manage international
affairs. All issues, global or national, are now played as domestic issues in
the United States. In a bipolar world, there was a good deal of concern for
winning hearts and minds'.
Policy makers felt that if they did not act on an issue, the other side would.
Expertise on non-U.S.A. cultures, political issues and domestic realities has
much less currency than in a bipolar world. Currently, decision makers in the
United States place a greater emphasis on the impacts of international decisions
on domestic interests. This focus extends to the district level and dominates
the bulk of discussions on issues of foreign policy. Canadian policy makers
adopt the opposite approach, exploring international implications of policies
before considering their impact on domestic issues. Further, the rise of American
focus on internal issues has increased over the last five years.
Bilateral issues between Canada and the United States will worsen. The softwood
lumber issue is only the beginning of bilateral tension. Another source of tension
for Canada and the world will arise from coping with how the hegemon acts on
other issues, such as the U.S.-Iraq relationship, the International Criminal
Court, an acceptance of the global-warming concept, addressing the need for
renewable energy research, and the definition of terrorism and acceptable responses
to that problem.
2. Static from globalization
- How can the world manage globalization? This is one of the most controversial
issues in public discourse.
- Is globalization worsening the divide between rich and poor nations and
creating a global underclass?
- Is globalization an essential step toward universal peace and prosperity?
The controversy surrounding the appropriate definition of globalization
is an issue in itself, since there is no clear and widely agreed-upon notion
of the word. Clearly, as a result of globalization the world experiences greater
flows of goods, services, investments, and people across national borders. In
addition, globalization has become a source of significant stress on the instruments
of global management.
Further, globalization raises questions of how to manage the sheer speed and
scale of change. New technologies in telecommunications and information management
accelerate the process. Illustrating the advance in connectedness, for instance,
broadband use in Japan is expected to rise 50 per cent in four years to include
87 million users. Terrorists and anti-globalists use these same tools. By contrast,
more than 50 per cent of the world's
population has never spoken on the phone.
Globalization also presents challenges to systems of governance. Economic,
financial and political crises in one part of the world quickly affect the others.
In addition, poor and vulnerable groups tend to bear a disproportionate share
of the impact of today's adversities.
Another challenge for governance is increased pressure to adopt the so-called
Washington Consensus Model. Individuals in capital markets who subscribe to
the model monitor government transactions closely and assess investment opportunities
accordingly. Without the approval of such capital markets when a government
deviates from the model, transactions become increasingly difficult to conduct.
This system has a strong impact on the issue of Third World debt and international
trade. Inhibiting the possibility of borrowing in poor countries, this aspect
of globalization hinders their efforts to provide basic social services for
their people.
3. Static from demography - root
causes
The good news is that the world's
population will eventually stabilize. The present population is 6 billion people;
it will settle at something less than 9 billion. The difficult news concerns
the momentum of global population trends. Momentum describes an important
phenomenon of population growth. Although more people wait longer to have children,
and more people use birth control, a significant proportion of the world's
population is reaching the age for childbearing; ergo, massive continuing population
increase.
This momentum in population growth produces problems for global management.
For example, the cohort issue. Who is what age in what countries? For example,
in an economy that is not growing, where 40 to 50 per cent of the population
is below 25 years old, there is a good deal of unemployment and frustration.
Since 50 per cent of that cohort will be male, this can lead to violence. These
demographics are linked to the incidence of terrorism and violence. Another
problematic issue is that African urbanization is not well managed. For instance,
with increased urbanization in Africa, the very poverty of African cities means
that effective tax bases have not been established.
As another cohort example - this
time positive - more favourable demographics
gave rise to the AAsian Miracle".
In these countries, population growth was on the decline, while economic growth
as a result of sound policies produced employment opportunities for the largest
cohort in that society at that time - an able work force that was mostly between
the ages of 15 and 35. Family formation and housing demand of a large young
working cohort can and did provide very powerful impetus for the growth that
occurred. This growth in the cohort entering the labour force when the economy
was growing assisted the economic miracle that ensued.
By 2050, there will be 2 billion people over the age of 65; if we look further
into the future, 40 per cent of the global population may be over 60. Such demographics
set political and economic agendas.
4. Static from the Arab and Islamic world
The Arab and Islamic world poses particular challenges to global management.
In contrast to the downturning demographic shifts just mentioned, the population
in the 22 Arab countries will grow from 280 million to between 410 and 459 million
by 2020. This means that one in 20 people in the world will come from the Arab
and Islamic world.
In addition to population growth, the Arab and Islamic region will suffer the
most from climate change. The ability to cope with climate change and other
adverse events will be complicated by the increasing rigidities regarding policy
change in the whole Arab (but not the whole Muslim) region. These indicators
point to a dramatic increase in what are already strong sources of tension in
this region.
The first United Nations Development Report on Arab Development, which was
written by a number of Arab intellectuals from a variety of disciplines, indicates
very difficult questions for global management. The report indicates that per
capita income growth shrank in the last 20 years to a level just above
that of sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, productivity in the region is declining.
Research and development efforts are weak or nonexistent, and science and technology
are dormant. Significant numbers of intellectuals are moving from this part
of the world.
Other gloomy indicators include evidence that use of the Internet in the region
is low. Film-making appears to be declining. There is a Asevere
shortage" of new writing. The whole
Arab world translates 330 books annually, or one-fifth the number of books translated
by Greece alone. In the one thousand years since the Mamoun caliphate, Arabs
have translated only as many books as Spain translates in one year. Fifty per
cent of women cannot read or write; the maternal mortality rate is two times
that of Latin America and four times that of East Asia.
BUT - life expectancy in the Arab and Islamic world is longer than the world
average of 67 years. The level of abject poverty is not one of the world's
lowest, because of the strength of family structures. Education spending is
higher than in the rest of the developing world. So there are strengths to build
on - but how?
These paradoxes make the Arab and Islamic World a source of static and pose
difficult questions for global management. Such causes of tension are exacerbated
when the first cause of static (the hegemon) seems to be travelling on a direct
collision course with the Arab and Islamic world. The two sources of static
together produce a tension that poses significant challenges to global management.
5. Static from poverty in Africa and sub-continental Asia
In Africa, 340 million people (which is nearly half the entire population of
Africa), live on less than a dollar a day each. Only 60 cent of the population
has access to safe water. Two hundred million people suffer from malnutrition.
The death rate is high due to sicknesses such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, and diarrhea.
For example, infant mortality (for children under five years old) is140 per1,000
infants. In addition, population growth is still very high.
Why do the poor stay poor? The main reason is systemic failure, which impacts
on everything. Well-implanted vicious circles impede development. For instance,
if a mother has six children, the two eldest daughters may be pulled from their
schools to help raise the family; these two also may grow up to have six children
each, again each pulling two to help raise the family; the cycle continues.
Another reason why the poor stay poor is the indifference of monied people
in the domestic economy and the international system. For instance, India experienced
a rise in middle class society, but that sector of society is not taxed in a
way that could improve Indian levels of poverty.
The international system makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the impoverished
to succeed. The use of agricultural subsidies shows why. In Ghana, for example,
consumers find it may be less expensive to buy food from the European Union
than from their own farmers.
Indeed, figures show that agricultural subsidies account for $350 billion dollars,
or seven times the amount of foreign aid. In addition, $50 billion is lost on
agricultural export opportunities, with the impact on domestic production worse
- and the impact on water worse still.
The African share of world trade is only 2 per cent, but this is still10 times
the amount of Overseas Development Assistance sent to Africa. In other words,
their ability to trade is a stronger and more important factor, even now, than
the ability to attract aid. In addition, Africa attracts less than 7 per cent
of foreign direct investment, compared with 15 per cent 20 years ago.
Programs for foreign debt relief have rigid conditions. The suggestions for
improved governance are strict: a requirement that countries provide evidence
that they will use the Afiscal space"
created by debt relief to address poverty issues places increased burdens on
already troubled economies. This debt relief formula has been successful for
a few countries, but most cannot borrow enough to improve social conditions,
let alone enough to buy and trade goods. Finally, results indicate that the
25 worst-nourished countries are all badly governed. The figures point to a
strong source of static that is difficult for global management.
6. Static from environmental problems
The Johannesburg Earth Summit caused me to question the utility of mega conferences.
The conference was vast, distances were enormous, and sites were widely separated
(often as much as 30 kilometers or one hour apart from each other). There was
little inter-sectoral communication (forests and water and biodiversity, for
example, were separated) and little awareness of what was going on at other
sites. Official government activity and other activities were almost totally
separated. I was unable to retrieve the contents of ministerial texts or declarations
until after the conference. Clearly, one must question the continuing utility
of mega conferences.
On the other hand, unlike the conference on racism, Johannesburg did not fall
apart. Participants seemed to recognize that the environment and development
(and poverty, but less so) are inextricably linked. Intergovernmental agreements
were achieved, although with results that were modest, to say the least. The
conference demonstrated high awareness of water as an issue of concern; in fact,
this was at the top of the agenda for many delegates.
The accomplishments of the conference were that two main documents were negotiated
and adopted: the plan of implementation and the Johannesburg declaration on
sustainable development. While significant, they left major areas of disagreement.
Those include: time-bound targets for sanitation, renewable energy, energy subsidies,
chemicals and health, natural resource degradation, biodiversity, loss of fish
stocks, certain Rio principles, governance, trade, finance and globalization,
the Kyoto protocol, and health and human rights. Clearly the abundance of key
areas of disagreement makes for a source of static that will challenge global
management.
7. Static from growing water concerns
The final source of static - critical
water problems - troubles many actors
internationally. Water tables are declining, many rivers no longer reach the
sea (including seven major rivers that for 60 to70 days of the year do not reach
the sea), and over1 billion people lack consistent access to fresh water (twice
that number lack access to proper sanitation). Twenty-eight per cent of all
freshwater fish are in peril; deltas and wetlands are disappearing. Water quality
everywhere is in decline. The majority of the population, even in the developing
world, will be in burgeoning cities by the end of the first decade of the 21st
century. This poses major difficulties for water management.
The world can therefore expect more conflict and competition for access to
water and use of water. Irrigation is a key issue: it will use between 17 and
38 per cent more water than now. Industry is projected to need 20 per cent more
water. At the same time, drinking water needs are projected to grow by 70 per
cent by 2025. During the period that population trebled (with the addition of
3 billion people), water demand rose six times. Two to 3 billion people will
be added to our population, which will no doubt make extremely high demands
on water.
In relation to such problems, global hot spots, namely in the Indus valley,
the Middle East, and the United States Mid-West, will vie for increased water,
disputing its territorial sources.
What is the response of global water laws? They are just not adequate for today's
world. Our current water laws may be traced from time immemorial up to and including
the time when the world's population
was 2 billion, when there was one-twentieth the amount of chemicals in the water
(or none at all), populations were mostly rural and people were mostly poor.
At that time the role of governments was to provide traditional delivery systems
based on traditional thought patterns, as opposed to providing a regulatory
system for water management. There is usually no Ministry of Water; nor is there
a water organization within the United Nations. People believe water should
be available at low cost, or no cost, and that water governance and expertise
were best organized sectorally.
Fortunately, things are changing and now there exists a kind of Anewwaterthink".
Public authorities are establishing policy and regulatory frameworks. There
is a recognition that old systems must be reformed and new institutional frameworks
developed. Transparency is needed toward subsidies and introducing full-cost
pricing, which shows in turn that an interest in making use of market mechanisms
is required. Finally, water problems are increasingly recognized as cross-sectoral.
The Global Water Partnership (GWP), which I serve as chairperson, is an organization
created to address this cause of static worldwide. GWP is a platform for alliance-building
that mobilizes political will and brings awareness to key areas of water management.
Decision makers, professionals, the public, and all key stakeholders are targeted.
Information is disseminated via the Internet, the media, the distribution of
background papers and what we call a toolbox with over 50 tools for enabling
effective water management.
The GWP operates in 12 regions which touch over 100 countries and directly
in 26 countries. These operators do not receive financial support from the GWP
for the implementation of their projects. They are, however, able to use the
GWP label and share in the knowledge network that is now well established. This
is one mechanism for addressing the pressing need for change in the global management
of water.
Evidently, the Post Cold War era is not how it was envisioned. The seven sources
of static on the international horizon -
the seven hot-button issues, to put it in the terms of this conference -
point to significant challenges to the management of global affairs.
Principal Speakers:
THE BALANCE BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC SECURITY
Warren Allmand
(Edited text)
As I have no taste for retirement, I appreciated your invitation as an opportunity
to keep up-to-date and in touch. As you know, the mission of Rights and Democracy,
where I ended my mandate as president three months ago, is to defend and promote
democracy and human rights in the international arena. This gave us an opportunity
to deal with some of the most challenging current issues, including those in
the aftermath of September 11, such as the relationship between Apublic
security and human rights", which
is my subject this afternoon. I would like to discuss it with you under seven
headings:
- The human rights implications of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
- The response of governments to September 11.
- The international campaign against terrorism.
- The war against the Taliban and Afghanistan.
- The treatment of prisoners of war.
- The enactment of anti-terrorist legislation.
- Some conclusions and recommendations, including a consideration of the roots
of terrorism, the need for a multilateral approach, and respect for the international
rule of law.
1. Human rights implications
We must first state emphatically that the attack on the World Trade Centre
and the Pentagon was a massive violation of Article 3 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). That Aeveryone has
the right to life, liberty, and security of person"
(Article 3) is the most basic of all human rights. Consequently, these rights
cannot be understated or trivialized in any way. I say this because some commentators
have done just that. There can be no excuse or justification for this attack
on thousands of innocent people, of many nationalities, not just Americans.
Furthermore, governments have a responsibility to ensure and protect these
rights and rights of the life and security of the person.
Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says: AEveryone
is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized".
But in protecting these rights -
the right to life - governments
must do so in a manner that does not violate other rights. Again the Declaration
of Human Rights in Article 30 says: ANothing
in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any state Y
any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction
of any of the rights set forth herein."
Consequently, in taking action against terrorism, governments must be careful
to maintain a delicate balance between collective security and individual
liberties. So in our letter to the Prime Minister on September 20, 2001, we
said that any response to September 11 must respect the UN Charter and international
human rights obligations - and in
no way should we target any one religion or ethnic group. Otherwise we are
repeating the sins of those we are condemning.
- Response of governments
Well, what was the response of the U.S., Europe, Canada and other countries
to the tragedy of September 11? First we had the establishment of the international
coalition and campaign against terrorism. Now, while admitting that such a
campaign was necessary, that something had to be done to prevent more September
11s, we have to be very clear that this particular campaign and this coalition
was put together with little or no consideration for human rights and democracy.
I had great difficulty believing President Bush when, soon after, I heard
him say that this was a campaign to defend democracy and Aour
way of life." In effect, to get
the broadest possible support for the campaign against international terrorism,
the United States, the United Kingdom, and others included nations that had
little respect, or no respect whatsoever, for democracy and human rights;
many of these nations are now using the anti-terrorism campaign to more aggressively
suppress democratic movements in their own countries. In effect, the anti-terrorism
campaign in several countries has encouraged the labelling of legitimate dissent
as terrorism.
We have seen this in Pakistan, China, Israel, India, Russia, Turkey, and
Colombia and so on. As a matter of fact, in several of these countries it
can be said that terrorists are in the government or tacitly supported by
the government. This sort of unholy alliance has happened before, with the
U.S., the U.K., France and others supporting non-democratic, even terrorist
governments to achieve their national objectives and international goals C
in recent years, the U.S. support for the Mujahideen to fight the U.S.S.R.
in Afghanistan, for Saddam Hussein and Iraq against Iran, for corrupt military
dictatorships in Latin America to suppress pro-democracy struggles.
- International campaign against terrorism
Consequently, this international coalition and campaign to combat terrorism
is not supporting but is rather undermining democracy and human rights.
I want to emphasize that we were not opposed to a coalition against terrorism,
but this campaign was put together without conditionality or long-term thinking
and outside the purview of the UN and international law.
President Bush recently described North Korea, Iraq and Iran as the evil
axis', but it is questionable whether
these three countries are any more evil than several of the states in the
coalition
The real criteria for membership in the coalition does not seem to be Agood"
or Aevil",
but rather whether or not the country in question will cooperate with the
U.S. To be cynical, one might observe that this is really a coalition against
terrorism directed at the U.S. and perhaps its close allies, and not a coalition
against terrorism of all kinds and in all places. After all, there has been
terrorism for some time in Pakistan, India, Colombia, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone,
Algeria, Sri Lanka, Burma ... and I could go on.
- The war against the Taliban and Afghanistan
The second response to the terrorist attacks was the war against the Taliban
and Afghanistan. Again, while accepting that we should take action against
states that harbour or encourage international terrorism, we said in our letter
to the Prime Minister (to be found on the Centre for Human Rights and Democratic
Development Web site) that such action should not harm those innocent Afghan
civilians who were already victims of a repressive government and various
wars over a period of ten years.
The United States, United Kingdom and Canada and others said at the beginning
they would attack or bomb only military targets. While it has been difficult
to get reliable information - as
distinct from propaganda - from
either side, it is clear that Afghan civilians and civilian targets were hit,
and there were numerous civilian casualties.
The euphemism Acollateral damage"
for killing of innocent civilian is a misuse -
an outrage of language - and certainly
not acceptable. A violation of human rights is a violation of human rights
and not collateral damage.
Unfortunately this war in many respects did repeat the sins of September
11, killing innocent civilians and therefore betraying the principles we said
we were defending.
Furthermore, we have to ask how the war in any way advanced the solution
to the issues of September 11 and the threat of massive terrorism. It does
not appear that any of the principal culprits who planned September 11 have
been arrested and charged, and very few al'Qaeda
cells (allegedly in 70 countries) have been discovered and broken. I expected,
and would have supported, surgical strikes and commando operations assisted
by first class intelligence, directed against al'Qaeda
operational centers and terrorist cells. But that is not what we got. We got
an all-out war against the Taliban government and, of course, that government
has now been defeated.
No doubt, it was an oppressive, cruel government, but that is not the way
under international law or the UN Charter that we remove oppressive governments.
The military success against the Taliban led the U.S. Secretary of Defence
to state that Awar works".
That is a totally unacceptable and extremely dangerous pronouncement of public
policy with respect to war. These criteria for launching war -
whether or not it will work, whether or not it will achieve national objectives,
without any reference to international law or the morality of those objectives
- have worked for many tyrants and
despots. The fact of the matter is that almost all nations (189 states) have
ratified the UN Charter and according to the UN Charter war (or military action)
is prohibited - is illegal -
in all but two cases: self-defence (Chapter 7, Article 51), or when authorized
by the Security Council after a breach of the peace or an act of aggression
(Chapter 7, Articles 39 and 42). There was no such authorization by the Security
Council for the war against Afghanistan; consequently one must conclude it
was illegal.
True, the Security Council passed two resolutions condemning the terrorist
attacks and affirming the right to self-defence (Resolutions 1368 of September
12 and 1373 of September 28, 2001)), but neither resolution authorized the
use of military force against Afghanistan. As a result, this war or military
action sets a bad precedent, which could come back to haunt some or all of
the key partners in the attack in years to come. If you don't
respect the rule of law yourself, it is pretty difficult to ask others to
do it later.
5. Treatment of prisoners of war
The same unilateral disregard for the law on international human rights is
being shown with respect to the Afghan-Taliban prisoners of war shipped to
Cuba. The U.S still has not recognized the provisions in the third Geneva
Convention of 1949 respecting the treatment of Aprisoners
of war" and continues to label these
prisoners as Aunlawful combatants",
presumably to remove itself from the Convention and its obligations, which
the United States has ratified. This is despite the fact that the Convention
stipulates that decisions on Awho
is" or Awho
is not" a prisoner of war are to
be established by procedure set out in the Convention. It is not a matter
to be decided unilaterally by any one state.
Then there is the proposal by President Bush to have all non-Americans tried
in military courts. This would result in two systems of justice for the same
offences, one for Americans and another for non-Americans. One more open,
the other more closed.
The option of using military tribunals for Nazi war criminals at the end
of World War II was rejected in favour of the Nuremberg process, which was
open, transparent, and respected the international rules of law. In a letter
that we and several other non-governmental organizations sent to President
Bush, we argued against the use of military courts and suggested an international
tribunal which would give the process greater credibility and acceptance.
Such a tribunal could be similar to the Rwandan or Yugoslav special tribunals.
Another possibility was a tribunal based on the model of the International
Criminal Court.
6. Enactment of anti-terrorism legislation
The fourth response to the terrorist attacks was the introduction and passage
of domestic legislation to combat terrorist activity -
in Canada Bills C.35, C.36, C.42, C.44 and certain amendments and regulations
to the Immigration Act; in the U.S., the Loyalty Bill; in Europe and throughout
the world, similar legislation.
I want to say immediately that a proper analysis of Bill C.36 in Canada was
a massive undertaking. The bill had 175 pages and 146 articles, amended 17
existing Canadian statutes (laws), and referred to 11 international conventions.
In the view of many experts, it was virtually impossible for Parliament to
properly examine the bill in the short time allotted for its consideration.
Consequently, it is feared that neither the government nor Parliament can
predict the adverse impact the bill might have on human rights, access to
information, privacy, international aid, and democratic development. The debate
was cut short by an allocation-of-time provision in both the House of Commons
and the Senate. For this reason, many of us pressed for a Asunset
clause" as recommended by the Canadian
Bar Association and the Senate Committee.
If you pass a controversial measure quickly and cannot predict all the consequences,
it is reasonable to introduce a Asunset
clause" that terminates the measures
after a period of time, say two or three years. Then, if necessary, provisions
might be reconsidered and passed again. In the end, some amendments were made
to the Bill, including a limited Asunset
clause". In the view of many experts,
however, the bill is still too ambiguous and too far-reaching in restricting
our rights and freedoms; it goes further than necessary to combat terrorist
threats.
Some felt it would be more productive to improve the enforcement of our present
laws and to have more effective police and intelligence services. Many of
us who appeared before the House of Commons Justice Committee on the bill
pointed out that the definitions of Aterrorist
activity" and Aterrorist
group" were so broad that they could
catch many innocent Canadian organizations, whose only activities were to
help pro-democracy and development groups in other countries.
In the bill, which is now an Act, it is an offence for a Canadian organization
to assist, facilitate, instruct, or finance what might be considered a Aterrorist
group" in another country, or a
group that carries on what might be considered a Aterrorist
activity". These considerations,
judgments and decisions about such groups would be made by police forces or
security agencies, often in other countries. For example, China considers
the Falun Gong to be a subversive, terrorist group, but many of us in human
rights are helping the Falun Gong. This is only one example. Under the Act,
if a Canadian NGO is linked to a foreign organization through, say, assistance
or financial aid, it could be listed as a Aterrorist
entity" without any notice or right
to object, and subject to a range of sanctions.
The Act also provides for preventive detention and investigative hearings
that do not have the protections traditional in our law. The Act does not
distinguish between those who struggle against oppression and terrorist governments,
and those who attacked the World Trade Center on September 11th.
There is thus no distinction between those who are freedom fighters and those
who are fanatical thugs. I don't
think our government and our MPs meant to catch innocent Canadian organizations
working in development and human rights; but terrorism, while easy to recognize
when it takes place, is not easy to define in law.
It will take some time to see how these measures are used and the laws enforced.
During this past summer, some of us put together a broadly based monitoring
coalition of NGOs, unions, churches, the Assembly of First Nations, and others
to advise civil society on what they can and cannot do under the law; to identify
where there might be Charter challenges; to document cases of unfair
or excessive application of the law; and to campaign for amendments and the
repeal of draconian articles. The important question for Canadians to answer
is whether the legislation goes too far. Is there an imbalance between human
rights and public security?
In attacking the evil of terrorism, are we opening the door to other evils:
the suppression of important human rights and democratic freedoms we say we
are defending? In my view, the more severe parts of C-36 should be repealed
or amended. We need legislation that will help us stop the real terrorists
but avoid interfering with those who are defenders of human rights and democracy.
Furthermore, when Canada and similar democracies pass similar legislation,
they send the wrong message to borderline democracies, states in transition
from dictatorship to democracy, as to the real value and sustainability of
democracy in the face of challenges and threats.
It makes it so easy for certain transitional democracies to return to the
old ways and their justification is that they are simply following the example
of Canada, the U.S., and other model democracies.
- Some conclusions and recommendations
In arriving at conclusions and making recommendations, I would repeat that
it is clear that terrorism is a serious violation of human rights and must
be dealt with. But any serious action to address this issue must look to the
root causes of terrorism, including factors of poverty, injustice, exploitation,
domination and hopelessness, which generate an environment of political instability,
resentment and hostility, and which can easily lead to violence, terrorism,
and revolution. Now the Prime Minister and other leaders are saying the same
thing. History has many examples of such incidents. If we want real security
against terrorism, these matters must be dealt with.
There is no doubt in my mind that the continuing violence in the Middle East,
on both sides, and the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory and the
expansion of settlements, contribute to terrorism, not only in the Middle
East, but in many other parts of the world. Yes, we must strengthen our laws
to deter, prevent and prosecute terrorists, but in doing so, not betray our
principles of democracy, our basic freedoms and human rights. Finally we must
urge that solutions to such problems be addressed multilaterally and not unilaterally.
There must be respect for the UN Charter and the international human rights
treaties; there must be respect for the international rule of law.
Otherwise we end up with international anarchy, where military power prevails,
where might is right, and brute force rules all decisions. If we rely primarily
on military solutions today, we open the door for our enemies and others to
take a similar path tomorrow. In the long run we won't
defeat terrorists who violate human rights standards by violating these same
standards ourselves; we won't build
a more secure, civilized, law-abiding world by the use of self-centred seeking
after unilateral military power.
Principal Speakers:
THE TROUBLE WITH GLOBALIZATION
Manfred Bienefeld
(Edited transcript)
Let me begin with my conclusion, so you know where I am going. To construct
socially desirable policy we need democracy. That means a flexible, responsive
policy process and a meaningful political space where people and parties can
be held accountable and must live with the consequences of their decisions.
This political space must, above all, define citizenship to include binding
rights and responsibilities, since only the exercise of citizenship can provide
the context for policy-making in the public interest. The political space in
a democratic society requires membership and commitment, since only this can
lead us to make the compromises needed for harmony, positive political stability,
and social cohesion, which are preconditions for building the trust societies
need to function well.
These democratic principles are ultimately also preconditions for successful
economic development - not only in
the developing world, but also in ours. Rather than have conflict between economic
institutions and social policy, the two must come to complement one another.
Unfortunately, globalization in its current form tends to conflict with such
a desire for substantive democracy. But this globalization'
is not something that is simply imposed on societies by outside forces. There
are interests in every society that are anxious to promote certain kinds of
international entanglement'
because these restrict the democratic rights of citizens in ways that they regard
as desirable. The fashionable term for this is locking
in' and it is widely acknowledged,
and frequently praised, when it is applied to the developing world. But it is
also a reality in the developed world, and in Canada. Thus, when our former
trade minister Pat Carney was asked why Canada needed a North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), she replied that such an agreement was desirable because
it would ensure that no future Canadian government ever returned to the bad
old days of nationalistic policies. That meant locking in certain policies,
which meant locking out certain democratic choices in the future.
Sylvia Ostry, Canada's ambassador
for the Uruguay Round of trade talks, said later of the movement to freer trade:
"Rather than simply making it easier for goods and people to move
across national borders ... what was created was a system of enormous intrusiveness
into our domestic system ...[In retrospect] we in the developed countries
did not fully understand all of the implications of the new trade system
... But if we didn't understand
all of the implications, the developing countries did not understand the
implications at all."
Good policy must be based on political economy, not on economics alone. Development
requires setting in motion a cumulative process of accumulation and growth -
and not just growth in the gross domestic product, but also growth in institutional
and human capacities, in policy-making capacities, and in technological capacities,
with the ultimate objective of enhancing society's
capacity to generate and to appropriate technology rents. Such rents denote
the extra income that a society can command because it has a technological advantage
over its competitors. And its crucial significance lies in the fact that it
is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for being able to remain
competitive while paying relatively high wages.
Development in this sense requires collective investment. And it requires the
retention of enough national'
control to ensure that the resulting benefits can be significantly appropriated
by the society that financed the investment; and that this same society has
the sovereign ability to make real choices as to the form in which it wishes
to enjoy these gains: that is, more income, more leisure, less social or economic
insecurity, stronger environmental protection.
I believe that such conclusions can be solidly grounded in theory -
even in neoclassical economic theory -
and that they are strongly supported by the historical record I now want to
underpin this conclusion with three arguments:
- Globalization in its present form is undesirable -
and unsustainable.
- The disappointing results of globalization should have been, and were, anticipated;
we must consider alternatives.
- The globalization process is driven by interests -
and by policy creep'
(locking in).
1. Neoliberal globalization is undesirable -
and unsustainable
Neoliberal globalization systematically transfers power over patterns of resource
allocation to largely unregulated global financial markets, reflecting the belief
that these markets are fundamentally efficient. It can best be understood as
a desire to extend the power of international finance to the far corners of
the earth. And in order to do this it needs to bring things into the ambit of
the market. In other words, it needs to privatize: resources, utilities, services,
education, health care, water, even where this is clearly inefficient'.
In the language of the Aglobalizers,"
we need to create a level playing
field' for finance, or for capital.
And that requires us to curb the ability of local
authorities' - at any level, up to
and including the nation state - to interfere'
in the market by creating arbitrary'
rules or restrictions, even if these interventions reflect the democratic wishes
of their constituents. Essentially, it is a project to create a form of power
that is universalized.
The ultimate rationale of this empowerment of global finance is based on something
called the Aefficient markets hypothesis",
which asserts that despite large (but random) fluctuations around the efficient'
outcomes, international financial markets are inherently rational, and ultimately
efficient, which ensures that they can be relied upon to promote long- term
public welfare (as narrowly defined in neoclassical theory).
The efficient markets hypothesis is further supported by the less formal, but
possibly more influential Ainefficient
government hypothesis", which is best
summarized in a neoliberal slogan of the late seventies. AGovernment
is not the solution. It is the problem."
Of course this assertion never had any scientific status. It was merely a prejudice
buttressed by endless anecdotal evidence.
Challenge to free-market theories
These critical foundations of neoliberal globalization have, in fact, been
theoretically contested and empirically challenged, from the outset.
The theoretical challenge is rooted in a Keynesian analysis which focuses on
the inherent, fundamental irrationality of relatively unregulated financial
markets due to widespread information asymmetries and subsequent herd behaviour.
The empirical challenge has been equally devastating, leading Paul Krugmen as
early as 1987 to conclude a review of the evidence with these words:
At this point belief in the efficiency of the foreign exchange market
is a matter of pure faith; there is not a shred of positive evidence that
the market is efficient, and ... similar results obtain for other asset
markets ... that is, both the bond market and the stock market … The bottom
line is that there is no positive evidence in favour of efficient markets,
and if anything a presumption from the data that (these) markets are not
efficient ... The important conclusion ... is that we are freed from Friedman's
... argument ... that an efficient market could not exhibit destabilizing
speculation. ... Now we know that in fact no evidence supports this hypothesis
- that it is one maintained purely on faith (emphasis added).
And since then, we have had endemic financial crises:
- Sixty-nine major banking crises from the late 70s to the early 90s (World
Bank).
- Crises growing in magnitude -
culminating in Asia - now followed
by the implosion of stock markets, the dot-com collapse and Argentina, Brazil.
In every case, the mainstream response -
the International Monetary Fund response -
has been to claim that the problem was due to domestic
policy mistakes', and that we can
fix it with more transparency, better regulation, bigger and earlier rescue
packages.
The questions we should be asking, however, are not just how do we bail people
out, although such questions are important. The real question is: how can we
continue to justify a fundamental policy thrust based on the assumption that
these markets are efficient? The bubble was a monumental mistake from a social
and economic point of view, representing an enormous misallocation of resources;
but we must always remember that it was not a mistake for the dot-com entrepreneurs
and the financial gurus living in their Swiss chateaux and lecturing the rest
of us about the need for prudence and nimbleness.
We need to examine the plausibility of the claim that better domestic regulation
and more transparency can be expected to solve these problems. And in this context,
we need to ask: Who has this so-called adequate regulation? Which country? What,
in fact, does this phrase mean, if anything? The fact is that approximately
half of the 69 major banking crises that the World Bank has documented (from
the late seventies to the early nineties) occurred in developed countries with
highly sophisticated regulatory mechanisms. Until Enron and the Wall Street
scandals, the United States was always implicitly regarded as the place that
was supposed to come closest to having such an adequate'
system. Certainly, the US has derived enormous benefits from these volatile
international markets, but it turns out that this was not because they had such
a well regulated system. In fact, it turns out to have been partly because their
system created especially strong incentives for speculation and financial manipulation.
The point is that these proposed solutions simply misunderstand the problem.
It was the same when people poured money into Argentina in the early 1990s,
when it was being celebrated as yet another miracle, just as they had poured
money into Mexico during its miracle phase, even though there was all kinds
of evidence suggesting that the resulting debt obligations were unsustainable
under any plausible set of circumstances.
To believe that the problem was a Alack
of information" is to forget that
people were pouring money into these countries for the same reason that they
poured money into Nortel stock even after it had reached $120. And the reason
was that they thought that others would continue to do the same. Such a process
has very little to do with serious analyses of the underlying realities. After
all, the financial press was full of stories telling investors that most dot-coms
had never made a profit and that almost as many appeared to have no prospect
of ever making a profit. But this did not matter because the reason why people
paid $120 for a $10 stock was that they believed (or hoped?) that someone else
would pay $240 some day soon. Speculative bubbles are about investors second-guessing
each other. And Amore information"
will not cure that problem. After all, the millions that were made by many of
the speculators are real money - even
today. So from their point of view, AThere
is no problem."
Irrational markets undermine national policies
In the developing world, the effects of irrational markets are much more devastating
than in the industrial world, but we are also very much involved. These chronically
unstable, inherently irrational markets are inevitably undermining national
policy processes in the following ways:
- They empower national elites who have benefited massively from their participation
in these speculative frenzies. And these elites are generally not bound by
national constraints, in part because tax evasion has become so easy.
- Irrational markets are constantly blackmailing electorates. Not long ago
a furor was raised in the United States because it was thought that some Chinese
money had supported somebody running for public office. And in the ensuing
discussion, the idea of external intervention in the American political process
was treated as anathema. However, this privilege is not granted to others
in this new world. First of all, the financial markets constantly interfere
openly in democratic elections all over the world, issuing threats and making
promises designed to influence the outcomes. Moreover, the United States,
along with many other industrial countries, no longer appears to have much
reticence about intervening openly in the political processes of other countries.
Apart from the extreme cases, where it openly advocates Aregime
change", it now participates actively
in many elections. In Colombia, the U.S. Ambassador is now regularly a major
player in the election. And in the current election in Brazil, the electorate
is being heavily bombarded by threats of various kinds, both from the imperial
powers and from the international financial markets.
- The biggest threat of all lies in the fact that the policies promoted by
this kind of globalization steadily undermine both administrative capacities,
and the moral authority of public institutions. Too often, other short term
questions, such as how will these policy changes affect the balance of payments
tomorrow, are the ones that attract all the attention. What we should really
be looking at is the impact of these changes on the underlying policy process.
We should ask: What is happening to the policy making capacity of this country
- to its capacity to respond constructively,
and in the public interest, to the challenges and the crises of tomorrow?
2. The alternative to neoliberal globalization?
This is the context within which a growing chorus of voices is demanding a
reassessment of the current directions of public policy in Canada, as in much
of the rest of the world. Some of the more prominent voices include:
- Joseph Stiglitz, whose Nobel prize-winning work in economics had already
addressed the fundamental asymmetry of financial markets many years ago;
- Paul Krugman, who concludes one of his articles by warning that Asome
day we will have to turn the clock back"
by reintroducing a range of controls into international financial markets;
- John Gray, a former confidant of Mrs. Thatcher, who has written eloquently
about the corrosive impact of Thatcherite policies on British society and
on the policy process in that country;
- Gordon Smith (former Canadian Ambassador to NATO) and Moses Naim, who as
co-authors of a recent book ask pointedly: AAfter
surviving the long process to democratic government, men and women have won
a disturbingly ambiguous prize. Responsible government, yes, but responsible
for what? Capable of what?"
Writing a couple of years before the onset of the present crisis in Latin America,
I had warned that:
In the meantime, Latin Americans need to think seriously about how their
countries will be able to respond when the next global financial crisis
disrupts capital flows, as it surely will quite soon. Having undermined
and weakened their public sectors; sharply reduced the moral authority of
their governments; sold off their most valuable resources and utilities;
locked themselves into highly restrictive international agreements; and
decentralized their domestic political systems, they will have fewer levers
with which to manage, or to moderate, the social and political consequences
of such crises. One can only hope that their elites will not respond simply
by reiterating their commitment to the logic of the global market at whatever
cost, and then argue that the human costs are the inevitable result of Asurplus
population". Argentina now faces
just this dilemma.
The alternative to neo-liberal globalization is the form of globalization that
was enshrined in the rules and institutions that emerged from the original Bretton
Woods negotiations. Its starting point is that a stable international system
must be composed of nations that are internally coherent and stable. Only when
that is true can we realistically hope that they will be prepared to cooperate
at the international level in defence of a positive collective outcome. If the
individual elements are not stable, then the system cannot be stable.
At the time of those early Bretton Woods negotiations, Henry Morgenthau, who
was then the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, described the main purpose as ensuring
that we would never again allow the global economy to fall into the clutches
of the international financial speculator. That is why the system established
at that time had at its core powerful safeguards in the form of a provision
allowing for permanent national capital controls, and a provision establishing
a managed system of exchange rates. Although it is true that this original Bretton
Woods system was also set up to facilitate and to promote international trade,
that objective was to be pursued within those constraints. And that is the key
to understanding the difference between that system, and the one that has emerged
in the neoliberal era that began in the late seventies. The alternative to the
neoliberal vision is not, therefore, Aagainst
trade." Nor is it Aagainst
markets." It is rather, in favour
of embedded markets, meaning markets that are embedded in democratic social
and political structures that can manage them effectively in the public interest.
Ultimately trade must play its role in the service of politically defined national
objectives and policies. It cannot be turned into the focal point around which
those national policies must then be constructed.. Trade is like fire. It is
a good servant, but a terrible master. One cannot start with trade and all of
its requirements and demands, and then try to construct a set of coherent national
policies around them. The same is true to an even greater degree of international
financial flows. Keynes wrote endlessly about the critical need for capital
controls if we were to avoid a repetition of the disaster of the 1920s, which
led more or less inevitably to the even greater disasters of the 1930s and the
subsequent war.
I believe that Keynes and the other main architects of the original Bretton
Woods system were basically right. Moreover, I believe that this is further
borne out by the extraordinary, and quite unexpected, success of the global
economy between 1948 and 1973, when growth of output, productivity, real wages
and social welfare was substantially faster than it was before, or has been
since. Most important, the stable cumulative growth of that period was very
effectively translated into higher wages, better social conditions, and better,
safer and less stressful working conditions.
Unfortunately, from the late seventies, these lessons of history were displaced
by the assertion of a resurgent fundamentalist economics which claimed that
the problems of the world were primarily due to the fact that markets were not
being allowed to work freely enough. And these views were first applied to the
developing world when the debt crisis forced many of these countries to accept
the resulting neoliberal policy regimes, which were attached as conditions to
loans that these countries desperately needed to stave off immediate social
and economic collapse.
3. Neoliberal globalization is driven by interests
My final point is that in order to understand the globalization debate, we
must understand that the process is primarily driven by interests. It is not
driven by logic, or by Agood policy"
derived from evidence. In this I agree with Jagdish Bhagwati, an eminent development
economist and an eloquent defender of the benefits of freer trade, who has recently
concluded that the continued push for international financial liberalization
can only be explained by looking for the interests that are served by these
policies. And these interests are, in his view, best described as a AWall
Street-Treasury complex". Bhagwati
reaches this startling conclusion, because he sees this pitch for deregulation
occurring in the face of overwhelming evidence that these policy shifts are
not conducive to growth, or efficiency, let alone human or social welfare.
Of course these issues are complex, so that no one can claim to have the absolute
truth. I would therefore urge you to consider all sides of the argument with
care. In the same spirit, however, I want to urge you most strongly to reject
the frequently heard claim that those who object to globalization because they
see it as dangerously flawed are simply mindless and ill informed. These are
serious debates and we need to examine the arguments and the evidence from all
sides of this debate.
As I read that evidence, it suggests to me that those who are fundamentally
disenchanted with the current form of globalization are basically right. I believe
that the evidence and the arguments are substantially in their favour. And that
leads me to believe that the continued defence of this process is only possible
if one ignores the accumulating social, economic and political evidence, or
if one falls back on the argument that there is no alternative. Unfortunately,
the claim that there is no alternative has become increasingly powerful, largely
because more and more obstacles are being placed in the way of attempts to move
in a different direction. ALocking
in" is working all too well, in many
instances. However, we still need to work for such alternatives, because while
they may not be feasible in the short term, the present polices are ultimately
unsustainable. And that means that alternatives that are politically impossible
today, may well become possible tomorrow. After all, in 1929 few people could
have imagined Athe New Deal"
in the United States. But it became possible because the world had changed in
the meantime. And the world is changing now.
Unfortunately the changes ushered in by the tragedy of September 11th
have not been conducive to a more open and reflective debate of these issues.
In fact, to a disturbing degree these events have tended to legitimize a certain
degree of suppression of public dissent in the interests of national security.
And that can easily be misdirected in the ensuing atmosphere of tension and
distrust.
Panel 1: ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT International
Commitment and Implementation.
Are We Going Forward?
Chair: Jennifer Dickson
THE BLIGHT OF ECONOMIC CORRECTNESS
Roy Culpeper (President North-South Institute)
(Rapporteur's account)
Dr. Culpeper took as his overall theme the perils of economic correctness in
the North- South policy dialogue.
This year has been a very important one for the world and Canada with events
such as the Doha Development Agenda in March, the International Conference for
Finance for Development in Monterrey, the G8 Summit towards a new partnership
for Africa's development in June,
and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. Dr. Culpeper
also mentioned the release of Canada Making a Difference in the World: a policy
statement on strengthening aid effectiveness in Ottawa and the first-ever G8
Session of Development Ministers, in Windsor.
Despite some critics, the Prime Minister has recognized the inter-relationships
between poverty, insecurity and terrorism during the first-year anniversary
of the terrorist attacks of September 11. Mr. Chrétien has also publicly
accepted the importance of addressing widening international disparities and
the need to increase international aid.
On the other hand, when we ask ourselves if we are going forward in terms of
aid, we will have to accept that we are going forward a few steps, but we are
going backwards a few steps too. Although there is some cause for optimism,
there are many deeper reasons for caution related to a new economic orthodoxy,
Aeconomic correctness"
in North-South relations.
Many dissonant voices have recently been raised about the new orthodoxy, not
just by civil society.
ASound"
and Aunsound"
economic policy
There has been deep skepticism about the economic policy agenda and about what
the World Bank or the International Monetary Found (IMF) are doing. The heart
of economic correctness is captured by the term sound economic policy, which
suggests there are only two kinds--sound and unsound (with little debate as
to what constitutes sound economic policies).
In general, correct economic policies are those that leverage and encourage
markets and create an environment friendly for business. They also include prudence
in fiscal and monetary policy, no deficits, low inflation, and no over-valued
exchange rates. All these issues were expressed in the Monterrey Summit, G8
Africa action plan (and, more significantly its New Economic Plan for African
Development- NEPAD), in the World
Summit on Sustainable Development-
WSSD, in Johannesburg.
The problem is, as (Nobel Prize Winner) Amartya Sen states, that the agenda
has become unbalanced with too much emphasis on market forces, but too little
attention and resources devoted to institutions and public goods. This has been
defined by (Nobel Prize Winner) Joe Stiglitz as Market Fundamentalism. Markets
will inevitably create and reinforce inequities: resources trickle up to those
who have purchasing power rather than trickle down to the poor.
A hallmark study Inequality, Growth and Poverty in the Era of Liberalization
and Globalization (Giovanni Andrea Cornia and Julius Court, 2000) indicates
inequalities have been growing in most countries since the mid-1980s and in
some since the mid-1970s. The reason for this phenomenon is a combination of
traditional causes (inequalities in assets including land and education) and
new causes (excessively liberal policies, including liberalization of the financial
sector and the deregulation of labour markets). Trade and technology, according
to these experts, are not particularly at fault.
Market-oriented promoters are pushing markets into controversial areas, including
health and education, which are traditionally public goods. Part of the reason
is the erosion of the tax base, in order to maintain a competitive business
environment and deter capital flight; part of this is also ideology. Another
controversial area is intellectual property (TRIPs in the parlance of trade
negotiations - Trade-Related Intellectual
Property). There is no compelling or logical reason for current laws, which
give a 20-year monopoly (why not 10 or even five?) to patent holders on the
grounds of creating incentives for innovation, while HIV/AIDS patients suffer
for lack of affordable medicines.
Market-magic orthodoxy
Perhaps the most controversial dimension of the new orthodoxy is the unqualified
assumption that openness to trade and capital flows is going to save developing
countries. The perverse role played by integrated international capital markets
can be seen in the growing financial instability in Brazil, ahead of the presidential
election in which Lula DaSilva, a social democrat, is the front runner. Capital
flight and downgrades by rating agencies will help precipitate a crisis, resulting
in a self-fulfilling prophecy.
There is dogma surrounding ownership implying that developing countries have
to own'
the policies they are going to implement. In reality, however, developing countries
know what sound economies are. Hence, these countries should not be forced to
adopt policies which they do not agree with.
As an example, Dr. Culpeper mentioned the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSP) which involve policies on how to reduce poverty in developing countries.
These policies are related to economic correctness and at their core contain
principles such as popular participation, poverty alleviation and health. However,
policies regarding trade and privatization are not open for discussion, because
if governments question these issues publicly, they would not get any support.
Developing countries have to own those policies accepted by the IMF and the
World Bank.
On environmental sustainability, social and environmental impacts are still
largely undocumented and unaccounted for in decision-making. On the other hand,
Foreign Direct Investment and Gross Domestic Product growth do not necessarily
translate into poverty reduction. As an example, Dr. Culpeper mentioned the
trend in the mining sector, which over the last decade has been moving towards
liberalization of mining codes and the weakening of environmental regulations.
In Colombia, the CIDA-supported revision to the Mining Code has also lead to
the weakening of once recognized indigenous rights.
Conclusions
The most worrying thing about the new climate of economic correctness is that
critics and skeptics are dismissed as being uninformed and obstructive. However,
skeptics have good reasons to question what is going on. It is high time the
policy-makers listen, specially when two Nobel Laureates in Economics (Stiglitz
and Sen) are also raising doubts.
THE FIGHT OVER WATER EXPORTS IN NAFTA
Mark Winfield (Acting Policy Director, Environmental Governance, Pembina
Institute) (Rapporteur's account)
This presentation comprises reflections on Canadian water policy -
trade and environmental considerations -
summarizing Canadian foreign policy since September 11.
Water is one of two key environmental relationships with the United States,
the other being air. In fact, water was the subject of the first environmental
treaty signed by Canada, the Boundary Waters Treaty (1906), establishing the
International Joint Commission (IJC) and subsequently, what many argued is the
most important regional environmental treaty: The Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement (1972, 1978, 1987).
Between 1960 and 1990, there were major remedial efforts on the Great Lakes
such as reducing excess nutrient loadings, reductions in industrial pollution,
a combination of structural economic changes in the region and regulatory initiatives
by governments. Some progress was made in restoring areas of concern identified
in the 1987 amendments.
However, efforts declined in both Canada and the U.S. in the 1990s and especially
on the Canadian side as a result of the combination of the federal program review
and Ontario's slashing of funding in its Common Sense Revolution These programs
have not really recovered since then, despite continuing and growing concerns
such as agriculture, urban sprawl, invasive species, and continuing habitat
loss, new science regarding fertilizers, and children's
health.
Bulk water removals
An aspect that has consistently drawn attention in Canada-U.S. relations has
been the issue of bulk water removals. This has been of particular concern in
the context of trade liberalization, furthered by the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (CUSTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). There
are also long-standing concerns regarding water demand.
Canada adopted a federal water policy in 1987 that included commitments to
prohibit bulk water exports; legislation was introduced for this purpose in
1988, but died with the election call that year.
Water has been a central debate within NAFTA, particularly with respect to
issues of proportional access to natural resources and issues between the investor
and the state (Chapter 11). The governments of Canada, the U.S. and Mexico agreed
to a statement in 1993 that NAFTA would not create rights over natural resources
of any party unless they enter commerce or become a good or product. In other
words, there was not an automatic right to take water, but once its use is permitted
for commercial purposes, the NAFTA rules apply.
These issues re-emerged in May, 1998, when Ontario's
Ministry of Environment issued a permit to take water for exporting purposes
from Lake Superior. This permit was ultimately withdrawn, but highlighted the
vulnerability of exporting water.
In February 1999, the Federal Government announced a three-part plan on bulk
water exports, which included:
- IJC reference on effects of water consumption, diversion and removals.
- Federal-provincial-territorial accord on bulk water removals.
- Amendments to Boundary Waters Treaty to give the federal government the
authority to prohibit bulk water removals from boundary waters, mainly the
Great Lakes.
After the announcement of this plan, the IJC reported in March 2000 a strong
recommendation against permitting removal from the watershed, which notes that
only one percent of waters in the basin are renewed each year. It also highlighted
the uncertainty regarding factors like climate change.
Conclusions
Continuing concern is that, except for boundary waters, once access for purposes
for export is provided, it will not be possible to turn off the tap without
invoking a NAFTA challenge.
Trade rules and domestic policy represent an interesting case study. Federal
governments did not thoroughly consider the domestic impacts of new international
trade rules.
Panel 2: TRADE AND GLOBAL EQUITY
New Partnerships Or Re-Colonization?
Chair: Dwight Fulford
ASPECIAL TREATMENT"
TURNS ECONOMICS ON ITS HEAD
William Dymond
(Rapporteur's account)
This intervention addresses special and differential treatment for developing
countries and the relationship of the trade system to income gaps.
The concept of special and differential treatment is so prominent that it is
mentioned 27 times in 52 paragraphs of the Doha Declaration, launching, or more
accurately, lurching, the World Trade Organization into a new round of multilateral
trade negotiations.
The subject is so critical that developing countries have made it clear that,
in the absence of a significant advance on the special and differential treatment
agenda, any idea of a success in the new negotiations should be consigned to
the trash can. Should that come to pass, it would be a mistake and a blunder.
Let us begin by defining the term special and differential treatment for developing
countries. Special and differential treatment has taken three forms:
- Rules avoidance:
Under the provisions of article 16 of the GATT in 1955 and subsequently in
subsidiary agreements, developing countries have been excused from the rigour
of international rules whenever they have found these inconvenient.
- Trade preferences
Trade preferences have been implemented principally via the general scheme
of tariff preference authorized in 1971 by which developed countries reduced
their customs duties on imports from developing countries without asking these
countries to make reciprocal concessions.
- Reverse special and differential treatment:
Such treatment was inspired by the notion that developing countries were in
fact different economies. Developed countries felt free to impose protective
regimes on imports of politically-sensitive products, notably low-standard technology
products, or maintain punishing barriers on imports such as agricultural products.
Special and differential treatment measures led to the following consequences.
Over the past 40 years, allowing trade negotiators to offer and accept special
and differential treatment has smoothed the path to the successful conclusion
of negotiations. Less than a year ago, it led to the launch of a new round of
negotiations. Unfortunately, special and differential treatment has had a perverse
impact upon economic development, especially in developing countries. It is
clear why restrictions on clothing imports are perverse, but rules avoidance
and trade preferences are also damaging to developing countries.
Shortcomings of special treatment
The premise of the trade rules set out in the GATT and the WTO is that economic
growth results from trade expansion. The rules are therefore designed principally
to influence domestic policy so as to further expand trade.
As the rules have developed since the late 1940s, they have not always made
perfect economic sense, but have instead met a criterion of political economy
sense, which is a different concept.
The developmental impact upon developed countries and those developing countries
that have accepted the disciplines of the system are dramatic: 80% of world
trade is among developed countries. Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, and
Mexico are among the few developing countries which fully embraced the rules
and benefited from them.
The principle of special and differential treatment turns economics on its
head. It is an example of do it yourself economics coined by the UK economist
David Henderson. This principle rests on the notion that competitive industries
can develop behind protective walls. It is a version of the infant industry
argument, which holds that domestic industries protected from competition from
powerful rivals in their home market will soon become competitive enough to
compete with developed countries in world markets.
The concept of preferences is equally bizarre. Its premise is that the small
price advantage that a preference would give over a developed country rival
suggests that goods sell principally on price. If that were the case, of course,
the Germans would have no car industry. Translated to the new agenda of trade
negotiations, the special and differential treatment of rules avoidance and
preferences becomes even odder. Take investment as an example. Rules avoidance
would mean that developing countries would be excused from offering protection
against expropriation while developed countries would offer higher, that is
preferential protection, to developing countries'
investors in their countries than to investors from developed countries. The
inevitable results would be to stimulate capital flight from developing countries
to developed countries.
Much outrage and equal amounts of piety have been expended on the subject of
income gaps between countries. Any suggestion that the gap results from the
international trade rules wilts under scrutiny. Arguments that the trade rules
are rigged against developing countries because they tolerate a situation where
their exports face high barriers is well founded. What would happen if those
barriers were eliminated, which they should be forthwith?
Developed countries would grow richer and the gap would increase. Both theory
and practice show us that the greatest beneficiaries of trade barrier reduction
are the countries which reduce barriers. The benefits flow from the effect which
imports have in stimulating the efficient employment of human and natural resources.
The issue is not whether the gap is growing or shrinking -
it is in fact shrinking - but whether
poor countries are pursuing appropriate policies to promote economic development
and alleviate poverty, and whether developed countries are prepared to adopt
programs and policies that support these efforts.
With our students at the Centre for Trade Policy and Law, we use the following
example. Suppose there were a choice between two economic policies with guaranteed
results. Policy one would result in 2% growth in the Canadian economy, and 1%
in the US economy. Policy two result in 3% growth in the Canadian economy, and
4% in the American economy. Which do they choose? The answer is easy.
Conclusion
So what is to be done apart from advocating special and differential treatment,
which retards the growth of developing countries?
If a rule is inimical to the developing countries, it is likely to be equally
harmful to developed countries. The WTO agreements do not represent perfect
instruments, but the results of negotiated settlements. Some of the settlements
need to be revisited - for example,
the whole regime governing anti-dumping and countervailing duties protection.
A concerted attack on the discredited anti-dumping regime, for example, should
be a core element of the WTO's development
agenda. Should there be a need to change a rule for some developing countries,
the case needs to be made on a country-specific basis, and addressed on the
basis of the provisions governing waivers. Blanket exemptions from the rules
facilitate member pursuance of policies that deny them the economic benefits
of WTO membership.
WTO members should develop an inventory of those procedures and requirements
of membership that pose a burden on developing and least developed members with
a view to developing simplified, less burdensome procedures.
Finally, the WTO as an organization, and developed members on an individual
basis, should adopt a co-ordinated and comprehensive strategy of training and
capacity- building programs. Such programs need to be tailored to the individual
needs of developing country members and linked to a firm commitment to implement
the full range of WTO obligations.
BLAIR HAS SET THE PACE IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Bernard Wood
(Edited text)
The title of this session is both provocative and puzzling. This -
and the confidence that Bill Dymond will cover the ground with total authority
- gives me the latitude to interpret
the topic quite broadly, and try to link it to some of the big debates around
globalization, clashes of civilization, war and peace. I think this kind of
reflection is in the spirit of the G78 from the outset, and in that spirit I
will stick my own neck out in several risky directions.
A certain number of statements of position are necessary to honestly cover
so much ground but I try to keep in mind a wise warning by an eminent Swiss
development practitioner that our time is almost always better spent in listening
to the people who struggle with development than in repeating our own déclarations
de foi.
As a starting point, it should not, but may sometimes, be necessary to remind
ourselves in the global chattering classes that to trade or not to trade is
not the question. Ninety-five per cent of the world's
people keep body and soul together by scrambling to grow, make, sell and buy
goods and services of all kinds. Trade at all levels is the circulatory system
of economic life and a powerful engine of growth. Many things are needed to
promote global equity and one necessary, if far from sufficient, condition is
clearly that of sustainable economic growth. This is surely one of the things
we have actually learnt about development, especially during the last half-century's
unprecedented ambition of promoting it worldwide. And we learnt a good deal
more.
Enabling environments
There are no simple, universal formulas for enduring success, even in economic
policy in its narrower senses. At the same time, it has been pretty well proven
that every country needs some basic foundations to make sustainable progress.
I think that the best current understanding about the main requirements within
countries has been summarized succinctly:
- A sound policy framework encouraging stable, growing economies with full
scope for a vigorous private sector and an adequate fiscal base.
2. Investment in social development, especially education, primary health care
and population activities.
3. Enhanced participation of all people, and notably women, in economic and
political life, and the reduction of social inequalities.
4. Good governance and public management, democratic accountability, the protection
of human rights and the rule of law.
5. Sustainable environmental practices.
6. Addressing root causes of potential conflict, limiting military expenditure,
and targeting reconstruction and peace-building efforts toward longer-term reconciliation
and development.
In very broad terms, these are the same policy conditions faced by all countries,
developing and industrialised, as a basis for sustainable development. It is
a very tall order--especially for developing countries, whose capacity is by
definition limited and whose margin for policy error is even less forgiving.
But the understanding has deepened that ultimately there is no escaping any
of these parts of an enabling internal environment if progress is to
be achieved and sustained.
And recent empirical studies have reinforced this conviction.
When we focus on international trade, the enabling external environment
comes to the fore, although it obviously also impinges on domestic opportunities
and constraints. What external conditions do countries--and especially poorer
and weaker countries--most need in order to make their way.
I would focus on two very broad conditions:
- Levels of peace and international political and economic stability that
permit people, firms and countries to go about their legitimate business;
and
2. Adequate rules of the game to keep it honest and open, and something different
from the game of Monopoly - so that
newer and weaker players can always get into the game, sustain themselves and
have the opportunity to prosper.
These external conditions are also achieved very imperfectly in the world we
have and the world we have known. I hope that most if not all of us could probably
agree on these conditions at the level of principle, but of course the devil
is in the details as to how and how far they should be applied.
This is far from easy and for some model of how to proceed I have to say that
I look to one serious country whose leadership has actually tried to confront
some of the most difficult issues while still in office -
that of the United Kingdom under New Labour.
Blair on globalization
Leaving aside the still-mystifying position that the Blair Government has adopted
on the immediate case for war against Iraq, they have since 1997 taken international
development more seriously and applied more intellectual, political, human and
financial resources to it, than any other major government over the past 40
years, and perhaps ever.
Many years ago, Lester Pearson looked back on his time in office and remarked
on how much easier it had always been to find a bit more money for the foreign
aid budget than to actually make some relatively modest changes in our import
policies that would have enormously greater benefits for developing countries.
The Blair Government has been the first to take this on frontally, and much
more widely by even taking on the fiery and confused debates around globalization.
The challenge is that of Making Globalization Work for the World's
Poor - and regrettably the British
White Paper of December, 2000 , with that title, still stands as one of few
respectable attempts to come to grips with these issues in a comprehensive,
informed, responsible and courageous way. Regrettably, too, that White Paper
and the kind of analysis it raises have found too little place in the often-fragmented
and feverish globalization debates.
At one point the UK White Paper rightly points out: While the market fundamentalism
of the 1980s and early 1990s has been discredited, it's
now widely accepted that efficient markets are indispensable for effective development.
It should not be any cause for triumphalist complacency in the West that the
entire planet has come to accept the fundamentals of open economies and market
disciplines. Rather it is an historic challenge to the OECD countries and the
international institutions to prove in practice that the system does actually
work consistent with its guiding principles, and that it can genuinely be a
force for inclusion of poor countries and poor people.
How is the system doing? Better in my view than many of the most clamorous
critics would have us believe, since they have never accepted the basic premises
in the first place and can always find instances, real as well as implausible,
where the operation of the system does harm.
A hand for the Ainvisible hand"
At the same time, the system is doing far worse than it needs to in order to
maintain and strengthen the confidence of developing countries and their peoples
that the invisible hand actually can operate to take account of their interests
and needs, and steadily expand the ground for global equity.
Let me just cite a few prominent instances. The American decisions on steel
imports and agricultural subsidies -
whatever their tactical place in the U.S. political equation or in relations
with the EU and others - can only
be enormously damaging to the credibility of the system. Abuses of corporate
governance have a similar global impact and we should recognize that sometimes
at least the Americans may actually be better at exposing and acting on them
than the rest of us.
At the WTO level, the slow response to the obvious need to modify intellectual
property regimes, particularly but not only in relation to medicine, raises
genuine questions about who is served by the system. Generosity -
or at least enlightened self-interest -
has been too slow to find a place in the traditionally cut-throat bazaar of
trade negotiations and to recognize that, even with the best will in the world,
some countries simply cannot take on all the desirable trade disciplines; they
need more time and more real help to keep moving in the right directions.
Because our meeting has some focus on Canadian foreign policy, let me just
say that our record is still not what it should be, even though we clearly do
have an overwhelming stake in a rules-based system. While our limited direct
trade with developing countries has minimized frictions, we have still seen
little courage in Canada blazing the trail for reforms in the interest of developing
countries. But there is a limit to how much we can credibly preach to others
when, for instance, our policies affecting them (if not directly developing
countries) in a sector like dairy run counter to the spirit if not the letter
of the system.
On aid tying, as one very direct test of principle in practice, Canada has
never led, and even the development community in Canada has shown itself to
be inconsistent or worse.
All of the talk about trade and trade policies and regulations is about tools
and means of economic life - powerful
and wondrous when they work, but still just means and tools. These are difficult
enough to manage and mediate, and often seem to completely dominate our attention.
But we are now challenged, as never before at a global scale, to focus on the
ends of economic life, and on its deepest guiding principles.
Principles for international development
Let me end with some much wider assertions about some new ground rules for
global policy of the West in the coming years and decades -
even for those who may consider themselves the most hardened realists.
- Poverty and concern for justice matter; they need to be the dominant concern
of the world for several decades.
- Basic values matter and need to be articulated and acted upon.
- Principles, consistency and avoiding double standards matter.
- Political will and courage matter, and this applies to civil society as
well as politicians; some of the choices really are difficult.
- Inclusion and participation matter
- Perceptions matter
- Respect matters: it is wrong and wasteful to ever patronize the poor; their
power to help themselves is awesome given half a chance.
With that kind of agenda, we cannot be satisfied with looking for black hats
or white knights; there is a lot of real work to be done.
Panel 3: REDEFINING NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY Canadian foreign policy at another crossroads
B or on
a steadily narrowing bicycle path?
Chair: Michael Shenstone
CANADA'S LOSS OF PRESENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES
Andrew Cohen
(Rapporteur's account)
As his overall theme, Mr. Cohen argued that the United States is an empire,
never more so than in the 1990s, during the presidency of Bill Clinton, an era
now seen in a nostalgic glow as one of peace and security. Strangely, though,
it seemed an unusual idea to Americans.
The United States dominates the world today as no other entity has since Ancient
Rome. Industry, finance, technology and information give it economic power.
Democracy, diversity and mobility give it moral power. And arms and diplomacy
give it military power. Together they make the U.S. the world's
indispensable nation, as its diplomats say, a superiority built on prosperity
at home and influence abroad. To be a citizen of the U.S. means to belong to
a unique, national enterprise. Let us count the elements of this empire, which
are military, economic, diplomatic, scientific/technological, and cultural.
The economy
The U.S. produces and consumes, creating work and wealth. In recent years Japan
has sunk into recession and Russia has collapsed but the American engine keeps
humming. It is a market unto itself. Only about 15 per cent of its wealth is
based on trade, unlike Canada, where trade generates some 45 per cent of our
wealth.
The U.S. accounts for 60 per cent of the world's
biggest companies. Its 280 million people account for four per cent of world
population and 29 per cent of output. Japan and China produce less than half
that with a population four times as large. Much of America's
wealth is generated , of course, by a country blessed with extraordinary raw
materials. For years, the U.S. has been good at making things: automobiles,
ovens and refrigerators, air conditioners, consumer goods.
It has also been good at selling and marketing things. It is no surprise that
the leading corporations are American such as General Motors, Ford, Chrysler
and Wal-mart.
The most telling statement of the influence of the U.S. on the global economy
is that in a century which trumpeted the command economy embraced by communist
states, most nations have come to share its faith in the free market, free trade,
property rights, deregulation and privatization.
Military
The United States' armed forces are
the strongest in the world. Only the U.S. can project power to the corners of
the earth. When the West goes to war, whether in the Persian Gulf or the Balkans,
or now Afghanistan or Iraq, it goes only if the United States goes, as general,
foot soldier and quartermaster. And now the U.S. goes alone.
Diplomatic
The influence of the U.S. is decisive. It brokers peace in Northern Ireland,
Bosnia, Haiti and the Middle East (or it did, at Camp David and Oslo). It funds
the world's international institutions
such as the UN, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It won't
always gets its way at the UN but it will probably get the resolution it wants
on Iraq.
Culture
The fashions, books, food, films and music of the U.S. are everywhere. In Canada,
we know this better than anyone. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that
the GAP and Ralph Lauren dress the planet. McDonald, Coca-Cola and Starbucks
nourish it. CNN and the International Herald Tribune and Vanity Fair inform
it. Dreamworks and Disney entertain it.
Science
The United States develops the Internet, explores outer space and the oceans,
and maps the human genetic code. A half century ago, serious scientists went
to Europe, Germany; now they go to the United States. This is the Golden Age
of American science. Eighty-five scientists based in the U.S. have won Nobel
Prizes since 1981. Canada has only three.
These are the elements of the empire.
The trauma after September 11 of an attack on the invulnerable country, on
its symbols of military and financial power, was the end of ignorance. There
is now, in a way there was not before, a recognition of the costs, the consequences,
the risks of Empire, the recognition of reality. That when you are who you are
with the interest you have and the view you hold, there will be those who don't
like you. It is simply a sudden awareness that you are the front runner and
there are people who resent you, and you have real interests, like any empire,
and you will have to protect them.
All this is now crystalizing in the Bush Doctrine, and the debate over Iraq.
What does it all mean for Canada? Do we matter in Washington today?
Off the radar screen
My sense is that we don't matter.
When George Bush failed to mention Canada in his seminal address before Congress
10 days after September 11, it was not a rebuke, as the critics said, but a
reflection - a reflection of Canada's
loss of stature in Washington, the hub of the universe, where we were there
but not there.
As Joe Clark, the leader of the Conservative Party, put it: I wouldn't
consider this a snub. I consider it, in fact, an indication that Canada is off
the radar screen ... The speech is also important only in so much as it is a
tidy, telling metaphor of a shifting relationship. If the association between
Canada and U.S. remains special, which is what it was once called, it may now
be becoming less special. Canada has always struggled for attention in Washington,
but it will now have to work harder to remain Aon
the radar screen".
The danger is that as Canada fades as a power in the world -
in the reach of its military, the impact of its foreign aid, the influence of
its diplomacy, the absence of a foreign intelligence- gathering service -
it risks becoming a fading presence in Washington, too.
It is not unusual for Canadians to worry about their standing with Americans;
it is a function of who we are, who they are, and the disparity between us.
As the U.S. grows stronger in the world, Canada becomes relatively weaker in
terms of its military, its foreign aid, its diplomatic service. As for its foreign-intelligence
gathering, it has none at all. But the threat to Canada's
presence in Washington probably has more to do with a clutch of other factors.
Here are some of them.
Canada's declining stature in Washington
Economic
Canada and the U.S. have the largest commercial relationship in the world.
The danger for Canada is that 85 per cent of its exports go to the U.S., an
increase from two-thirds a quarter century ago. At the same time, only about
25 per cent of U.S. exports go to Canada. It means that Canada has to care more
about its interest in Washington than Washington has to care about its interests
in Canada, which is not to say that its trade and investment in Canada are insignificant.
Moreover, there are signs that commerce between Canada and the U.S. may be
overtaken by U.S. commerce with Mexico. In other words, Canada is in danger
of losing its status as the largest trading partner of the world's
most formidable economy.
Political
In political terms, Canada has geography and history against it in Bush's
Washington. The president came to office knowing less about Canada than Mexico,
which is now led by a friend. The other threat to Canada's
stature in Washington is Congress. While the Democrats control the Senate, the
Republicans control the House of Representatives. Many of its leaders are from
the Southwest, where economic and political power has grown markedly.
Demographic
Another danger for Canada is the rise of Mexican-Americans. Latinos from Central
and South America are displacing black Americans as the country's
largest visible minority and as a new electoral force. Of those, an estimated
four to five million come from Mexico.
Military
The U.S. does not rely on Canada as a military power, which is just as well,
because Canada can offer little help anyway. All observers reach the same sad
conclusion: Canada's forces are ill-equipped,
under-manned and under-funded.
Diplomatic
Whereas Canada supported the Landmines Treaty, the International Tribunal on
War Criminals and the Kyoto Treaty, the U.S. has opposed all of them.
To regain trust and respect
All of these factors - the personal
orientation of President Bush, the shift in political power, the rise of Mexico,
the erosion of Canada's military,
the thrust of our diplomacy - have
contributed to the loss of presence in the U.S., a loss which manifests itself
in other ways.
In the world after September 11, we had to ask ourselves once again: is there
a way to be true to our friends and true to ourselves? To be an independent
nation and a reliable ally? The challenge for Canada is to be an effective power
that would win both trust and respect. The way to do that is to reclaim old
assets: a strong, credible military; an efficient, exemplary aid program; an
effective diplomatic service, and a first-class intelligence service.
FROM DETERRENCE TO PRE-EMPTION
Fen Hampson
(Edited Text)
Last week, President Bush issued a 31-page document to Congress that discussed
new security challenges confronting the U.S. The document argued that the traditional
concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed
tactics are wanton destruction and targeting of innocents. Instead, the document
argued the U.S. will have to take anticipatory action and attack as soon as
it sees danger.
The U.S. case for pre-emptive war is premised on several propositions:
- The threat from Iraq is high because, as numerous senior U.S. officials
have argued, Saddam Hussein has developed biological weapons, lied repeatedly
about stockpiles and used chemical weapons against his own people.
- There are several precendents for pre-emptive war. The Israeli assault on
the armed forces of Egypt and Syria in 1967 was launched to pre-empt imminent
attacks by Damascus and Cairo.
- Containment and deterrence are not effective strategies against so-called
rogue regimes. Pre-emption therefore is necessary.
- The U.S. has also signalled that it wants the UN to enforce its previous
resolutions on Iraq and to start inspections right away. But it also says
that it does not believe that inspections will work because Saddam Hussein
has already demonstrated that he cannot be trusted and, in the end, he will
not co-operate with the inspectors.
American interest in pre-emption precedes the doctrinal statements of the Bush
administration. In the first Clinton administration, the then Secretary of Defense
Les Aspin announced that the U.S. would seek the capability to undertake offensive
counter-strikes against proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. During
the Cold War, the U.S. flirted with pre-emption on more than one occasion.
Current U.S. policy echoes the New Look policies of the first Eisenhower administration.
The architect of this policy was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who
believed that international politics was indeed a struggle between good and
evil. The short-lived policy of massive retaliation, which Dulles enunciated
at the New York Council on Foreign Relations in1954, was that the way to deter
aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously
at places and with means of it own choosing.
There are a number of important legal and normative questions raised by this
new American doctrine, especially regarding the legitimacy of any attack on
Iraq. First, Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the
UN pending Security Council resolution. But Article 51 envisages self-defence
only in cases of actual attacks. Secondly, some argue that the restrictions
of Article 51 are superseded by UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 of September
12, 2001, and 1373 of September 28, 2001.
But the operative provisions of these two resolutions do not contain authorization
language for resorting to force. They are simply warning that the Council itself
may take further steps to authorize force in the event that such steps are necessary.
Others argue that events, notably the Clinton administration's
application of Article 51 to justify action against Iraq in 1993, Sudan, and
Afghanistan in 1998, and Kosovo in 1999, has led to an evolution in the customary
law of self defence which may be invoked when ethnic cleansing is occurring,
a head of state is threatened, or when terrorists kill innocent people.
Finally, others argue that the criteria for anticipatory self-defence against
an imminent threat, even in the absence of an actual armed attack, can be found
in sources of customary law. One precedent cited is the Caroline case, involving
an incident between the U.S. and Britain in 1837. The then U.S. Secretary of
State Daniel Webster argued that the legitimate claim of self-defence should
be grounded in a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means and no moment for deliberation and that the response should
involve nothing unreasonable or excessive.
Coercive power a blunt instrument
Placing legal and normative arguments temporarily aside, there is also the
broader question that has to be posed and that is whether military force is
the best instrument to wage the current war against terrorism and against regimes
that possess WMD (weapons of mass destruction). Coercive power is a blunt instrument
at the best of times. Yes, it can defeat military forces, topple nasty regimes,
seize and hold territory, and deter or intimidate. But the military action only
creates brief windows of opportunity and is clearly the wrong instrument to
promote long-term stability.
Even if Saddam Hussein is deposed, there are many other countries that have
the will and capacity to provide terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.
As Sandy Berger recently argued, the U.S. has to look carefully at the consequences
of its actions.
There is no silver bullet to eliminate the spread of nuclear weapons and other
WMD. The building blocks of a long-term strategy are to promote a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty and Biological Weapons enforcement. Back in 1970, it was generally
assumed that there would be 20-30 nuclear weapons states within 20 years. Today,
there are only eight and many governments have given up nuclear weapon programs:
Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Argentina, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Taiwan.
The real problem is to secure dangerous nuclear materials at their source.
The G8 at the Kananaskis summit pledged some $20 billion over the next 10 years
to secure these weapons and material, particularly in Russia. This must be a
priority.
BUILDING AND LOSING SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS
Peggy Mason
(edited text)
The UN Security Council’s actions in dealing with Iraq show how a multilateral
consensus can be built, maintained for a time, and then lost. It is a study
initially of strong USA leadership and then of its gradual frittering away.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 1, 1990 was a fundamental challenge
to the international community in general and the UN in particular because it
came at a time when the Security Council was no longer paralyzed by the Cold
War veto power of East and West. The fact that now the Council, in theory at
least, could respond to an act of naked aggression – an unequivocal breach of
the most fundamental principle underpinning the creation of the UN and of the
successive development of international law since end of WWII – the Art 2(4)
prohibition on the use of force (except in self-defence against an armed attack)
– meant that its failure would be immense if it did not do so. The UNSC has
been given an extraordinary role under the Charter. It has the power, on behalf
of all UN member states, to authorize the use of force where it has determined
that a threat or breach of international peace and security cannot be addressed
effectively in any other way. Now the Council had to live up to that extraordinary
responsibility.
It was not a foregone conclusion that the Council would authorize the use of
force to oust Saddam from Kuwait. Indeed, many member states and interested
observers were horrified at the thought that the ‘UN might wage war’. And the
USA - while strongly in favour of military action from the outset - did not
automatically look to the Security Council for authorization of its actions.
After much internal debate – and in this regard Canada along with many others
played a modest role in convincing them to this end – the USA did decide to
work within the parameters of international law and to set about building strong
multilateral support for effective action by the UN Security Council to get
Iraq out of Kuwait.
At this point it is important to note that the Security Council does not work
in isolation. Even the five, veto-wielding permanent members - China, France,
Great Britain, Russia and the USA - pay at least some attention to what the
international community at large wants. Even China – which refers to itself
as the Group of One – is unwilling to be isolated on an issue where many developing
countries have taken a strong stand.
So the USA worked inside and outside the UN to build support. An important
factor in building support at the UN was the role by played by Ambassador Thomas
Pickering, one of America’s most seasoned and experienced diplomats. And resorting
to force was not the first step authorized by the Security Council but
the last, when it had become clear that even a crippling economic embargo
would not change Saddam’s mind. Resolution 678 authorized a coalition of states
cooperating with the government of Kuwait to use "all necessary means"
to remove Iraq from Kuwait. China abstained and Cuba and Yemen voted "no".
The other 4 permanent members and 8 non-permanent members, including Canada,
voted in favour. Regime change was not part of the mandate laid out by Resolution
678. The American-led coalition forces stopped short of Baghdad, not least because
of President George Bush Senior’s fears about what an expansion of the mandate
would do to Arab support within the coalition. There was also the question of
whether Iraq could survive as a state, given the substantial Kurdish minorities
in the North and South and the cleavages between the Sunni ruling minority under
Hussein and the excluded Shiite majority in the South with its close ties to
Iran.
The terms of the Security Council ceasefire resolution 687, to which Iraq agreed
in April 1991, included the establishment of the most comprehensive and intrusive
multilateral disarmament inspection, destruction and ongoing monitoring regime
ever devised. The first head of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), the body
of international inspectors whose disarmament mandate related to Iraq’s chemical
and biological weapons and long range missiles, was the extremely adept Swedish
diplomat, Ambassador Ekeus. (His fellow countryman, Dr. Hans Blix, was already
the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the pre-existing international
institution mandated by SCR 687 to set up a special "Action Team"
to carry out the nuclear disarmament of Iraq.) Not only were extraordinary diplomats
heading the disarmament effort but, of equal importance, they were working with
the full support of the UN Security Council and the international community
at large. Testament to this unity was the first – and only – Summit-level meeting
of the UN Security Council held on 31 January, 1992. It took place against a
backdrop of public revulsion at the emerging revelations of the extent of conventional
weaponry pumped into Iraq by the USA, the then Soviet Union, the UK and France,
not to mention the sheer breadth of the weapons of mass destruction programmes
Iraq had had underway (with mounting evidence that American, German and British
companies were complicit). So great was the desire of the Council to be seen
to stand foursquare against WMD proliferation, that a statement was issued by
the President of the Council at the end of their meeting declaring that such
proliferation was a threat to international peace and security. Even India,
then a non-permanent member of the Council and a relentless critic of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (to which, unlike Iraq, it was not a party)
as a discriminatory document legitimizing nuclear weapons for a privileged few
and banning them for the rest, signed on to the unanimous statement (albeit
with a qualifying footnote), wisely judging that now was not the time to risk
being seen as soft on nuclear proliferation.
Destroyed More Weaponry than Desert Storm
So the stage was set for UNSCOM and the IAEA to do their work and do it they
did with persistence, dedication and innovation, using multinational teams of
inspectors, developing their own imagery analysis capability and employing a
wide variety of new techniques and technologies. Whatever the ensuing (and still
ongoing) arguments over what percentage of weaponry remained at the time of
the UN withdrawal of inspectors in December 1998, it is indisputable that UNSCOM
and the IAEA destroyed far more weaponry than Operation Desert Storm. Indeed,
the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme – which had not yet reached the point of
successfully producing a bomb – was completely dismantled and a system of ongoing
monitoring and verification put in place using sensors, cameras and other devices
for remote monitoring to ensure timely warning should Iraq attempt to restart
the programme. By as early as March of 1996 the Security Council had also approved
an import monitoring system to track all sensitive dual use equipment that might
be used by Iraq in relation to any of the prohibited weapons categories. This
ongoing monitoring and verification system was to replace the blanket economic
embargo, once the UN inspectors certified that Iraq had complied with its disarmament
obligations.
Perhaps one of the great ironies of the UN inspection saga is that the work
of UNSCOM and the IAEA Action Team was more or less invisible until things started
to go wrong. Only when inspectors started being actively harassed and blocked
by Iraq, did the media really start to pay attention. What brought about this
sorry state of affairs? It is not that Saddam Hussein willingly cooperated with
the inspectors at the outset and then suddenly changed his mind. On the contrary.
From the beginning of the disarmament process, Saddam engaged in a variety of
delay, deception and disinformation techniques to mislead the inspectors. But
for the most part they did not work. Ambassador Ekeus took great care to avoid
any action that might undermine the unity of the Security Council and, so long
as it held, the opportunity for Saddam to ‘divide and conquer’ - to play the
interests of one Security Council member off against another - was limited.
The Consensus Unravels
The situation was entirely different, however, by the time the former Australian
Disarmament Ambassador, Richard Butler, took over in 1997. Security Council
unity was in tatters as concerns grew over the terrible hardship that the economic
sanctions were wreaking on the ordinary Iraqi citizen – even as they strengthened
the grip of Saddam’s ruthless dictatorship - and as the belief took hold that
the United States would never be satisfied no matter how much disarmament took
place so long as Saddam Hussein was still in power. Add to this the poisoned
atmosphere at the UN as the USA racked up millions of dollars in arrears of
dues for both the regular UN budget and for peacekeeping operations, and the
bitterness of African member states in particular over the USA refusal to authorize
robust peace operations in response to African crises, while at the same time
sparing no cost when it came to conflict in Europe. The final ingredient in
this volatile mix was a new head of UNSCOM whose bellicose style and apparent
deference to USA wishes, rather than those of the Council as a whole set the
scene for increasing confrontations between the inspectors and Iraq, culminating
in the UN decision to withdraw the inspectors in December of 1998 in light of
the declared intention of the USA and UK to begin a unilateral, unsanctioned
and therefore entirely illegal bombing campaign, allegedly to force Saddam to
begin to cooperate with the inspectors once again.
In my view, the lessons from this brief history are extremely clear. When the
USA takes the multilateral process seriously and works to build a genuine consensus,
the result is far more efficacious than unilateral action, no matter how powerful
the unilateral actor is. But an international consensus, once built, has to
be maintained. Instead, the United States embarked on a course of action that
progressively undermined and eventually destroyed that consensus. To put this
another way, by abandoning the high road so blatantly in favour of narrow perceived
self-interest, the USA freed up other would-be mischief makers to do the same.
Predictably, the USA then loudly decried the loss of resolve of the Security
Council and the international community at large, demonstrating an all too familiar
and convenient blindness to the role its actions had played in bringing about
the very state of affairs it now condemned.
Discussion Group 1:
CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY
Moderator - Graeme Kirby
Resource Persons: Stan Carlson, Douglas Fraser
(Rapporteur's account)
Mr. Carlson said the United States is the only country that can create foreign
policy and make others follow. Canada is in a position where it should have
an informed reaction to world events and can sometimes exert influence.
The world is a better place than 20 years ago. We are better off in terms of
literacy rates, health, and economic indicators. Most of the world is politically
more stable, and there is less inter-state conflict.
Instability and conflict exist in pockets, such as failed states like Iraq
and Afghanistan, the Congo and other parts of Africa. A second cause of instability
is transnational groups employing violence, including drug dealers and political
extremists.
Terrorism arises in areas with extremes of wealth and poverty, often accompanied
by corruption, social splits on racial and ethnic lines, and political marginalization.
People feel they have little or no influence on government.
Few threats exist to Canada at home or from other states. The main threat to
Canadian security would arise in the wider context of global insecurity and
instability. Canada needs multilateral agreements to address these issues.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is on its way out, but the United Nations
still has potential, with its many branches and many available tools.
Future Canadian defence policies should be based on the ability to build new
alliances and ad-hoc arrangements. Canada needs to improve information collection
and intelligence capabilities and make better threat assessments. Threats should
be reduced through greater economic development, support for human rights and
religious tolerance and democratic institution building, and continued arms
control. We should make a credible contribution to peace-keeping or peace-enforcement
through a flexible, highly mobile, rapidly-deployable force. Defence policy
should be considered as part of an overall foreign policy review, and this must
include particular attention to Canada-U.S.A. relations.
Mr. Fraser observed in discussing Canada-U.S.A relations that the military
has closer ties to the United States than does the foreign affairs department
or, indeed, the general public. Core defence issues in this context are: command
and control, and inter-operability.
Unified command systems exist all over the world, except in North America.
The ANorthern Command"
is the first example of an American command system that has involved consultation
with affected nation-states, through the establishment of a planning group to
coordinate issues of planning and security. Priorities include maritime defence,
civil emergency issues such as planning protection against biological attack,
and the possible transit of land troops during crises.
Canada has little manoeuvring room and has to decide where it can have most
influence. Sovereignty has a financial price, but it is also expensive to involve
ourselves with the United States. Do we want to be inside or outside the tent?
Conclusions
The discussion group decided Canada urgently needs a comprehensive, integrated
review of foreign affairs, defence, and security policy. Members of the group
decided that increased investment is needed in foreign policy and defence. Members
also believed that Canada can play a significant role in peace-keeping, peace-making,
and conflict resolution.
Discussion Group 2:
CANADIAN WATER POLICY
Moderator: Penny Sanger
Resource persons: Margaret Catley-Carlson, Mark Winfield
(Rapporteur's summary)
Margaret Catley-Carlson noted that Canadian water concerns are more focused
on the quality than the quantity of water. In general, water services are underpriced.
Many municipal water infrastructures are degrading. Water polluters are a problem;
it is difficult to make them pay for their pollution. Worldwide, the greatest
polluters are farmers because of the use of pesticides and other chemicals.
Canadian-American cooperation under the Boundary Waters Treaty and the International
Joint Commission is extraordinary and a model to the world. There is good -
but degrading - scientific analysis
and monitoring compared with the world.
Mark Winfield reviewed water-policy gaps or loopholes in Canada and stressed
that watershed management is poor in terms of groundwater and use control. Agriculture
production must be included in watershed management because of farm contamination
of surface and underground water. Ms. Catley-Carlson added that the new U.S.
Farm Bill includes a section on how farmers can be better water managers.
Mr. Winfield said a more efficient institutional framework and regulatory
regimes are required for farmers. He suggested a farm income regime in which
farmers don't get their income supports
unless they comply with certain regulations. In this sense, community-based
interventions were critical. One participant said southwestern Ontario faces
serious problems because of the excess nutrient loads in farmland water and
the fact that most of the contaminated water is a primary source of domestic
use. Fish and other habitats are also endangered.
Discussion group members agreed it is hard for all parties involved in the
agricultural problem to interact and get a hearing because of diverse and strong
interests. They felt, however, that farms operate essentially as an exemption
from the environmental regime and this must change.
There was also consensus that it is not profitable or desirable for companies
to take care of the water resources. Britain's privatization of its system has
brought complaints of too steep price increases. Canada should stress the role
of the government since water is seen in this country as a common public good.
The group agreed there is also a distribution problem. Canada has large masses
of land with rain and others without it. In some places, there is a misuse of
the resource. In Alberta, for example, fresh water is used down to push oil
up. This is a crime considering the farming sector's
importance in this province.
Mr. Winfield noted again the link and the importance of environmental law and
governance and the need to emphasize water management on the local or relatively
small scale. Canadian water policy directed at foreign dealings involved funding
for small projects, not big ones.
In connection with the possibility of bulk water exports under the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the group felt that investors should back off
to let governments make the appropriate policy decisions. The Newfoundland bid
to export bulk water was cited.
Conclusions
Foreign There should be global emphasis on exploring and applying
small-scale technical alternatives in water use and preservation. This would
include run-of-the-river (no dam) turbines, water harvesting, and storage tanks.
Domestic A major challenge is the lack of government regulation
to encourage compliance by agriculture with watershed protection, especially
domestic water sources threatened by pollution from chemical fertilizers.
Other The interpretation of chapter 11 of the NAFTA agreement
should be narrowed to ensure government has the power in dealing with the question
of bulk water exports to conserve water resources and protect health and the
environment. The current treaty language could lead to international legal challenges
on control of water exports, resulting in applications for compensation where
export schemes are denied.
Discussion group 3:
CANADIAN ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION
Moderator: Tim Creery
Resource person: Hon. John M. Reid PC
(Edited text and discussion. Mr. Reid's
full text is given in appendix 1)
In the weeks following the events of September 11, 2001, the government rushed
to put in place legislative tools for use in the so-called Awar
on terrorism". One of those initiatives
was the antiterrorism bill (Bill C-36), introduced into the House of Commons
on October 14, 2001. Contained in that Bill was a sweeping derogation from the
right of access contained in the Access to Information Act.
Section 87 of Bill C-36 authorized the Attorney General of Canada to issue
a Acertificate that prohibits the
disclosure of information for the purpose of protecting international relations
or national defense or security".
A similar provision already existed in the Access to Information Act. However,
Bill C-36 also removed the authority of the Information Commissioner and the
Federal Court of Canada to review the information covered by a certificate for
the purpose of providing an independent assessment of whether or not secrecy
was justifiable. Such a change constituted an unprecedented shift of power,
from individual Canadians to the state.
Discussing the issue before a Parliamentary committee, the Information Commissioner
cited a recent, government-commissioned study, which concluded that the Access
to Information Act posed no risk of possible disclosure of sensitive intelligence
information, that no such information had ever been disclosed under the Act
in the 18 years of its life and that the Access to Information Act regime offered
as much or more secrecy to intelligence information as do the laws of our allies.
( Despite such advice, the bill, including the measures restricting access to
information, has now been passed into law.)
In times of emergency or threat, it is sometimes necessary for states to take
rights away from citizens and give new powers to governments. The challenge
for any healthy democracy is to resist the temptation of states to overreach.
Salman Rushdie, in his recently published book, Step Across This Line: Collected
Nonfiction 1992-2000, says A[i]n
the battle between freedom and security, freedom always has to be the one that
wins". In my judgement, our government
failed the challenge when it gave itself the power, through the secrecy certificate,
to escape independent scrutiny of its decisions to keep secrets from its citizens.
Following his statement, Mr. Reid summarized his thoughts by saying that under
the incentive that "something had to be done", the government acted
without really dealing with the root causes of the insecurity expressed after
September 11th. He mainly deplored the resulting decrease in the
authority of the Courts.
The group broadened the topic by discussing the Anti-Terrorism Legislation
in regard to its various implications for citizens, as well as the process of
its adoption. Mr. Reid described the limitations faced by the Parliamentary
committees in charge of investigating Bill C-36, which had to manage an Aoverwhelming"
load of information in a short time.
The Group concluded that under pressure of time and a panic reaction to the
terrorist threat, Parliament adopted a bill providing for unreasonable restrictions
on citizens and impairing the capacity of the courts to protect a number of
citizens' rights.
The Group recommends that the anti-terrorism legislation should now be subject
to thorough study by the House of Commons Justice Committee with a view to repealing
or amending those provisions that cannot be shown to be needed for the protection
of citizens and their rights and liberties from terrorist attack. This would
offer citizens and interested parties a full opportunity to express their views.
If such a course is not adopted, the Group recommends that the Government refer
the legislation to the Supreme Court of Canada to determined whether all its
provisions are consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Discussion Group 4:
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Moderator, Peggy Mason
Resource persons: Mike Perry, Fergus Watt
(Rapporteur's summary)
The goals of this discussion are, first, to discuss the nature and development
of the International Criminal Court -
the ICC - and, second, to explore
ways that members of the Group of 78 can promote the ICC.
The ICC was generated in the form of a draft convention called The Rome
Statute (Athe statute"),
which was drafted in 1988 and entered into force July1. As 81 out of 139 countries
ratified the statute, the ICC enjoys a significant amount of support worldwide.
The court is dissimilar to both the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (the ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(the ICTR) in that both of those tribunals were created by the United Nations
to address specific instances within specific time limits. Like the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), the ICC is a permanent court but, unlike the ICJ, it
is not a part of the United Nations system. In addition, while the ICJ has jurisdiction
over disputes regarding states, the ICC, like the ICTY and the ICTR, may prosecute
individuals, as opposed to states, for committing a limited number of crimes.
The most important feature of the ICC is that it operates under the principle
of complementarity. Only when states are unable or unwilling to participate
in a case would a case proceed to the ICC. Since the ICC is secondary to national
proceedings, states that support the convention harmonize their criminal laws
and standards with the laws of the court. In addition, as much of the court's
work is in scrutinizing national laws, the court is therefore a powerful tool
of reform.
Other key elements of the ICC include: (I) the limited scope of the crimes
that are prosecuted (crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and crimes
of aggression, which are yet to be defined), (ii) a treaty-based recognition
of gender elements of war crimes, (iii) there are three ways that a case may
proceed to the ICC (prosecutors can have a case referred to them by a state
party, the UN Security Council can refer a case, and prosecutors can refer a
case on their own initiative), (iv) the ICC has no jurisdiction over individuals
who are under 18 years old, (v) there are no immunities offered, (vi) there
is a presumption of innocence, (vii) sensitivities for victims are reflected
in a variety of procedures, (viii) there is no death penalty, (ix) there is
no statute of limitations for ICC crimes, and (x) the ICC law is made up of
a hybrid of common and civil law systems.
Canadians can be very proud of the role Canada continues to play in supporting
the ICC. Although some data indicates that public opinion in the U.S supports
the ICC, the U.S. administration actively opposes the court. Such opposition,
which is being launched when the court is at its most vulnerable stage, necessitates
the generation of increased public support for the ICC.
What can the Group of 78 do now to help generate more public support for the
ICC?
I. Public Advocacy: Create a network of NGOs and groups of lawyers who are
interested in criminal law and human rights issues. Members of this network
could:
- Create an International Criminal Bar Association.
- Promote the further development of Canadian Criminal legislation.
- Propose definitions of the crime of aggression that would further strengthen
current laws, including the UN Charter .
- Help expand efforts to create a trust fund for victims, and to pressure
the Canadian government to make a substantial initial contribution.
- Generate further discussion promoting the ICC and publicize those discussions.
Media groups should be targeted, lunches can be organized, members of local
bars should be included, a speaker's
bureau can be formed and faculties of law could also be included in the process.
II. Individual Initiative: Support the ICC by accessing the Amnesty International
web site and signing the petition at the following web site: www.amnesty.org
then click on the International Justice link.
Clearly, there is cause for optimism in the current movement to establish a
permanent international criminal law system. With active support by members
of governments and civil society, the ICC has the potential to make vast improvements
to criminal law protections worldwide.
Appendix 1:
ANTI-TERRORISM AND SECRECY
Hon. John M. Reid PC, Information Commissioner of Canada
Information Commissioner John Reid’s address to the Discussion Group on Anti-terrorism
Legislation might have been entitled "The Devil is in the Details".
To illustrate how the intricacies of legal wording can lead to harsher effects
than many critics, including the Canadian Bar Association, thought necessary,
and how the effects of this wording can be fudged by the responsible minister,
this appendix gives the full text of Mr. Reid’s remarks.
In the weeks following the horrific events of September 11, 2001, the government
rushed to put in place legislative tools for use in the so-called "war
on terrorism." One of those initiatives was the antiterrorism bill (Bill
C-36), introduced into the House of Commons on October 14, 2001. Contained in
that Bill was a sweeping derogation from the right of access contained in the
Access to Information Act.
As first introduced, section 87 of Bill C-36 would have authorized the Attorney
General of Canada "at any time" to "issue a certificate that
prohibits the disclosure of information for the purpose of protecting international
relations or national defence or security." That same provision also stated
that the Access to Information Act would not apply to any such information.
The first version of section 87 of Bill C-36 contained no time limits on the
period of secrecy. As well, it removed the authority of the Information Commissioner
and the Federal Court of Canada to review the information covered by a certificate
for the purpose of providing an independent assessment of whether or not secrecy
was justifiable.
This unprecedented shift of power, from individual Canadians to the state,
came under intense scrutiny by the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights
of the House of Commons and by a special committee of the Senate, which was
struck to conduct a pre-study of the Bill. The then Minister of Justice was
asked to explain the reason for this new blanket of secrecy.
In all of her evidence before the committees of the Senate and the House of
Commons, the Minister offered only one explanation. The explanation is most
exhaustively set out in her response, to a question posed by Mr. Michel Bellehumeur
during the former Minister's appearance before the Justice and Human Rights
Committee on October 18, 2001. Mr. Bellehumeur asked the Minister why she proposed
to remove from the scope of the Access to Information Act (and from review
by the Information Commissioner and the courts) the very type of information
which the exemption contained in section 15 of the access law was designed to
protect from disclosure. The Minister answered as follows:
"No, what section 15 does in fact is leave open, creates a loophole
in terms of the possibility of disclosure of information that may have been
provided to us by our allies and in fact we know that in relation to these
sensitive matters where in fact one must work with ones allies -- one is
gathering intelligence, one shares intelligence -- much of this speaks to
the national security, not only of this country, but of other countries,
and to the very lives of perhaps informants and others. Unless we can guarantee
to our allies that that kind of limited, exceptionally sensitive information
will not be subject to public disclosure, we will not get that information
and we will not be able to fight terrorism as effectively as we should.
I'm afraid, Mr. Chair, that under existing access legislation, there is
a loophole created because it permits the Access Commissioner to make certain
recommendations. In fact, as far as we're concerned, that is not sufficient
for our allies and we must do that which is necessary to ensure we have
the best information and we are protecting that exceptionally sensitive
information."
The Information Commissioner and others challenged the Minister to explain
the "loophole" - it could not be the Commissioner, as he has no power
to order the disclosure of records. The Commissioner reminded the Minister of
a very recent, government-commissioned study, which concluded that the Access
to Information Act posed no risk of possible disclosure of sensitive
intelligence information, that no such information had ever been disclosed under
the Act in the 18 years of its life and that the Access to Information
Act régime offered as much or more secrecy to intelligence information
as do the laws of our allies.
The only "loophole," thus, could be the possibility that a misguided
judge of the Federal Court would order the disclosure of sensitive intelligence
information, notwithstanding a clear exemption if such information contained
in the Access law. Given the Federal Court history of applying sections 13 and
15 of the Access law and the presence of appeal mechanisms to the Federal Court
of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada, the "misguided judge" theory
had no rational basis. Moreover, there was an air of unreality to the former
Minister's suggestion that our allies had asked the government to give them
a "guarantee" by plugging the "misguided judge" loophole.
The Information Commissioner asked the former Minister to produce the evidence
of any such request; none was forthcoming.
The Minister could not produce the evidence because our major allies and suppliers
of intelligence also operate under freedom of information laws, which include
avenues of independent review. They understand that the purpose of these laws
is to remove the caprice from decisions about secrecy, by subjecting such decisions
to a legislative and judicial system of definition and review. The allies want
no more than the simple assurance from Canada that intelligence information
which needs to be protected can be protected. Not a single ally doubts Canada's
ability to do so under the existing Access to Information Act.
In the face of the criticism, the former Minister went back to the drawing
board and made a number of changes. It would be a mistake to assume, however,
that these changes amounted to concessions to her critics. In fact, the amendments
broadened the sweeping scope of secrecy certificates, and increased the power
of the Attorney General to interfere with the independent investigations of
the Information Commissioner. The government's addiction to secrecy was to be
fed at all costs!
First, the scope was broadened by changing the permitted purposes for a secrecy
certificate from:
Version #1: "for the purpose of protecting international relations,
national defence or security."
to:
Version #2: "for the purpose of protecting information obtained in
confidence from or in relation to a foreign entity as defined in subsection
2 (1) of the Security of Information Act or for the purpose of protecting
national defence or national security."
To fully appreciate the breadth of Version #2, one must carefully read subsection
2 (1) of the Security of Information Act, it defines "foreign entity"
as
"(a) a foreign power
(b) a group or association of foreign powers, or of one or more foreign
powers and one or more terrorist groups, or
(c) a person acting at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association
with a foreign power or a group of association referred to in paragraph
(b)."
The effect of this change from Version #1 to Version #2 is to give the Attorney
General the power to cloak in secrecy information on any subject provided in
confidence by any person, group or foreign power.
Second, the former Minister amended Bill C-36 to provide that, where a secrecy
certificate is issued after an investigation of a complaint has been commenced
by the Information Commissioner, "all proceedings under this Act
(the Access to Information Act) in respect of the complaint, including
an investigation, appeal or judicial review, are discontinued." As originally
introduced, Bill C-36 contained no such provision. In the original version,
the Information Commissioner could continue his investigation (and the courts
could continue their reviews) with the only restriction being that neither could
have access to the information covered by the certificate.
The troubling significance of this change requires some explanation of the
nature of most complaints to the Information Commissioner. Access requesters,
typically, do not request access to a specific record. Rather, they typically
request access to records on a particular subject such as, for example: the
steps being taken by Health Canada to respond to the threat of terrorism by
anthrax or changes being made by Transport Canada to policies on air passenger
screening or the policy of the Canadian Forces with regard to prisoners taken
in Afghanistan.
Hence, it is usual that a number and variety of records are identified as being
relevant to an access request; it is also usual for a variety of exemptions
under the Access to Information Act to be relied upon to justify any
refusals to give access. In all such cases, the requesters have a right to complain
to the Information Commissioner and to expect an independent, thorough investigation
of the denial of access.
Here is the rub. If, during the Commissioner's investigation, a secrecy certificate
is issued with respect to even one record of all those covered by the access
request, the Commissioner's investigation is discontinued in its entirety. And
if the matter has proceeded past the investigation stage and on to a Federal
Court review, the issuance of a secrecy certificate, for even one record, has
the effect of discontinuing the entirety of the Federal Court review.
Let this sink in for a moment. The federal government has given itself the
legal tools to stop in its tracks any independent review of denials of access
under the Access to Information Act. The cloak of secrecy is not even
limited to the information covered by the secrecy certificates.
Yes, the former minister protested that this outcome was not what she intended.
She said she intended that the Commissioner's investigations and court reviews
would be discontinued only insofar as they relate to the information covered
by the secrecy certificates. It was pointed out to her that, if a more limited
effect was intended, the form of the words used in the amendment to the companion
provision contained in the Privacy Act, should be followed. With respect
to proceedings under the Privacy Act, the amended Bill C-36 provides
that, when a secrecy certificate is issued after the commencement of an investigation
by the Privacy Commissioner:
"all proceeding under this Act in respect of that information,
including an investigation, audit, appeal or judicial review, are discontinued."
The former minister urged Parliamentarians and the Information Commissioner
to trust her word that the amendment to the Access to Information Act
(which reads: "in respect of the complaint") has the same effect as
the amendment to the Privacy Act (which reads: "in respect of that
information"). The former Minister said her word was enough, there was
no need to correct the obviously inconsistent language. Is this any way to make
law!
This was not the only "trust me" aspect of the former Minister's
explanations about her amendments. She told the committees that, in an effort
to ensure as little interference as possible with the work of the Information
Commissioner, she had changed the original version of the Bill, which allowed
the Attorney General to issue a secrecy certificate "at any time."
Here is the limit she imposed:
"The certificate may only be issued after an order or decision that
would result in the disclosure of the information to be subject to the certificate
has been made under this or any other Act of Parliament"
On November 20, 2001, the former Minister of Justice gave the Justice Committee
her opinion as to the effect of this provision on investigations by the Information
and Privacy Commissioners. She said:
"Also, under the amendments we are proposing to Bill C-36, the certificates
could no longer be issued at any time, which is the present language, but
only after an order or decision for disclosure in a proceeding. The result
is that the certificate could only be issued after the judicial review of
an access or privacy request."
The former Minister's view, then, was that a secrecy certificate could not
be issued during the Commissioner's investigation or during a Federal Court
review under the Access Act. A certificate, according to the former Minister,
could only be issued in the event the Federal Court were to order the disclosure
of the previously withheld information.
If the words of the amended Bill had clearly stated what the former Minister
said she intended them to say, the Information Commissioner would have much
less to complain of . . . alas, they do not. The Information Commissioner drew
the Minister's attention to the fact that the Commissioner holds the power of
a superior court of record to compel disclosure to him, for investigative purposes,
of any information he deems relevant to an investigation. The Commissioner pointed
out to the former Minister that, in the absence of clarifying words, such as
"disclosure to the public or a member of the public," it would be
open to the Attorney General to issue a secrecy certificate for the purpose
of resisting an order made by the Information Commissioner requiring that records
be disclosed to him.
The Commissioner also reminded the former Minister that she herself, in three
Federal Court cases, was arguing that certain national defence and security
information should not be disclosed to the Commissioner. She made the argument
in those cases that compliance with the Commissioner's order for production
of the records in those cases constitutes a "disclosure" for the purposes
of the secrecy certificates issued under the previous sections 37 and 38 of
the Canada Evidence Act.
In her appearance before the Senate Special Committee on December 4, 2001,
the former Minister attempted to answer this concern. She stated:
"Second, Mr. Reid has made reference to Crown arguments in litigation
to suggest that the Attorney General could use the certificate process to
terminate his investigations. As you can appreciate, I cannot comment on
matters before the courts. However, I can remind this committee of the original
purpose of the certificate scheme, namely, to protect a narrow class of
highly sensitive information following the issuance of an order or decision
that would result in its disclosure.
The critical words of the Bill refer to an order or decision that would
result in the disclosure of the information. This would be a critical test
that I, as Attorney General, would have to be satisfied with on a case-by-case
basis before issuing a certificate."
Could there be a less resounding refutation of the Information Commissioner's
concerns! While it is unclear exactly what this statement means, it is clear
that the former Minister did not deny that this amended version of Bill C-36
(now in law) gives the Attorney General the power to use a secrecy certificate
to resist giving records to the Information Commissioner.
This bring us to a consideration of the final "concession" which
the former Minister made to the critics of the original version of Bill C-36.
An amendment was introduced creating an opportunity for a party to a proceeding
(in relation to which a secrecy certificate is issued) to seek from a judge
of the Federal Court of Appeal, an order varying or cancelling a secrecy certificate.
If this form of independent review is the "quid" for the "quo"
of cutting off independent review under the Access to Information Act,
it is woefully inadequate. The reviewing judge is not permitted by this amendment
to conduct any of the usual types of judicial review of an administrative decision
(de novo, legality, correctness); rather the reviewing judge's sole authority
is to review the information covered by the certificate for the purpose of deciding
whether or not it "relates to":
information disclosed in confidence from, or in relation to, a foreign
entity;
national defence; or
security
One would be hard pressed to imagine any operational information held by any
of our investigative, defence, security, intelligence, immigration or foreign
affairs institutions, which would not "relate to" one or more of these
three broad categories. This "relates to" form of judicial review
does not authorize the reviewing judge to make any independent assessment of
the sensitivity of the information or of the Attorney General's purpose in issuing
the certificate. This form of judicial review is significantly less rigorous
than the independent review of secrecy certificates available in our major allied
countries. This form of review has been aptly termed "window dressing"
because it does not subject the Attorney General to any meaningful accountability
for the use of certificates.
In times of emergency or threat, it is sometimes necessary for states to take
rights away from citizens and give new powers to governments. But, too, history
is replete with examples of unnecessary power grabs by states in the guise of
protecting the welfare of the collectivity. The challenge for any healthy democracy
is to resist the temptation of states to overreach. Salman Rushdie, in his recently
published book, Step Across This Line: Collected Nonfiction 1992-2002,
says "[i]n the battle between freedom and security, freedom always has
to be the one that wins." Speaking about the changes in security laws since
September, 11th, 2001, he notes that …"it may be, then in a
way, you have destroyed the thing you were supposed to be protecting. This may
be the big question of the next 20 or 30 years: How do you make a free society
safe without making it unfree."
Our government failed the challenge when it gave itself the power, through
the secrecy certificate, to escape independent scrutiny of its decisions to
keep secrets from its citizens. "Trust me," the former minister said;
these provisions will be rarely, carefully and fairly used! The bill having
now been passed into law, we have no choice, but to trust, because we have lost
the ability to independently verify that our trust is well founded. In losing
this ability, we have severely weakened our access to information system and
added to what I call our democratic deficit in Canada.
.
Appendix 2:
THE GROUP OF 78
The Group of 78 is an informal association of Canadians seeking to promote
global priorities for peace and disarmament, equitable and sustainable development,
and a strong and revitalized United Nations system.
It began in 1980 when a small group including Andrew Brewin MP and Peggy
Brewin, Murray Thomson of Project Ploughshares, Robert McClure, former Moderator
of the United Church, and King Gordon, formerly of the United Nations Secretariat,
drafted a statement on how best Canada could contribute to the building
of a peaceful and secure world. In November 1981 that statement, Canadian
Foreign Policy in the 80s, was sent to Prime Minister Trudeau. It was signed
by 78 Canadians — a group of 78.
The statement set out three inter-related objectives:
- removal of the threat of nuclear war;
2. the mobilization of world resources to achieve a more equitable international
order and bring an end to the crushing poverty which is the common lot of
the majority in the Third World;
3. the strengthening and reform of the United Nations and other global
institutions designed to bring about a pacific settlement of disputes, foster
international cooperation, promote the growth of world law and the protection
of basic human rights.
That was the beginning of a dialogue between the Group of 78 and the Canadian
government. In the following years, members of the Group discussed, and
made their views known, about new issues facing Canada in international
relations and their implications for the central, and universal, objectives
of policy already mentioned.
The Group of 78
• meets in conferences to consider needed changes in foreign policy, seeking
consensus on recommendations to government;
• produces publications on conference findings and special issues;
• publishes a web site
• organizes lunches with invited speakers.
THE GROUP OF
78 - FOUNDING MEMBERS |
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Margaret Atwood |
Walter Gordon |
John Meisel |
Donald Bates |
Roger Guindon |
Brian Meredith |
Pierre Berton |
James Ham |
Joanna Miller |
Florence Bird |
Richard Harmston |
Michael Oliver |
Elisabeth Mann Borgese |
Jacques Hébert |
Archbishop A. L. Penney |
Andrew Brewin |
Gerhard Herzberg |
Lucie Pépin |
Tim Brodhead |
John Holmes |
Beryl Plumptre |
General E.L.M. Burns |
John Humphrey |
Nancy Pocock |
Rita Cadieux |
George Ignatieff |
John Polanyi |
Thérèse Casgrain |
Heather Johnston |
Escott Reid |
Maxwell Cohen |
Kalmen Kaplansky |
Clyde Sanger |
Irwin Cotler |
Hugh Keenleyside |
Archbishop E.W. Scott |
Marion Dewar |
Roby Kidd |
Frank Scott |
T.C. Douglas |
David Kirk |
Marian Scott |
William Epstein |
Anton Kuerti |
John Sigler |
Gordon Fairweather |
Renaude Lapointe |
Adelaide Sinclair |
Geraldine Farmer |
Margaret Laurence |
David Smith |
Eugene Forsey |
J. Francis Leddy |
Maurice Strong |
Ursula Franklin |
Clarke MacDonald |
Murray Thomson |
Northrop Frye |
David MacDonald |
Bruce Thordarson |
E. Margaret Fulton |
Donald MacDonald |
Norma E. Walmsley |
Sylva Gelber |
R. St. J. MacDonald |
Patrick Watson |
Alfred Gleave |
Gregory MacKinnon |
Hellie Wilson |
James George |
Yvon Madore |
Lois Wilson |
Paul Gérin-Lajoie |
Robert McClure |
Gregory Wirick |
Maynard Gertler |
Dennis McDermott |
Diana Wright |
J. King Gordon |
Peter Meincke |
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